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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Assembly Transportation Committee met in Oakland on Tuesday, November 20, 2001, to 
explore the state's preparedness to prevent and respond to terrorist threats against California's 
transportation facilities and services. The hearing was held in response to Assembly Speaker 
Robert Hertzberg's request that certain policy committees review the readiness of the sectors they 
oversee in light of the events of September 11. Over three dozen witnesses from state, federal, 
and local agencies, transit operators, railroad companies, airports, industry associations, and 
labor unions offered testimony regarding their respective programs and the security measures 
they have taken before and since September 11. They also laid out their needs for further action. 
The hearing assigned each of the witnesses to one or more of eight separate panels: Bridges, 
Tunnels, and other Highway Facilities; Airports; Rail and Transit; Seaports; Freight- Highways; 
Freight -Rail; DMV Documents; and Emergency Response. Witnesses were asked to address 
three basic questions: What have you done to enhance the security of your customers? What 
more needs to be done? What can the Legislature do to assist you? 
Testimony revealed certain common themes to be prevalent among transportation providers and 
public safety agencies: 
+ Preparedness and response programs must be based upon extensive communication and 
cooperation within and among affected agencies. 
+ Security efforts undertaken since September 11 are not sustainable at their current levels 
without significant increases in staffing and funding. 
+ The multibillion deficit in the state's General Fund makes it imperative that federal assistance 
be forthcoming to help finance anti-terror measures. 
+ California's transportation providers have been able to draw upon their prior experiences 
dealing with natural disasters and other extraordinary events as the basis for addressing new 
security concerns. 
+ It is important not to overreact to real or perceived terror threats. Security measures should 
be well thought out and balanced so as not to overly burden travel or commerce. 
+ Although most agencies have been able to perform risk assessments, others believe the state 
should help define and identify the threats against which they need to protect themselves. 
+ Much of the information offered at the hearing was positive: extensive preparations have 
been taken and security has been enhanced. This information needs to be disseminated to the 
public. 
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Recommendations emanating from the panels were fairly straightforward and mostly revolved 
around funding issues: pursuing federal financial assistance, providing resources for DMV to 
develop biometric identifiers for drivers' licenses, protecting local governments from further 
reductions in their state allocations, and augmenting the staffing of CHP and other agencies so 
that they can continue their newly-acquired efforts without cutting back on their routine 
activities. Other suggestions included expanding the authority of the Public Utilities 
Commission and providing greater safeguards in the issuance of drivers' licenses and hazardous 
materials endorsements. 
In reviewing the information presented at the hearing, the Chairman determined that the 
enormity of expenditures that state and local agencies will need to sustain in order to provide an 
adequate level of security to transportation users will necessarily require the assistance of the 
federal government. Inasmuch as national security is a federal responsibility, it is the duty of the 
federal government, in a situation that is akin to war, to assume this burden. Nevertheless, until 
such assistance is forthcoming, the state must take whatever steps are necessary, and expend 
whatever resources are needed, in order to assure that Californians are reasonably safe when 
using transportation facilities. Furthermore, the state must take the lead in assessing where the 
security risks lie and in identifying the appropriate measures to mitigate those risks. 
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Opening Statement 
CHAIRMAN'S OPENING STATEMENT 
ASSEMBLY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE HEARING 
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ISSUES 
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA NOVEMBER 20, 2001 
I'd like to welcome everyone to this special hearing ofthe Assembly Transportation Committee. 
We are here today at the request of Assembly Speaker Robert Hertzberg who has asked several 
of the Assembly's policy committees to explore the state's readiness to avert and respond to 
potential terrorist attacks on the state's infrastructure and resources. We will hear testimony from 
representatives of various state and local entities that provide transportation services to 
California's citizens as to what steps they have taken, and what assistance they may need from 
the Legislature, to protect their assets and their customers from terrorism. Additionally, public 
safety agencies and emergency response providers will tell us how they are preparing to deal 
with incidents that may occur within our transportation facilities. 
Even before September 11, we knew that transportation clients depend upon our vigilance for 
their physical security while they are patronizing our facilities. This responsibility is 
complicated by the nature of so many of our transportation facilities- airports, transit stations, 
bridges, and tunnels- that involve large numbers of people or vehicles congregated within small 
or enclosed spaces. The challenge we face is to mitigate, reduce, or eliminate the vulnerabilities 
that inevitably spring from this environment. 
At all times during today's proceedings, we will be cognizant and respectful of the fact that not 
everything that is being done to protect Californians from attack is suitable for public disclosure. 
With that proviso, I will remind each of our witnesses of the three basic questions we noted in 
our invitations: what steps have you taken to reduce the risk of terrorism in your segment of the 
transportation industry, what more needs to be done, and how can the Legislature assist you. In 
consideration of our crowded agenda, I will ask that most presentations be limited to 2 to 5 
minutes. 
-3-
The hearing will be divided into 4 major segments. Respectively, they will deal with 
transportation infrastructure; freight movement; misuse of DMV documents; and emergency 
response. Within each of the four segments, we will have panel discussions with representatives 
from the appropriate agencies. We will also provide time for comments from the public. 
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DUTRA TO HOLD HEARING ON 
TERRORISM AND TRANSPORTATION 
Legislative solutions will be proposed to increase security in the 
state following the September 11 attack 
OAKLAND_ Assemblymember John Dutra (D-Fremont), chair of the Assembly 
Transportation Committee, will conduct a hearing on terrorism and transportation 
security on Tuesday, November 20 in Oakland. 
Entitled "The Impact of Terrorism on State Transportation Services and 
Facilities," it will be held from 9 a.m. to 3:30p.m. in the Elihu Harris State Building 
auditorium, 1515 Clay Street, Oakland. It is open to the public and will include time for 
public comment. 
At the hearing, transportation officials from more than two dozen agencies will 
address the safety of the state's bridges, tunnels, highways, airports, seaports, rail and 
transit lines and propose legislative solutions where improvements are warranted. 
"The tragic events of September 11 underscore the urgency of making our 
transportation systems safe,'' said Assemblymember Dutra. "Obviously, we don't want 
to succumb to unnecessary alarm. But we have a responsibility to take a close look at 
how we can ensure public safety. It is my hope that this hearing will help set the course 
for work we will undertake in Sacramento on this issue." 
Representatives and topics to be covered include: the Department of Motor 
Vehicles on drivers' licenses and identity fraud issues; Officials from SEIU on the 
training of airport security personnel; California Highway Patrol Commissioner D.O. 
"Spike" Helmick on the safety of bridges, tunnels and airports; Brigadier General Ezell 
Ware of the California National Guard on bridge and airport security; Staff from the 
Oakland Airport and the Port of Oakland on airport and seaport safety; Rail and highway 
officials on freight movement. 
Also present will be officials from BART, the Office of Emergency Services, the 
Golden Gate Bridge, the L.A. County Metropolitan Transit Authority, AC Transit, Union 
Pacific, Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railroad Company, the Santa Clara Valley 
Transportation Authority, the California Trucking Association, Alameda County Fire and 
the cities of San Jose and Fremont, among others. 
### 
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Going for Broke on Extra Security 
Finances: State agencies warn legislators they'll need lots more 
money to keep their guards up. 
By TIM REITERMAN 
TIMES STAFF WRITER 
Los Angeles Times, November 21 2001 
OAKLAND-- California, already beset by a projected $12-billion budget deficit, 
cannot sustain massive security upgrades to help deter terrorism on the state's 
bridges, roadways and waterfronts without spending many more millions of 
dollars, lawmakers were warned on Tuesday. 
Agencies ranging from the Highway Patrol and National Guard to bridge districts 
and mass transit systems told a legislative hearing here that their resources are 
rapidly being sapped by security measures following the Sept. 11 attacks. Some 
said their staffs are putting in long days, retirees and reservists are being 
pressed into service, and money is being poured into fencing, security cameras 
and lighting. 
The Highway Patrol alone said its anti-terrorism effort already has cost more than 
$12 million and is projected to top $40 million this fiscal year. The total tab for 
heightened security on the transportation network so vital to the state's economy 
and lifestyle could be as much as $1 billion this year, according to Assemblyman 
John Dutra (D-Fremont), who headed a Transportation Committee hearing on the 
problem. 
"We have to find the money," Dutra said in an interview. "The need is there .... 
This security is going to be a wartime necessity, but it's not going to be easy" for 
the governor and lawmakers to make the big budget cuts necessary to pay for it. 
Many of the emergency security measures taken recently to protect the Golden 
Gate Bridge, one of the country's potential targets for terrorism, are not 
sustainable for the long run, said Kary Witt, deputy general manager of the 
Golden Gate Bridge District. Noting that staffers are putting in 12-hour shifts and 
vacations have been canceled, he said, "You can only work people so long." 
The bridge district, which also runs a ferry system, needs $13.5 million in capital 
improvements such as construction, security cameras and lighting, Witt said. But 
it needs almost that much annually to expand and maintain its security force. 
"You need people to watch the cameras and respond to what the cameras see," 
he said. 
Most of the extra cost to the Highway Patrol, said CHP Commissioner Spike 
Helmick, is for overtime for patrol officers working 12-hour shifts and fuel for 
increased air patrols. To help save money, he said, the CHP has stopped training 
programs and nonessential construction. 
Caltrans officials said they already have spent almost $40 million on lighting, 
security cameras and other hardware such as fencing and razor wire installed 
around vulnerable locations on the Bay Bridge. Labor costs for security 
improvements are expected to run many times that much. 
The cost also is rising rapidly for more than 1,000 National Guard troops 
stationed at 29 airports and other locations throughout the state. Officials said the 
federal government is expected to help with the airport duty, which already has 
cost $36 million. 
Major ports, transit systems and airports have been spending increasing 
amounts on security too. Officials said they have been preparing for innumerable 
terrorist scenarios but can only afford to focus on a limited number in the future. 
The Port of Los Angeles reported that it had spent $1 million in overtime to date, 
but needs 15 more port police officersat a cost of $1 million to maintain the high 
level of security. 
Many asked the legislators to help secure some federal assistance or to help 
provide state funding. 
But Dutra was not encouraging: "Where do we find the money to pay for this?" 
Peace of mind takes steep toll on state costs 
Additional $335,00 spent daily on CHP 
By Sean Holstege 
STAFF WRITER 
Oakland Tribune, November 21, 2001 
With wartime security becoming a new way of life, the escalating price for 
peace of mind began to sink in at a state hearing in Oakland on Tuesday. 
How high the costs might ultimately climb remains unclear, but already talk is 
floating around the state capital about asking voters to pitch in. 
It's easy to see why. 
The California Highway Patrol spends an extra $335,000 each day paying 
officers to work 12-hour shifts to be on full alert. Added security since Sept. 
11 has cost the state $12 million and is projected to top $40 million by June. 
CHP Commissioner D.O. "Spike" Helmick said the money hasn't weakened 
traditional law enforcement yet, but he did say there is "very, very little 
training right now," and building and car maintenance must wait. 
Posting National Guard troops on four California bridges costs the state 
$420,000 a month, on top of the $36 million the federal government spends 
to patrol airports. 
At the height of its alert, BART spent an extra $100,000 a week patrolling 
trains. 
U.S. Coast Guard Lt. Cmdr. Richard Teubner said the Coast Guard has 
brought in 2,600 reservists, who have been working 70-hour weeks for the 
last two months. It's a common story at the California National Guard, the 
CHP and others charged with safety. 
"The question isn't what more can we do, but can we continue doing what we 
are doing? We cannot operate at this rate indefinitely. This is way beyond our 
budget," Teubner said. 
Assembly Transportation Committee Chairman John Dutra, D-Fremont, 
asked a wide array of law enforcement, emergency, airport, transit, military, 
rail and union officials to explain what they've been doing to improve security 
since Sept. 11 and what more they could do. 
The answers pointed directly to the next crisis in the state capital: 
skyrocketing and unfunded security costs amid a $12 billion state budget 
shortfall. 
"Funding is going to be a serious, serious problem," Dutra observed. "We've 
identified $125 million in one-time costs, and we've only gotten through the 
first panel." 
"My sense today is this will end up being a staggering amount of money," 
Dutra said. "Most people really feel this is a federal issue. This is a wartime 
circumstance." 
Currently three ideas are circulating the capital on how to pay for homeland 
security. One involves a bond measure for anywhere between $4 billion and 
$16 billion, which could go to California voters next fall. Another source of 
money could be a quarter-cent sales tax surcharge, also put to voters next 
fall. Or surcharges on transit tickets. 
Ticket surcharges got a cool reception on Tuesday. 
Although much of the talk focused on the growing costs of security, Dutra 
walked away with legislative ideas, after soliciting testimony from 40 
transportation security experts. 
One security highlight was mandating biometric thumbprints on all new 
drivers' licenses so that digital prints can be compared by computer with 
actual prints. 
Another idea was requiring state-administered background checks on all 
truck drivers who deliver hazardous materials or gasoline. 
The Transportation Committee will report to the Assembly Speaker's office 
on Dec. 7 with recommendations. 
The good news is that most panelists said California is better prepared than 
just about anywhere. 
"This is not new to you folks. You've been doing this for a number of years. 
The public should be very comforted." Dutra said. 
Panel weighs the costs of keeping safe 
Law enforcement, transportation firms, bridge operators 
and labor discuss the toll on finances, manpower 
By Guy Ashley 
CONTRA COSTA TIMES 
November 21, 2001 
OAKLAND -- Unprecedented levels of commitment and circumspection are 
keeping the Bay Area transportation system well-guarded from terrorist attacks. 
But a panel of law enforcement and public transit officials wondered aloud 
Tuesday just how long the monumental effort can be sustained before personnel 
burn out and money dries up. 
"I don't think the question is what more can we do, but how long can we do it," 
Coast Guard Lt. Cmdr. Richard Teubner told state Assembly panel gathered to 
discuss the impacts of terrorism on transportation. 
Coast Guard reservists and active duty personnel have been guarding Bay Area 
ports and water-bound transportation structures around the clock since the Sept. 
11 attacks. 
The Coast Guard has activated a nimble and effective security force, Teubner 
said, but the demands are exacting a toll on officers who frequently are asked to 
work 18-hour days. 
"We can't operate at this pace continually," he said. 
The hearing was called by Assemblyman John Dutra, D-Fremont, who sought a 
discussion of security measures needed to guard long-term the state's 
transportation infrastructure. 
CHP Commissioner Dwight "Spike" Helmick said his agency has spent $12 
million on additional security measures since Sept. 11, and that figure will bulge 
to more than $40 million if it is sustained through the current fiscal year, he said. 
The CHP has been monitoring bridges and other key transportation facilities, as 
well as serving as the key security component in state buildings deemed 
possible terrorist targets. 
The new responsibilities have come at a cost, Helmick said, as CHP officers 
have had to curtail their more traditional enforcement duties, such as monitoring 
speeds on freeways and operating truck scales to ensure that big rigs are 
operated safely. 
With the state projecting a $12.4 billion deficit over the next two years, Dutra said 
it is also necessary to ask questions that may be politically unpopular, including 
whether current security measures are an overreaction to the potential threat. 
More than three dozen officials spoke before Dutra's committee at the daylong 
hearing, representing law enforcement, transportation, airports, bridge operators 
and organized labor. They told of unprecedented efforts to keep their interests 
safe, and to take part in a larger effort to guard the transportation system as a 
whole. 
Dutra encouraged officials to brainstorm ideas for how to pay for increased 
security needs. One, he said, could be surcharges similar to those imposed on 
airline tickets to pay for airport security. 
Some transportation officials balked at the idea, however. Gil Mallory, president 
of Amtrak West, told the panel that surcharges of $1 0 may not seem much to 
passengers paying several hundred dollars for an air ticket. But adding that cost 
to tickets for other, lower-priced modes of transportation could have a drastic 
impact on who decides to ride the bus or take the train. 
Wednesday, November 21, 2001 
Breaking News Section of the San Francisco Chronicle 
website 
(11-21) 06:00 PST-- Representatives from transit 
agencies throughout California told a state assembly 
committee that the cost of providing enhanced 
vigilance after Sept. 11 is taking a toll on their 
operating costs. 
The State Assembly Transportation Committee held 
a hearing in Oakland on Tuesday. 
Chaired by Assemblyman John Dutra, D-Fremont, 
the hearing allowed transportation officials from 
more than 20 agencies to address the safety of 
California's bridges, tunnels, highways, airports, 
ports, and rail and transit lines. 
One constant theme throughout the testimony is that 
increased security measures are straining agencies' 
budgets. 
The California Highway Patrol, for example, has 
been spending an average of $335,000 per day 
since the attacks to provide security for the state, 
said Commissioner Dwight "Spike" Helmick. 
So far, the CHP has spent $12 million, and if things 
continue as they are, by the end of the fiscal year, 
the CHP will have spent $40 million to provide 
enhanced security, Helmick said. 
Most of the added expenses are the result of beefed 
up security and associated overtime costs, as well 
as the cost of operating patrol aircraft, Helmick 
said. 
Helmick added that there are also some one-time 
costs that are needed to pay for surveillance 
equipment. 
Randy Iwasaki, director of Caltrans District 4, said 
that one-time cost for increased security measures 
including surveillance cameras for bridges, tunnels 
and tubes, as well as other equipment, could set the 
Department of Transportation back $40 million. 
Brig. Gen. Dennis Kneally of the California National 
Guard said that patrol of the state's bridges costs 
$420,000 a month, for as long as extra security is 
needed. 
Assemblyman Dutra said such examples only begin 
to illustrate the challenge that California lawmakers 
face as they prepare for the upcoming legislative 
session. 
Dutra said it is all going to come down to 
reassessing the state's priorities once the reports 
from all of the state committees are complete. 
"Finding these funds is going to be very difficult," 
Dutra said. "Nevertheless, the security needs are 
there, so we're going to have to find the funds." 
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PUBLIC COMMENT 
BREAK 
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Fremont Fire Department 
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Washington Hospital 
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Summary of Testimony 
BRIDGES, TUNNELS AND HIGHWAYS 
CHP- Commissioner Dwight ("Spike") Helmick · 
Caltrans- Randy Iwasaki (Acting District Director, District 4) 
Golden Gate Bridge District - Kary Witt (Deputy Gen Mgr) 
US Coast Guard- Lt. Commander Richard Teubner 
California National Guard- Brigadier General Dennis Kenneally 
Major Mike Wells, Public Affairs 
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BRIDGES HIGHWAYS AND TUNNELS 
"As I enter my 33rd year oflaw enforcement, I have never seen 
such a large variety of people working together better than they 
are right now. And I am referring to local sheriffs, police, and fire 
departments, military, bridge staff, and Caltrans. Collectively, a 
lot of barriers have been dropped in the last 60 days in order to try 
and make to state safer." 
Dwight "Spike" Helmick, 
Commissioner, California Highway Patrol 
For many, highways, bridges and tunnels are the most immediate things that come to 
mind when one thinks about protecting California's physical infrastructure. But the list of 
agencies that are involved in their protection are not so obvious. Protecting California's 
highways, bridges and tunnels from a potential terrorist attack requires the collaboration 
of efforts from a cross-section of public works, public safety and military organizations at 
the state, local and federal level. 
Bridge Security 
This has translated into more personnel devoted to security on the bridges. One agency, 
the Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transportation District (bridge district), testified 
that in addition to dedicating more of their own staff to security, other agencies, have 
helped including: 
• California Highway Patrol (CHP), 
• The National Park Service (both ends of the bridge are in National Parks), 
• US Park Police, 
• The California National Guard, 
• The US Coast Guard, 
• The FBI, 
• The San Francisco Police Department, and 
• The Marin County Sheriffs Office 
Agencies like the CHP have been working collectively with Caltrans, and the Golden 
Gate BH&TD to increase security on these facilities. Targeted facilities include the 
Golden Gate Bridge and the Bay Bridge in the San Francisco Bay Area, as well as the 
Coronado Bridge in San Diego, and the Vincent Thomas Bridge in the Los Angeles area. 
CHP has assigned staff to patrol the bridges on a 24-hour cycle in cooperation with the 
US Coast Guard, who are conducting waterside patrols. The National Guard is stationed 
at posts on the bridges and the CHP is flying over the bridges and other key infrastructure 
facilities on a 24-hour cycle. These agencies have procured new, high-tech equipment to 
protect the bridges, including thermal imaging devices and infrared equipment in order to 
enhance night patrols. 
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Caltrans and the bridge district both reported that they worked very closely with the CHP 
to make security improvements based on risk assessments developed by CHP the Office 
of Emergency Services (OES) and other public safety agencies. For example, the 
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory was enlisted by CHP to help identify vulnerable points 
on the bridges. In response, Caltrans and the Golden Gate (BTH&D) have worked 
aggressively over the last six weeks to fortify those vulnerable points and eliminate 
public access to those locations on the bridge. Lighting has been installed where 
appropriate based on input from CHP, Coast Guard and Caltrans personnel. 
Fencing has been improved, and hardened perimeters have been established with 
detection systems installed to prevent unauthorized trucks and vehicles from entering in 
certain areas. Additionally, Caltrans reports that they have issued a $2 million contract to 
install a chain-link fence with barbed wire at additional points on the bridge. Caltrans is 
also in the process of awarding a $20 million contract to install additional security 
cameras and sensors along the bridges. 
Personnel and contractors for the bridge agencies are required to carry identification on 
site. Temporary facilities, i.e. resident engineer trailers have been moved away from 
critical points on the structures so that explosives cannot be near sensitive locations. 
Caltrans is also increasing towing service to move disabled vehicles off the bridge. 
Contractors are also being asked to register their vehicles, and this information, along 
with emergency contact information is being shared with CHP and the US Coast Guard. 
CHP is given advance notice of which personnel from the bridge agencies are scheduled 
to enter the facility. 
Other Key Facilities 
With respect to the tunnels, Caltrans reports that the Posey/Webster tube and the 
Caldecott Tunnel are two of the primary facilities that have been identified for additional 
security. Fencing has been installed to limit access to the air intake system. Personnel 
access has also been restricted at these points. The CHP has also increased patrols 
through those tubes and tunnels. It is important to note that the additional surveillance 
systems will complement equipment that is already in place. 
CHP has also been focusing on other major corridors in the state. For example, the I-5 
Freeway. The state water system circumvents and flows alongside that freeway. CHP 
has increased its aerial patrols from a 48- to a 24-hour cycle, and is also assigning 
additional staff and using new equipment to monitor movement in and out of major 
tunnels in the state. 
Threats on the Highway 
Monitoring and securing large trucks continue to be a major concern for the CHP. Two 
weeks ago (from Nov. 20th), CHP conducted major spot checks and stopped all trucks 
that approached the Golden Gate Bridge to determine what kind of congestion problem 
would result from these kind of inspections. 
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In addition, CHP staff has been sent into all the terminals that haul hazardous materials. 
These types of inspections are usually done on a 25-month cycle, but within the last few 
months, all trucks that have been stopped and inspected. Scale facilities have been open 
on a 24-hour basis and CHP staff performing much closer inspections of all trucks that 
haul hazardous materials. 
CHP continues to have strong concerns about the potential theft of a large truck, 
especially one that is hauling diesel fuel or some other substance that could be used as an 
explosive in a terrorist attack. The CHP Commissioner pointed out that every one of the 
terrorist attacks in the US and in other countries has involved a petroleum-based product 
as a portion of the explosive substance in their assault. CHP has identified the need to 
protect against the risk of someone stealing a gasoline hauler, an aviation fuel truck or a 
truck hauling some other combustible material and use it as a weapon on a bridge. 
CHP has been working with the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory to develop a device that 
would allow a CHP officer to quickly stop a runaway or hijacked large truck. If the 
testing of this device is successful, CHP would like to recommend that the federal 
government require that these devices be installed on all large trucks. 
Concerns were also raised by the CHP regarding containers that are brought in from 
overseas through the ports and hauled through the state on trucks. Currently there are 
devices that can be used to detect nuclear materials in containers. The Lawrence 
Livermore Laboratory has developed a much a smaller version of equipment that can 
potentially be installed in strategic locations so that every container can be examined for 
nuclear contents. 
Budgetary Constraints 
"The people are the most expensive part of this security equation. In 
contrast to any surveillance and monitoring equipment that may be 
purchased, personnel must be hired and trained to operate this 
equipment. Personnel is the most significant, ongoing category of 
expense." 
Kary Witt, Deputy General Manager, 
Golden Gate Bride, Highway and Transportation District 
All of the agencies that testified before the committee raised concerns regarding their 
ability to sustain the emergency security measures over a long period of time. As it has 
become clear that the threat of a potential terrorist attack will not subside in the near 
future, the panelists testified that they will need help from the state or federal government 
if they are to continue providing security at a heightened level. 
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The bridge district testified that they would need an additional $70 million per year in 
order to develop and implement a bare bones, no-frills, security staffing plan for the 
bridge and the district's transit operations. The district also reported that they would need 
$4 million in order to retain security services provided by the National Park Service and 
CHP. The bridge agencies also noted that one of their long-term security goals is to 
minimize the need for additional CHP staff for monitoring by utilizing automation. 
Public Access vs. Security 
Both bridge agencies reported that they continue to wrestle with the need to secure the 
bridges, while not going too far to restrict public access. When discussing security on the 
bridge, the district continues to struggle with the need to balance public access against the 
need to close security gaps. If public access continues to be restricted, then the bridge 
will be in danger of not serving its original purpose. Cal trans pointed out that they 
continue to block access to certain locations underneath bridge and highway structures 
that are above city streets. This is likely to result in complaints from cities and counties, 
as the local traffic pattern may change. 
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AIRPORTS 
SFO --Peter Nardoza (Deputy Director of Public Policy) 
Oakland Airport- Steve Grossman (Director of Aviation) 
CHP- Commissioner Dwight ("Spike") Helmick 
California National Guard- Brigadier General Dennis Kenneally 
Major Mike Wells, Public Affairs 
Service Employees International Union- Tom Csekey, Local Pres. 
Airborne Express- Allen Tubbs (District Field Service Mgr) 
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AIRPORTS 
The September 11th attacks had the most profound effect on airport and aviation security. 
California is home to two of the largest airports in the nation. No one has forgotten that 
all of the flights that were hijacked on September 11th were headed for California. A few 
days before the committee's hearing on transportation security, the President signed H.R 
3150, the Airport Security Federalization Act 2001. This act has largely shaped the 
recent debate on aviation security. However, representatives from the air freight industry 
(Airborne Express), Oakland International Airport, San Francisco International Airport 
(SFO), law enforcement (CHP) the National Guard and the labor community (SEIU), 
reported that state and local officials did not wait for the passage of this measure before 
taking action. 
Recent Activities 
Airport representatives presented testimony regarding the enhanced screening of 
passengers. SFO reported that all bags are being opened and that the inspection process 
is much slower, and much more thorough. Both airports reported that all trucks are 
screened before they enter airfield. All food, delivery trucks and other trucks are sealed 
prior to entering. In addition, SFO has also installed "red teams" on the airfield. These 
are individuals who move around the airfield checking badges to insure that individuals 
working on the field are authorized to be there. 
Representatives from the Oakland International Airport testified that they have nearly 
doubled the number of staff in the airport security unit of the Oakland Police Department 
(from 8.5 officers to 21 ). The Oakland Police Department has security responsibility for 
all activities within all buildings the airport. In addition, the Alameda County Sheriff's 
Department has assigned 23 deputies to the airport, who are responsible for the security 
on the exterior of the facility and on the roadway and parking system. Private security 
firms continue to staff the necessary posts at vehicle access gates and parking lots that are 
near the terminal. 
Short-term parking within 300 feet of the terminal has been closed to prevent a potential 
attack by truck or car bomb. Both airports reported that they have implemented a 
monitoring program for quality assurance of the new safety commitments. 
National Guard 
Governor Davis ordered National Guard troops to report to 29 airports across the state. 
These airports were identified for deployment of military personnel because of the 
volume of passengers and transportation priority. Their mission at the airports is to 
provide a military security presence, reinforce local law enforcement, and help restore 
confidence in air transportation. Currently, there are 1000 guards stationed at the 
selected airports throughout the state. 
The National Guard is performing the airport mission under Title 32 of the United State 
Code. This means that the personnel remain under the control and authority of the 
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Governor, but it also means that these activities receive their funding from the federal 
government. Recently the number of personnel stationed at airports was increased by 
25%. This level of service will most likely continue through the end of the year. 
Long Term Security 
Oakland Airport testified that they would work harder over time to reemphasize the role 
that each of its employees share in providing increased security. Each employee has a 
mandated responsibility to challenge other individuals they may seen on the facility or in 
a secure area to make sure that they have the proper credentials. The airport is currently 
examining ways to screen all employees that enter or exit the airport facility, and all 
materials that come on the airfield. A number of design alternatives are also being 
examined for the new terminal complex to direct all employee traffic and deliveries to the 
airport through a single or multiple checkpoints. 
SFO reported that they would need to improve the screening of passengers. They argued 
that this would require a workforce that is better trained, better performing, better paid 
and better retained. Both airports highlighted the need to improve baggage screening. 
Federal law now requires that all baggage, both international and domestic, be screened 
by electronic detection systems. Lastly, all employees that enter the airfield must be 
screened everyday as they come to work. 
Public Confidence 
Although these increased security measures may have caused inconvenience for patrons, 
the Oakland Airport testified that they have not received many complaints. The public 
appears willing to accept the need for higher security and the attendant inconveniences. 
The recent signing of federal airport security legislation will boost the confidence of the 
traveling public, sustain higher passenger levels. However, representatives from both 
airports testified that the recent federal legislation would present them with some 
immediate challenges. 
Impact of Federal Legislation 
SFO testified that they currently have 12 or 14 CTX machines, which are used to screen 
baggage electronically and detect explosives. SFO estimates that they will need to 
procure somewhere between 40 and 50 of those machines in order to meet the goals 
established for airports in the legislation, at a cost of approximately $1 million each. The 
Oakland Airport reports that security costs will increase by at least $7million per year due 
to the increased standards for airport security. 
The Service Employees International Union (SEIU) testified that they represent 
thousands of airport workers; in particular, they represent about 600 screeners at LAX, 
500 at SFO and are organizing 1 00 screeners at Oakland Airport. Concerns were raised 
about the requirement that all screeners have US citizenship. The representative from 
SEIU noted that one does not have to be a citizen in order to serve in US Armed Forces. 
There are currently about 50,000 non-citizens are actually serving in the US Armed 
Services. A high percentage of these screeners are immigrants. The current workforce is 
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almost completely comprised of low-income workers. As a result, SEIU predicted that 
the job dislocation would have most severe impact on the poorest communities in 
California. 
SEIU asked that the Legislature communicate its concern regarding provisions in the new 
airport security act that requires US citizenship for airport screeners. SEIU asked that the 
Legislature urge Congress to "correct" that element of the legislation and replace it with 
the "Armed Forces Standard" for citizenship status. Lastly, they proposed that the state 
work with local government to help those displaced workers find alternate employment. 
General Aviation Airports and Small Airstrips 
In response to a question from the chair, airport representatives testified that security at 
general aviation airports around the country is much less than at air carrier facilities. 
These conditions have been authorized by the FAA. However, witnesses predicted that 
this condition will likely change in the next 6 to 12 months. The Oakland Airport has 
required that each of its fixed based operators submit a detailed security plan. 
CHP raised a concern regarding small planes and airstrips in rural parts of the state, 
where planes are operated from facilities that are not traditionally identified as airports. 
They argue that this increases the risk that the planes will be used for bio-terrorism. CHP 
identified areas north of Sacramento where a numerous amount of small planes are used 
by the agricultural industry for example. CHP also testified that they have fielded a lot of 
requests for bomb searches and "walk-throughs" with bomb-sniffing dogs. These small 
planes go largely unscrutinized, and this continues to be a disturbing issue for the CHP. 
What Can the Legislature Do to Assist? 
Airport representatives reported that the Legislature could help them meet security 
challenges by defining the threats that any security measures are to prevent. They argue 
that it is extremely difficult for airports to protect passengers and the public without 
understanding what they are guarding against. Defining the threat would enable airports 
to develop viable solutions and directed efforts to avoid those dangers. Without this 
definition, airports are left with a monumental task. Airports would have to formulate an 
infinite number of scenarios of potential harm that may be exacted against the public and 
then to implement policies to protect against these activities. 
SFO asks that Legislators individually and collectively, speak forcefully on behalf of 
California's airports to their federal counterparts. Securing the money that is necessary to 
make California airports safer is a top priority. SFO requests that Legislators help insure 
that as they talk to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the United States 
Department of Transportation (US DOT) and to the members of the House and Senate 
their interests are preserved. 
The CHP reported that state officials had already developed an early draft of a plan that 
establishes a uniform protocol for risk assessment. It is not yet in final form, and the 
Office of Emergency Services (OES) will be distributing this document in draft form and 
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soliciting input from local agencies (everyone from airports to law enforcement) to 
provide input before it is formally adopted. 
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RAIL AND TRANSIT 
California Transit Ass'n- Jeanne Kreig 
Eastern Contra Costa Transit Authority- Jeanne Kreig_(GM) 
American Public Transportation Ass'n - Pete Cipolla 
VTA- Pete Cipolla (General Manager) 
AMTRAK - Gil Mallery (President, Amtrak West) 
BART- Paul Oversier (Ass't General Mgr) 
Commander Clark Lynch (BART Police) 
LAMT A - Paul Lennon (Director for System Safety & Security) 
AC Transit- Robert Hughes (Head of Security) 
Greyhound -Randy Isaacs (State Government Affairs Rep) 
Metrolink- Ann Louise Rice (Government Affairs Manager) 
United Transportation Union- JP Jones 
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RAIL AND TRANSIT 
Mass transportation plays a key mobility role in California and throughout the nation. Prior 
catastrophic events in the state, such as the Lorna Prieta earthquake in 1989 that shut down the 
Bay Bridge for a month, highlighted the need for the continuing viability of alternative modes of 
transportation that can move large numbers of commuters and other travelers. Immediately after 
the September 11 attacks, when the nation's airports were not operating for a period of three 
days, interstate carriers such as Amtrak and Greyhound saw a spike in their passenger volumes. 
Upon revelation of a purported threat to California's suspension bridges several weeks later, 
BART and other mass transit providers experienced increases in patronage. While transit 
agencies offer both an everyday means to transport large numbers of commuters, and a necessary 
redundancy in the event of a shutdown of other modes, the nature of mass transportation presents 
its own unique set of vulnerabilities in the current environment of international terrorism. 
As the largest panel of the November 20 hearing, with representatives from nine different 
transportation providers as well as from two industry associations, the Rail and Transit panel 
expressed many common concerns and described many common responses to the September 11 
incidents. This group discussed security arrangements within the context of a transportation 
sector characterized by one participant as an open, high volume system with multiple points of 
access. (BART, for instance, has 95 miles oftrack and 39 stations. The LA County MTA has 60 
miles of track and 50 stations. In 2000, California's transit operators provided more than 1.3 
billion passenger trips.) 
Most of the providers noted the high number of passengers they serve as well as the numerous 
vehicles and ground facilities that they maintain. (In fact, among the carriers, only Amtrak and 
Greyhound are in a position to check passenger names and ID's. Amtrak actually matches the 
names of people making reservations against the FBI's watch list on a real-time basis.) Thus, the 
points at which security might be breached are varied and numerous. The identification of 
security weaknesses and the development of strategies and tools to address those weaknesses 
have been facilitated by entities such as the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) 
and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). APTA has convened several task forces and 
working groups to develop strategies and share and disseminate information. The FT A has 
provided to transit systems training and resources on emergency preparedness, protecting and 
responding against chemical and biological attacks, and dealing with bus and rail highjackings. 
The materials they have circulated include a Safety and Security Tool Kit containing various 
publications on these and related subjects. The FT A has also begun to conduct security 
assessments of the 100 largest American transit systems and will be offering free, two-day 
security awareness and training workshops at various locations across the country. 
As in other transportation sectors, rail and transit operators have had prior experience preparing 
for, and dealing with, natural and man-made disasters. The 1995 Tokyo subway nerve gas 
attack, for example, brought home the need to learn chemical, biological and nuclear 
preparedness. Contingency planning and training for these and other eventualities have been 
ongomg. 
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In responding since September 11 to their newly-recognized vulnerabilities on an individual 
level, California's providers have expended vast amounts of resources that have stretched their 
budgets and staffs to the breaking point. Nevertheless, all the participants were able to point to 
widespread efforts to coordinate with one another and with public safety agencies in the 
development of safety plans and risk assessments. Typical security-enhancing measures taken 
thus far include the installation of closed circuit television monitors and intrusion alarms, 
increased inspections of facilities, placement of surveillance personnel at critical points, 
trimming of landscaping, improvement of lighting, closure of some restrooms, development of 
better ID badges and cards, removal of trash receptacles, and relocation of bicycle lockers. 
Operators have developed mutual response plans and have practiced and trained with police, fire, 
and emergency response agencies. Vehicle operators and mailroom personnel have received 
new training for their respective responsibilities. While participants suggested further 
innovations such as the development of advanced technologies to automate the detection of 
chemical and biological agents, most of their suggestions for additional security actions 
essentially call for the funding of more of the same measures as described above. 
While acknowledging that the General Fund deficit makes it unlikely that the State will provide 
any meaningful financial assistance, the panel was resistant to suggestions that their patrons be 
assessed a surcharge in order to fund the increased costs associated with enhanced security 
measures. It was noted that the airline ticket surcharge recently adopted by the federal 
government exceeds, by itself, the price of most transit tickets. Many providers suggested 
looking to the federal government, rather than the state, for monetary assistance. One witness, in 
fact, proposed that a federal fuel tax surcharge be established in order to fund security programs. 
Whatever the source of funding might be, the consensus, as with most other panels, was that the 
current level of effort being put forth by rail and transit agencies could not be sustained very 
much longer without additional resources. 
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SEAPORTS 
Port of Oakland- Tay Yoshitani (Executive Director) 
Port of Los Angeles- Noel Cunningham (Director ofQperations) 
Captain Ralph Tracy (Port Police) 
Port of Long Beach - Gus He in (Director of Government Affairs) 
US Coast Guard- Lt. Commander Richard Teubner 
International Longshore & Warehouse Union- Joseph Wenzl 
(Coast Committee Man) 
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SEAPORTS 
"California is horne to three of our country's four largest ports. Our ports are a vital asset 
to our state and the entire country. Since 95% of all international trade is seaborne, our 
ports help drive our state's economy by serving as California's entre to the global 
economy and all the economic benefits that come with it. It is critical that we keep our 
seaports safe, secure, and operating efficiently and effectively." 
Tay Yoshitani, Port of Oakland 
Federal legislation to upgrade security at the nation's major ports was actually introduced 
prior to the September 11 terrorist attack. The Port, Maritime, and Rail Security Act of 
2001 is Senate Bill1214. It was introduced in July of this year and is currently pending 
in Congress. 
In addition, the MTS (Maritime Transportation System), an initiative to improve the 
nation's port facilities, sponsored by MARAD (the U.S. Maritime Administration) and 
DOT (U.S. Department of Transportation) has established a national Port Security 
Subcommittee structure. These subcommittees are currently assessing security needs and 
making recommendations to Congress, based on findings gathered from the country's 
major ports. California, because of the sheer size of its port infrastructure, has two MTS 
committees (northern and southern California). In addition, the Assembly Select 
Committee on California Ports, chaired by Assernblyrnernber Alan Lowenthal, has 
developed the California MTS Advisory Committee as a coordinating body for the two 
regional bodies. 
Senate Bill 1214 hearings found that many seaports have minimum physical, procedural, 
and personnel security standards that leave them vulnerable. Therefore, after the 
September 11 attacks, several amendments to the bill were introduced. One major 
amendment establishes criteria for which ports and ships would be staffed by Sea 
Marshals. These Sea Marshals would be made up of members ofthe U.S. Coast Guard, 
U.S. Customs, Immigration and Naturalization and civilian port police. Some ports 
already have such a program in place, but this new legislation would greatly expand the 
effort. The Sea Marshall program requires the boarding of vessels at sea and the 
placement of armed personnel in the pilothouse of large commercial vessels prior to port 
entry. It prevents terrorists from gaining control of a large commercial vessel that could 
potentially be used as an instrument of destruction. 
The Committee heard testimony from representatives of the State's three largest ports, as 
well as from the Coast Guard and the Longshore & Warehouse Union. 
The Coast Guard, for obvious reasons, plays a large role in the effort to secure the 
nation's ports. It provides the nation with an existing foundation upon which to build its 
maritime homeland security efforts. 
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Its security actions focus on three key areas: vessels transiting in and out of ports, 
waterside security of ports, and shoreside security of port facilities. These objectives are 
accomplished through the Sea Marshal program, vessel escorts, harbor patrols, facility 
inspections and Maritime Domain Awareness. The Sea Marshal program, as described 
above, builds public confidence and is one of the few security measures that actually 
improves the flow of traffic into port. The vessel escorts are used in bringing in 
particularly important vessels to protect them against USS COLE type attacks. Harbor 
patrols are used to protect waterfront facilities from waterborne attack or sabotage. And 
Maritime Domain Awareness is a vigilance effort that has now been enhanced by 
requiring 96-hour notification from inbound vessels prior to entering port. 
In order to accomplish these enhanced security measures, the Coast Guard has placed its 
members on extraordinary 12-hour shifts and has placed 2,600 reservists on active duty. 
This is the largest recall since WWII. In addition, auxiliarists who normally conduct 
volunteer recreational boating safety inspections are manning Coast Guard active duty 
offices. 
The Coast Guard cannot maintain this level of security in the long term without federal 
and state assistance. The Navy has loaned some patrol vessels and the state Fish and 
Game Department has provided boats and crews. However, sustained security efforts 
will eventually require additional federal funding. Legislation is currently pending in 
Congress that would augment current security related funding. California can help by 
requesting that such funding be expedited and that the Coast Guard in California gets its 
fair share of these funds. The Coast Guard currently works with OES, the State Strategic 
Committee on Terrorism (SSCOTT), State Threat Assessment Committee (STAC), and 
the State Lands Commission in the area of oil facility security. The State needs to 
continue to coordinate such security activities with the Coast Guard, which will assume 
even greater responsibilities once federal maritime security legislation is passed. 
California's ports have all instituted security measures, in coordination with the Coast 
Guard and other federal and state agencies. The ports have placed fire and police 
services on heightened alert and have increased security throughout port facilities. High 
visibility patrols are utilized and access to port facilities is more strictly regulated. The 
ports are working with both federal and state agencies in conducting facility risk 
assessments and are working closely with local and regional authorities in coordinated 
security task force efforts. Furthermore, individual terminals within the ports have 
instituted their own increased security measures. 
Amendments to S. 1214, when passed by Congress, will require background checks of 
some port workers. Labor has raised concerns about background checks, specifically the 
scope and nature ofthese checks. The Longshore and Warehouse Union argues that 
labor should be asked to help in developing security measures, not singled out for 
suspicion. 
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The panelists suggested that the State can help by providing funding for security 
measures, specifically training and surveillance costs. They also suggested that the state 
and federal government can help by better defining the threats that seaports face. This 
would help to focus security efforts and insure their success. 
Finally, it was emphasized that ports need to find new ways to protect against potential 
security threats while at the same time making sure that they continue to operate 
efficiently and cost-effectively. We cannot let security shut down or severely disrupt the 
commercial activities that drive the California economy. 
-25-
FREIGHT MOVEMENT- HWYS 
CHP- Commissioner Dwight ("Spike) Helmick 
California Public Utilities Commission- Trina Homer (Director Rail 
Safety and Carrier Division 
California Trucking Association- Stephanie Williams 
Teamsters Public Affairs Council- Shane Gusman, Legislative 
Advocate 
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FREIGHT - HIGHWAYS 
Representatives from both the California Trucking Association (CTA) and Teamsters Public 
Affairs Council (Teamsters) commented on the safety concerns regarding highway freight 
movement. One of the main concerns offered by the panel was the security of California's ports 
of entry, specifically the seaports and the Mexican border. 
Trucks that carry hazardous waste, such as petroleum, chlorine, and ammonia nitrate, frequently 
enter the state. According to CTA, 25% of all vehicles crossing the Mexican border could be 
carrying hazardous material. To ensure that these drivers are authorized to carry such material, 
they suggested an international identification system, similar to the current background checks 
conducted on US drivers. 
Additionally, once a truck enters California, CT A believes that protection of these trucks from 
theft is paramount since the materials they are carrying can be used in terrorist activity. To help 
prevent this from occurring, they suggest that the communication between the industry and law 
enforcement needs to be enhanced. One particular program, known as the California 
Transportation Improvement Program System (CTIP), has developed an improved 
communication system between the industry and the CHP and has already proven successful in 
circumstances such as stolen vehicles. They believe more funding should be made available for 
such programs and a greater effort to improve overall communication. 
Regarding freight movement from seaports, a concern was raised about the current security 
measures. The trucking industry would like to improve the training of the port personnel and 
ensure the proper protocol in responding to a breach of security. One possible breach could 
occur during times of peak congestion. The more time a driver remains at a port, the greater the 
possibility of stolen cargo or accidental transfer of vital information. To prevent this from 
occurring, congestion should be reduced. 
CT A suggests that a uniform terminal identification system may also improve the functioning of 
seaports. In Los Angeles, for example, there are approximately 12 gates which all have their 
own ID systems. This can both complicate and slow the process of the goods movement. 
In summary, six suggestions were offered by the industry to improve freight security. They are 
as follows: 
1. Evaluate ports of entry to target hazardous material. 
2. Terminate excessive communication between drivers at ports by reducing congestion. 
3. Increase the number of certified and trained gate security personnel and establish 
standard protocols for security breaches. 
4. Develop a uniform identification system for drivers. 
5. Establish a task force to evaluate those drivers who may or may not pose a security risk 
that warrants denial of a hazardous materials license. 
6. Provide adequate funding for CHP to continue highway safety enhancement actions and 
allow new activities to prevent and/or mitigate terrorism activities. 
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In addition to the views of the industry, the drivers, represented by Teamsters, expressed their 
concerns. Sharing similar views to those of CT A, they have researched potential security 
concerns, primarily the potential highjacking of trucks containing hazardous material. In a 
coordinated effort with the CHP and DMV, the trucking industry is working to ensure that 
drivers are properly trained prior to their transportation of hazardous material. Once they are on 
the road, the industry pointed out that every effort has been made to ensure constant 
communication between the truckers and the dispatchers. 
With the new policies of open trade with Mexico, the state can expect to see a significant 
increase in truck traffic across the border. To mitigate possible security problems, Teamsters 
hope the CHP will be given sufficient resources to inspect all trucks and ensure that the drivers 
have the proper certifications. These inspections will assure that all trucks crossing the border 
have the same identification placards as those in the United States. 
A final point made by both the industry and the drivers is that the government should not 
overreact. They would hope that any legislation to improve background checks on drivers is 
sensible and a reasonable response to an actual threat. 
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FREIGHT MOVEMENT- RAIL 
California Public Utilities Commission- Trina Homer (Director Rail 
Safety and Carrier Division 
Burlington, Northern, Santa Fe-Juan Acosta 
Union Pacific- Captain John Allen (Regional Mgr, RR Police) 
United Transportation Union-JP Jones 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers-Tim Smith 
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FREIGHT- RAILROADS 
Several representatives of the freight rail industry, including Burlington Northern and Santa Fe, 
Union Pacific, United Transportation Union, and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, as 
well as the Public Utility Commission (PUC), comprised a panel to discuss security of freight 
rail. 
Overseeing the safety and security of freight rail, the PUC is responsible for over 30 short line 
railroads, as well as Amtrak and other commuter rail lines. They work in partnership with the 
Federal Transit Association (FTA) to inspect the safety of railroad operating practices, signals, 
equipment, and hazardous material. To ensure that the track is adhering to the proper standards, 
they make sure that their staff is available at all times for inspection. The staff, who are 
responsible for the safety operations of light rail systems, such as BART and the Santa Clara 
Valley Transit Authority, are trained to audit those agencies to ensure they are compliant with 
the proper safety operations and procedures. They conduct field inspections of accidents to 
make certain that they are operating their facilities in a safe way. 
Usually concentrating on safety, the PUC's focus has expanded, since September events, to 
include more security measures. They are monitoring the rail carriers to ensure that they have an 
emergency plan, that they are compliant with the plan, and that their employees know about 
them. Additionally, the PUC is working with the industry, the federal government, and other 
state agencies to ensure that additional security measures developed by FT A will be 
implemented by next summer or sooner. 
According to the PUC, agency investigators are in the field 90% of the time to inspect the tracks 
and equipment for possible security breaches. If during an inspection an investigator is not asked 
for his or her identification by a railroad employee, the PUC states that this is a reason for 
concern. They are currently working with the railroads and transit agencies to let them know 
about their access to the equipment and the precautions they are taking. 
Finally, the PUC hopes to work with the Legislature to ensure that they have adequate access to 
the information needed to enforce security. They believe their field investigators can greatly 
assist in the rail security measures as long as they are able to access the same information of the 
transit agencies as the FT A. 
Turning to the railroad industry, Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railroad and Union Pacific 
Railroad reacted swiftly to the events of September 11. In the immediate aftermath of the 
attacks, railroads tightened security and intensified inspections across their systems. At the 
direction of the Association of American Railroads (AAR), major railroads, which maintain their 
own police forces to help assure the security of employe.es, property and freight, put enhanced 
security plans in place. Access to important rail facilities was restricted and movement of freight 
to the New York area was suspended completely until the immediate threat was over. 
On October 7, when major U.S. military action was initiated against foreign terrorists, the 
railroad industry again instituted precautionary measures, instituting a 72-hour self-imposed "red 
alert." This red alert included such actions as restricting and increasing security for some types 
of cargo, increasing patrols and security at critical facilities, restricting certain operations near 
major public events, tightening security on railroads' web-based information systems, removing 
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some data, and severely restricting access to information dealing with shipment of certain 
materials. 
However, these new security measures have not come without a price. With the halt in freight 
movement and the unbudgeted increase in security measures, the cost to the railroad industry 
will be significant. Additionally, they are fearful that the threat of terrorism will cause their 
insurance premiums to be increased or denied renewal. To alleviate this financial setback, they 
are supporting a federal measure that will create a railroad security fund and are supporting 
federal action to provide some relief of liability, similar to that granted to airlines, from a 
terrorist attack. They have asked the Legislature to support both measures. 
The rail industry continues to implement the necessary security measures. These measures 
include: 
• Employing heightened patrols, inspections and surveillance by railroad police as 
deemed appropriate for the security of shipments and facilities. 
• Modifying certain train operations commensurate with security requirements. 
• Continuing to operate a 24-hour command center linked to federal national security 
personnel and the railroads' 24-hour operations centers. 
• Continuing to restrict access to its information systems. 
• Maintaining high awareness and vigilance. 
To further address security matters, the AAR Board of Directors has established five critical 
action teams, each led by a senior railroad or AAR executive and involving the full participation 
of all AAR members. The five critical action teams established by the AAR are Information 
Technology and Communications, Physical Infrastructure, Operational Security, Hazardous 
Materials, and Military Liaison. 
Each of the critical action teams described above is working quickly and carefully to assess 
short-term and long-term vulnerabilities in the areas of people, process, and technology and are 
developing an array of additional countermeasures. Some of these new countermeasures, 
designed to prevent, detect, and mitigate any terrorist attack, have already been deployed. To 
assist in this comprehensive effort, AAR has retained a group of former U.S. military and 
government security experts who bring a valued perspective to the evaluation. The analyses and 
action plans generated will form the basis for additional measures deemed necessary to enhance 
the security of the freight rail network. 
To help the industry prioritize the protection of particular assets, Union Pacific established a risk 
profile. Based on a military model, this profile can be determined by the formula "risk= impact 
x vulnerability x threat potential." 
While the industry focuses on increased security, they also believe there needs to be a balance. 
They hope that any additional security measures will be practical and not unnecessarily impede 
vital commerce. 
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Representing the contractors and rail yard workers, the United Transportation Union (UTU) 
asked that they be included in the web of information sharing within the industry. Since they 
deal directly with the system, it is vital that they are aware of what is going on. To emphasize 
the importance of communication, UTU noted the different terminology used by railroad 
operators. Proper communication is the only way to bridge the "railroad dialogue" with the 
"public response dialogue." 
To help improve communication and response, the UTU believes that there should be as many 
operators on the rails as possible. SB 200 (O'Connell), which failed passage in the Assembly 
during the 2000 legislative session, would have mandated two crewmembers on all freight trains 
at all times. They believe the Legislature should revisit this issue. 
Also in support of revisiting SB 200, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE) agrees 
that communication should be enhanced within the entire industry, both by increased personnel 
and improved technology. Other suggested improvements include improved lighting at rail 
yards and increased security regarding transients. The BLE supports an increase in the number 
of PUC inspectors to help enhance rail security and improving the response times of railroad 
police. 
The BLE hopes that the incident command system will be enhanced so that the operating crews, 
the engineers themselves, are kept in the loop regarding certain events. They believe it is 
important that the incident commander gamer the information from the engineers since they 
might be able to provide the most accurate and immediate information. 
Finally, they encouraged increased inspection of cars before departing rail yards. While this may 
cause delays, they believe it is vital to ensure the protection of the cargo. 
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DMV DOCUMENTS 
DMV - Michelle Snyder (Manager of Drivers Licensing) 
Bill Cather (Assistant Director for Legislation) 
CHP- Commissioner Dwight ("Spike") Helmick or stand-in 
California Trucking Ass'n - Stephanie Williams 




The authenticity ofDMV documents, notably the drivers license and other documents that are 
typically used to establish one's identity, is of critical importance in modem society. These 
instruments have been termed "gateway documents" since they enable their holders to establish 
identities (real or fraudulent) that facilitate access to myriad types of benefits, both in the 
financial arena and in the ability to gain physical entrance into public and private facilities, 
including airliners and other transportation facilities. Additionally, the DMV issues 
endorsements to holders of commercial drivers licenses that authorize those licensees to transport 
hazardous materials. 
The panel that examined the security of DMV documents outlined the various steps that are 
being taken to protect against the issuance or use of fraudulent drivers licenses and hazardous 
materials endorsements. Since the integrity of drivers licenses had been the subject of increasing 
scrutiny for some time prior to September 11, the enumerated efforts have been underway for 
many months. However, the importance of DMV document integrity was highlighted by the 
revelation that several of the September 11 hijackers were in possession of false drivers licenses 
issued by other states' departments of motor vehicles. Furthermore, it has been reported that 
members of the terrorist network were seeking hazardous materials endorsements as well. 
Recent reforms instituted by the DMV include matching drivers license applicants against any 
photographic records in the DMV files, verifying social security numbers and citizenship or 
residency documents with the appropriate federal agencies, and enhancing the physical drivers 
license itself to make it more resistant to counterfeiting. Additionally, the DMV publishes a 
brochure to help merchants and others more easily identify false drivers licenses. 
Nevertheless, the ability of individuals to obtain fraudulent birth certificates will continue to 
provide identity thieves an inroad to the procurement of drivers licenses using names other than 
their own. It is widely acknowledged that the best means of conclusively liking the identity of an 
individual to his or her license is through "biometrics" (e.g., fingerprints, retinal scans, facial 
recognition). Money to begin the development of biometric technology for drivers licenses was 
stricken from the 2001 Budget by the Senate budget conferees. Legislation to provide a 
dedicated source of funding for this activity is currently stalled in the Senate. Absent the 
development of a biometric identification system for the drivers license, the integrity of the 
document will remain in doubt. 
Additionally, it was noted that despite the best efforts ofDMV, any reforms are ultimately 
subject to subversion if an identity thief is able to obtain the cooperation of DMV staff. Recent 
publicity regarding this problem has resulted in a spate of investigations and prosecutions that 
will, presumably, discourage illegal activities by DMV personnel. This effect may be transitory, 
however, and it is thought that enactment of stiffer penalties for DMV staff who abet the 
procurement of false drivers licenses would serve as a powerful disincentive to employee 
complicity in identity theft. 
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Finally, in regard to the issuance of drivers licenses based upon social security numbers and 
citizenship or other residency documents, testimony indicated that AB 60, passed by the 
Legislature last summer, would make it more difficult for the DMV to verify the identity of 
individuals applying for drivers licenses. The committee was informed that the Davis 
Administration does not believe the bill was properly on the Governor's desk for consideration 
upon the adjournment of the Legislature and, therefore, that it was not eligible to become law 
without his signature. It was surmised, however, that advocacy groups were prepared to go to 
court to argue that the bill is indeed law and to ask that the DMV be required to implement it. 
On the issue ofhazmat endorsements, it was noted that there is currently no background check 
made of applicants. Although this step would have some impact on screening out potential 
misuse of these endorsements, there is an associated fear that in a tight labor market, it could 
inadvertently screen out trustworthy applicants who may have committed a minor transgression 
many years ago. It was suggested that the parameters of any mandated background check need 
to be carefully developed. 
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
Calif National Guard- Brigadier General Dennis Kenneally 
Office of Emergency Services - Rich Eisner (Regional Manager) 
City of San Jose- Dr. Francis Edwards-Winslow (OES) 
Fremont City Police -Lt. Mike Eads 
Fremont Fire Dept- Vic Valdes (Division Chief) 
Alameda County Fire Dept- Chief Bill McCammon 
Alameda County Sheriffs Dept- Captain James Williams 
Washington Hospital-Kristine LaVoy (Strategic Planning 
Management) 




The recurring central themes in the area of emergency response are well-defined action 
plans, regional coordination of effort, training, staffing, equipment, and supplies, and 
funding. 
The City of San Jose is the model in Northern California for terrorist attack response. It 
was the first city in the nation to create a federally approved terrorism response plan as 
part of its emergency preparedness program first begun in the early 1990's. The City's 
Emergency Operation Plan was developed to comply with the State's Standardized 
Emergency Management System, and to provide a framework for responding to any type 
of disaster. 
As one ofthe country's twenty-seven largest cities, San Jose was chosen to participate in 
the Federal Government's Domestic Preparedness Program. It therefore received training 
from the Department of Defense and planning guidance from the Department of Health 
and Human Services in 1997. It also received funding for the development of a cache of 
equipment and pharmaceuticals to support the care of victims of weapons of mass 
destruction for the first 12 hours following an attack. Over 500 public safety personnel 
and their mutual aid partners completed "train the trainer" courses on responding to 
terrorist attack and caring for the victims of such an attack. In addition, the Department 
of Justice awarded two competitive grants totaling over $1.38 million to the San Jose 
Metropolitan Medical Task Force (MMTF) for planning, equipment and training 
exercises. Regular exercises are conducted with the larger Metropolitan Medical 
Response System (MMRS). The MMRS concentrates on beyond the scene care and 
partners with the County Health Department, the Medical Examiner/Coroner, private 
medical transportation services and the medical community (laboratories, private 
practitioners, and hospitals). 
The City's size and its ability to act on the opportunity afforded it by the federal 
government has given it a huge head start in emergency response preparedness. 
Other cities and regions are not as fortunate. Panelists revealed that Alameda County, 
and most other regions in the State, remain ill-prepared to deal with major hazardous 
materials and biological agent situations. Coordinating federal funds distribution in an 
effective regionalized manner is a real problem. Recently, for example, Fremont and 
Oakland (the County's two largest cities) qualified for emergency medical equipment 
funding but Alameda County and its other cities did not. The effort needs to be regional 
because no one city can respond adequately to an incident on its own. 
Among the problem areas are lack of sustained pharmaceutical supplies (which should be 
replaced every 12 months), mass decontamination facilities and chemical agent detection 
equipment. The expense of maintaining an effective emergency medical response 
program is substantial. 
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For example, a simple decontamination system involving hoses, a tent and peripheral 
equipment can cost more than $20,000 per unit. In addition, county labs are unprepared 
to accept all possible chemical agents for analysis, chemical agent field analyzers are not 
available (the Lawrence Livermore Lab is developing small 
portable devices), and more training for first responders in chemical and biological 
weapon attack scenarios is needed. 
It was suggested that the State can help by creating incentives for regional response 
systems. 
The City of San Jose stressed that the State's public health labs are vastly under-funded 
and under-equipped. They have no microbiologists. In addition, California's paper file 
disease reporting system is inadequate and needs to be computerized and automated. 
Without adequate labs and accurate reporting, disease outbreaks and contamination 
situations can easily reach crisis proportions before state and local officials can act. A 
ventilator shortage also hampers effective emergency medical response. Victims of 
chemical or biological agent contamination need to be placed on ventilators because the 
treatment of such victims shuts down their biological functions to the point where they 
cannot breath on their own. It was also stressed that teachers should receive emergency 
training. 
Local emergency service providers emphasized that more inter-agency practice training 
exercises are necessary. These exercises not only help develop more efficient response 
times, they familiarize the agencies with one another's procedures and therefore 
minimize misunderstandings. 
The State Office ofEmergency Services (OES) continues to coordinate emergency 
response procedures with local governments, and it has developed transportation 
emergency solutions with the National Guard, the CHP and Caltrans since the 1980's, 
including bridge closing contingency plans involving expanded ferry service. The CHP, 
Caltrans and the OES share procedures and protocol. However, communication between 
emergency service providers is still a problem. There is a need for more black box 
transponders in order to communicate with different frequencies. 
The National Guard has called upon an additional 10,000 to 11,000 personnel and is also 
prepared to assist in decontamination scenarios. It works 24 hours a day with OES and 
the Governor's Office, as well as with other state and local agencies. 
Most local law enforcement agencies have chosen specifically identified bridges, roads, 
tunnels and other major facilities within their communities that might be possible terrorist 
targets. Increased security has been implemented to protect these facilities, as well as to 
respond to emergency situations. They are coordinating this effort with the FBI and other 
federal and state agencies. 
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Various agencies raised the issue of funding, since many of the steps being taken present 
substantial long-term budget burdens. Given the State's current budget situation, many 
local government jurisdictions are concerned that they may lose Vehicle License Fee 
(VLF) backfill funds. Many have tapped into this funding source for emergency response 
efforts and, consequently, the loss of these funds would have a substantial impact on 
emergency preparedness. 
Another area of concern has been the inability of first-on-scene responders, such as 
paramedics, to act because of scope of practice issues. There have also been instances of 
law enforcement units not being able to assist their own personnel due to this issue. The 
State can correct these issues through appropriate legislation. 
It is evident from the panel discussions that emergency response needs to be part of a 
proactive coordinated safety effort requiring the updating of building codes, land use, fire 
codes, flood control, hazardous materials handling and disease control procedures. It also 
requires the coordination of medical, law enforcement, hospital, and health services. 
Terrorist attack preparedness needs to part of a well-coordinated emergency response 
program. It is also clear that the issues are usually multi-jurisdictional therefore requiring 
national, state and regional coordination. The State can help by creating coordination and 
incentives for such efforts. 
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Analysis & Conclusions 
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ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS 
While the November 20 hearing examined security issues across most of the varied and diverse 
modes of transportation- air, sea, and ground; highway and rail; passenger and freight- certain 
themes and suggestions recurred throughout the proceedings. It was apparent that within the 
realm of transportation, there are common assessments and recommendations regarding the 
protection of system users from terrorist attack. Identification of these common themes, which 
are described below, may represent the most significant product of the hearing. 
I. Communication & Coordination 
Perhaps the need most often highlighted was in regard to communication and coordination 
among transportation and public safety agencies. In the area of bridge security, for example, 
Caltrans, the CHP, and the Golden Gate Bridge District must (and do) share information with 
one another as well as with the Coast Guard, National Guard, and local law enforcement. These 
relationships, some of which are longstanding, others newly established, are key to the success of 
individual and collective security arrangements. The testimony revealed that through the 
establishment of task forces, the auspices of public agencies and private associations, and the 
simple expedient of one-on-one meetings, a vast collaborative network has evolved within which 
the level of communication and cooperation is exceedingly high. In many instances, however, it 
was suggested that even more collaborative efforts will be necessary. 
II. Sustainability 
Virtually every agency at the hearing described actions taken since September 11 that simply 
cannot be sustained at their current levels using existing resources. Crews are working 
substantial amounts of overtime with few if any days off. Retirees have been called back to 
work and have thus far been willing to remain on the job. Regular agency programs and 
activities have been deferred or neglected. Budgets have been stretched thin or exceeded. In 
order for these efforts to continue, staffing must be increased and budgets augmented. The need 
for some of these ongoing costs may be reduced by one-time capital expenditures for items such 
as fencing, surveillance cameras, motion detectors, and other "target-hardening" measures. 
Additionally, should the threat of terrorism recede and the public apprehension decline over 
time, the state of alert and its concomitant need for resources may be reduced to some degree. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that current levels of effort are not sustainable for much longer under 
existing circumstances and that permanent security arrangements must be designed to be 
sustainable within whatever resource mix is ultimately made available. 
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III. Budgetary Constraints 
Witnesses uniformly recognized that their new monetary needs are unlikely to be met by 
significant state augmentations at a time when the General Fund faces a likely deficit in excess of 
$12 billion. While some transportation sectors (e.g., aviation) have an ability to cover their new 
security costs through customer surcharges, in most instances that approach would simply erode 
the customer base and ultimately be self-defeating. What most agencies are requesting the state 
to do is to advocate on their behalf with the federal government for financial assistance. One 
persistent recommendation was for the Legislature to enact resolutions requesting Congress to 
fund various initiatives that would enhance the ability of these agencies to secure their facilities. 
IV. Building Upon Prior Efforts 
While the September 11 attacks highlighted the need for enhanced security of transportation 
services, the protection of clients has long been a concern of California's providers. From floods, 
fires, and earthquakes to civil unrest and prior threats of terrorism, transportation agencies 
already had developed action plans and procedures and had taken other steps that laid the 
groundwork for more recent anti-terrorist security efforts. In many instances, post-September 11 
planning exercises and risk assessments were simply extensions of activities undertaken prior to 
that date. In other instances, lessons learned from dealing with natural disasters and other 
historical disruptions allowed for the speedy development of anti-terrorism measures. 
V. A void Overreaction 
Several witnesses opined that while their facilities were certainly potential terrorist targets, they 
were unaware of any specific credible terrorist threats against them. Although there was 
universal agreement that all reasonable steps should be taken to close security breaches, many 
agencies expressed concern that the current climate of apprehension might lead to unnecessary 
expenditures and could inadvertently and unduly hinder commerce or travel. One example, cited 
by the Coast Guard, involved the potential interception and inspection of every parcel of cargo 
carried by marine shipping. Since many cargo recipients now use "just-in-time" systems of 
shipment and inventory control, proposed security programs that would have the effect of 
excessively slowing marine commerce would simply result in the diversion of shipments to other 
transportation modes. 
VI. Define the Threat 
Although most agencies cited risk assessments that they have undertaken in the wake of the 
attacks, a few requested the state's assistance in determining the types of incidents they need to 
protect against. In an environment where potential types and agents of terror attacks are virtually 
unlimited, agencies can never hope to attain a completely airtight level of security. While the 
Legislature itself may not have the expertise to make useful threat assessments or threat 
inventories, it does have the ability to convene the various security agencies and experts that can 
perform that function. 
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VII. Reassure the Public 
While it is not possible to guarantee complete security for all transportation users in all segments 
of the industry at all times, the efforts described at the hearing were of much comfort to 
committee members and to other observers. It became quite apparent upon hearing the 
testimony that the efforts of the various parties have been comprehensive, well thought out, and 
well coordinated. And, as previously noted, these security activities pre-date, in large part, 
September 11, so that few agencies are considering these issues for the very first time. The level 
of preparation by transportation providers would be tremendously reassuring to the public were 






The hearing uncovered no magic potions or silver bullets that would universally protect 
transportation facilities and services from terrorist attack. Not surprisingly, the most common 
suggestion was for the infusion of public funds to assist agencies in bearing the new burdens they 
have assumed since September 11 -not an unreasonable request given the labor-intensive and 
otherwise expensive nature of most of the measures already taken or recommended for future 
implementation by these agencies. However, as previously noted, the state is unlikely to be able 
to provide much more than a token amount of financial assistance in this regard. 
Nevertheless, several concrete suggestions were offered by participants for consideration by the 
Legislature. These recommendations fall into three major categories as outlined below: 
Legislation 
+ Enact resolutions supporting various Congressional initiatives that would provide funding 
and other assistance to transportation agencies for their new security responsibilities. 
+ Enact legislation making it a felony for DMV staff to knowingly assist identity thieves in 
obtaining drivers licenses to which they are not entitled. One such bill is AB 1155 (Dutra), 
which is currently in the Senate Public Safety Committee. 
+ Enact legislation to create a funding source for the establishment of a biometric identifier for 
drivers' licenses. One such bill is AB 1474 (Koretz), which is currently in the Senate Privacy 
Committee. 
+ Do not enact legislation (such as AB 60 in its current form) that would hinder the ability of 
DMV to verify the identity of drivers license applicants. 
+ Enact legislation requiring background checks of applicants seeking commercial driver's 
license endorsements authorizing the transportation of hazardous materials. The standards 
for approval of endorsement applicants must be developed with care to assure that they only 
screen out individuals at risk for performing serious criminal acts. 
+ Enact legislation that clarifies the role of the Public Utilities Commission in overseeing the 
security efforts of railroad and transit operators. The legislation should clearly grant the PUC 
access to appropriate railroad and transit agency records and facilities. 
+ Enact legislation increasing the penalties for the commission of terrorist acts targeting 
transportation facility users. 
+ Pass a resolution requesting Congress to reconsider the requirement for airport baggage 
screeners to be American citizens. 
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+ Enact legislation strengthening the state's support of general aviation airports and 
standardizing security procedures at these airports. 
+ Enact legislation streamlining highway project development processes so surplus 
transportation funds may quickly be expended as a means of stimulating the economy. 
+ Enact legislation creating incentives for the establishment of regional emergency response 
systems. 
+ Enact legislation addressing scope-of-practice issues that thwart emergency response efforts 
by on-the-scene responders. 
Budget 
+ Provide funding for the development of a biometric identification system by DMV. 
+ Provide funding and staffing so that CHP may assume its new security functions and 
responsibilities without deferring or neglecting its normal and routine duties. 
+ Provide funding to the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory for the further development of 
technologies that detect and deter terrorist actions. 
+ In addressing the General Fund deficit, resist any proposals to scale back levels of VLF 
reduction offsets currently allocated to local governments. 
Other activities 
+ Support efforts to publicize the high degree of safety that has been achieved through the 
security measures that have been undertaken by transportation providers. 
+ Convene a meeting of security and public safety experts to assist transportation providers in 
identifying and assessing the various potential risks posed by would-be terrorists to their 
facilities, services and passengers. 
+ Coordinate security efforts with the Federal Railroad Administration, Federal Transit 
Administration, and American Public Transportation Association, which will jointly be 
releasing security recommendations early next year drawn from the experiences of transit 




CHAIRMAN'S CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
While the hearing's witnesses offered various observations and suggestions on how to deal with 
the specific needs of their individual agencies, the Chair found it necessary to take a wider view 
of the testimony in order to attain a global perspective on the security challenges facing 
California's transportation sector and the state as a whole. 
The Chair has concluded that the United States finds itself to be in a state of war with enemies 
both known and unknown, foreign and possibly domestic. Under these circumstances, California 
as well as all the other states of the nation must take a variety of actions to secure the home front 
that will be enormously expensive. Just as the testimony indicated that none of California's local 
governments or agencies can reasonably be expected to bear all these new expenses without 
outside assistance, neither can any of the 50 states reasonably be expected to shoulder their new 
burdens without federal help. Since the national defense is a federal responsibility, the cost of 
providing that defense when the home soil is threatened should be a federal responsibility as 
well. 
While the costs of protecting our facilities and services will be inordinate, they pale in 
comparison to the cost of replacing just a handful of our most treasured assets. Our failure to 
take adequate security steps today will be judged harshly by our forebears should we fall prey, 
unprepared, to terrorist attack tomorrow. In the Chair's words: "The day of reckoning is 
coming." It is incumbent upon the state, and in tum the federal government, to face up to its 
responsibilities to protect the citizenry. 
The Chair believes that the most prudent means of providing an adequate defense is first for the 
appropriate public safety or "first response" agencies (CHP, OES, National Guard, and Coast 
Guard) to come together and assess California's defense posture (i.e., Where will any likely 
attacks come from? What will be the nature of the attacks? Which assets are not adequately 
protected and what are their points of vulnerability?) Next, these agencies must create an 
inventory of security measures that will address the vulnerabilities they have identified. Finally, 
the estimated costs of these measures, both one-time outlays for equipment and ongoing 
expenditures for personnel, must be quantified and the results of the assessment must be 
transmitted, confidentially, to the legislative leadership. 
Testimony offered at the hearing indicated that many of these assessments have already been 
accomplished, at least on a preliminary level. In any event, the Chair specifically recommends 
that legislation be adopted requiring a more comprehensive and coordinated assessment. The 
results of that assessment should be submitted to the Legislature within a very tight timeframe. 
Once the results have been received, the Legislature must identify and allocate sufficient 
resources to fund the recommended measures and should mandate their implementation, without 
waiting/or federal assistance. Should the federal government shirk its responsibility in this area, 
the state would have to look to bonding, temporary sales tax increases, or any other expedient to 
come up with the necessary financing. The physical well-being of the populace requires that we 
do no less. 
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The Chair has been both sobered and encouraged by the information garnered at this hearing. 
Public safety and transportation agencies have done yeoman's work in addressing the inordinate 
number of security concerns that have recently come to their attention. It is clear, however, that 
their efforts not only are not sustainable at their current level without additional resources, but 
that they are also not yet comprehensive enough to yield the degree of security that Californians 
expect and deserve from their government. 
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Appendix A: 
Bridges, Tunnels and Highways 
Golden Gate Bridge, Highwav and Transportation District 
Security Improvements 
In light of the tragic events that occurred on September 11,2001, the Golden Gate Bridge has developed an action 
plan designed to increase the safety and security of its transportation facilities and the people who use them. The 
cost to implement the measures identified in this plan is $24.45 million. These measures include expansion of 
our security forces and installation of equipment to support tightened access monitoring and security. 
Golden Gate Bridge 
Security of the Bridge is of utmost importance, as it is a core element of the San Francisco Bay Area transportation 
network. The potential for terrorist activities at the Bridge is heightened by its status as a national landmark and 
American icon. As a result, immediately following the September 11 terrorist activities, the Golden Gate Bridge took 
action to install an increased security presence on the Bridge, its highway approaches, and adjacent lands consisting of 
Bridge security personnel, National Park Service police and state law enforcement personnel. Security measures to be 
funded with this request include sustaining these increased levels of security personnel at the Bridge coupled with 
installation of additional surveillance, access control, intrusion detection, and security lighting systems on the Bridge 
and at various Bridge access points, including the national park facilities at each end of the Bridge. 
FY 2001-02 
Qperatin_g Item DescriPtion 
$3~000,000 Bridge Security Personnel To provide additional security personnel/patrols 24/7/365 
$4,000,000 Contract Federal/State/Local Law To provide 2417/365 security patrols on Bridge highway approaches and 
Enforcement Services on NPS land immediately adjacent to and underneath the Bridge 
$7,000,000 Total Bridge Operating 
Capital Equipment Item DescriPtion 
$2,000,000 Capital Equipment Surveillance cameras, monitoring and intrusion detection equipment, 
electronic access control systems, security gates and fencing, security 
lighting. and back-up emergencv communications equipment 
$2,000,000 Total Bridge Capital 
$9.000.000 TOTAL BRIDQE REQUEST 
Golden Gate Transit 
The Golden Gate Transit bus and ferry system provides 11.3 million passenger trips per year in the 60+ mile service 
corridor between San Francisco, Marin, Sonoma and Contra Costa Counties. These facilities and services were 
critically needed on September 11 and after serious earthquakes. Security measures to be funded with this request 
include expansion of security forces and installation of additional surveillance, access control, intrusion detection, and 
security lighting systems at various transit facilities, particularly at the Larkspur and San Francisco Ferry Terminal 
facilities. They also include improved communications systems and vehicle tracking systems. 
FY 2001-02 .. 
Ooerating Item Description 
$2,000,000 Bus Security Personnel 
$2,000,000 Fe!!Y Security Personnel To provide additional rotating security patrols at transit facilities 2417/365 
$4,000,000 Total Transit Operatin_g < 
Capital Equipment Item Descriotion 
$600,000 Bus Capital Equipment Surveillance cameras, monitoring and intrusion detection equipment, 
$1,100,000 Ferry Capital Equipment electronic access control systems, security gates and fencing, security 
lighting, and back-uQ_ emergency communications equipment 
$9,000,000 Automatic Vehicle Locator To provide A VL and an integrated radio communications system to 
System support real-time surveillance and monitoring of bus operations 
$750,000 Emergency Power Generators To provide sufficient back-up power generation to ensure continuous 
(Novato/Santa Rosa) operation ofGGT bus services during an emergency 
$11,450,000 Total Transit Capital 
$15,450.000 TOTAL TRANSIT REQUEST 





TESTIMONY BY STEVEN GROSSMAN, DIRECTOR OF AVIATION 
OAKLAND INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT SECURITY 
ASSEMBLY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE 
NOVEMBER 20, 2001 
Good morning Chairman Dutra and members of the Committee, my name is Steve Grossman 
and I'm the Aviation Director at Oakland International Airport. I'm pleased to come before this 
committee today to discuss the current status of our airport security measures and to look at what 
the state legislature can do to assist California airports. Since we're in our busiest week of the 
year, the week of Thanksgiving, it is particularly relevant that we are looking at this important 
issue at this time. 
First, I'd like to give you the good news. The Oakland Airport is rebounding from the recent 
tragic events, with customers returning to use our facilities. Our passenger levels for October 
were 95% of what they were last October. Although we lost more than 5% of our passengers, 
since we were growing rapidly this year, we are pleased that we did not sustain greater losses. 
Furthermore, passenger load factors are at the expected November levels. Our November 
passenger totals are expected to equal those of November 2000. Concession revenue is at the 
expected November 2000 levels. Food and Beverage/News Gift revenues are higher than 2000 
levels. We are still being contacted by airlines that wish to move to Oakland. And, lastly, 
domestic and international carriers are adding new service at Oakland International. 
However, even though our numbers look extremely positive, September II will have a major 
impact now, as well as in the future, on our bottom line. We have placed a tremendous amount 
of our time, efforts, and finances into improving airport security. We no longer can return to the 
levels that we saw on September 10. Therefore, we expect our security costs this year will 
increase by at least $7 million due to the increased standards. I will discuss this further when I 
respond to the three questions posed by the Committee. 
I would like to step back for a moment to reflect on what I believe is the most critical issue that 
our policy makers can address. The issue that I am referring to is the definition of"the threat." 
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for airports to protect our passengers and the public 
without understanding what we are guarding against. Defining "the threat" will enable airports 
to come up with viable solutions and directed efforts to avoid those dangers. Without this 
definition, airports are left with a monumental task - to come up with an infinite number of 
scenarios of potential harms that may be exacted against the public and then to implement 
policies to prevent these potential activities. At this point, we simply are unable to address this 
topic in such a widespread manner. 
Just this past week, Congress passed important aviation security legislation. We believe that this 
will boost the confidence of the traveling public and we hope that this will sustain higher 
passenger levels. While overall this was very positive and important legislation, there were 
elements of this legislation that will be extremely costly and difficult to implement. 
I look forward to providing information today to the committee to assist you as you craft your 
recommendations· for the Speaker. The airport community looks forward to working with the 
Committee as well as the State Legislature, as we grapple with the difficult security issues that 
we are faced with on a daily basis. Thank you. 
QUESTIONS 
1. What has Oakland International Airport done to enhance security? 
Oakland International Airport has been working diligently to ensure the safety of its passengers 
and employees. Following the events of September 11, the following actions were taken to 
increase security and comply with all federal directives relative to Airport Security: 
• Oakland Police Officers on-duty were increased from 8 Yz to 21 
Oakland Police Department is responsible for security within terminal buildings 
• Alameda County Sheriffs Office assigned 23 deputies to the Airport 
Sheriff is responsible for security on roadways, parking areas and terminal curb areas. 
Also responsible for monitoring activities of private security firm. 
• Private security firm increased its staffing to handle additional posts at vehicle access gates 
and parking lots close to the terminals. 
• The short-term parking lot was closed within 300 feet of terminals 
• Airport implemented a monitoring program to ensure commitments are met 
• National Guard is staffing the checkpoints with three guardsmen 
• Port Board enacted performance standards program for security checkpoints 
• The Oakland Airport expects an increase in security costs of $7 million per year 
Although this increased security has caused inconveniences to our travelers, we have not been 
receiving many complaints. The traveling public has seemed to be pleased with our efforts to 
enhance our security. 
2. What more can be done to increase security at Oakland International? 
There are two areas where I believe there could be efforts to increase our security. The first is 
educating employees and others who enter the airport operating area about security risks at the 
airport. It is important that we not only educate airport employees, particularly those who have 
contact with the airport operating area, but also those who serve the airplanes. There are 
approximately 100 people who will have contact with an airplane once it reaches the ground. 
The caterer, the fueler, the cleaning staff, the mechanics and the marshals are just a few of those 
individuals who will come into contact with it in addition to the on-board staff. We need not 
only to educate these individuals initially on airline security risks, but also to ensure that this 
subject is taught on a continuing basis to these employees. 
The second area is more Oakland International Airport specific, although it applies to many other 
California airports. This is the issue of initiating a central point of access for the airport 
operating area. What would be ideal would be to redesign our airport to ensure that every person 
and every item that comes into the airport operating area is screened. This central point would 
enable us to make a thorough check of each person or item that would be getting close to an 
airplane. This central point should contain x-ray machines to enact this function. 
This effort, however, would pose a significant cost to our airport. This brings me to your third 
question, "What can the state legislature do to help?" 
3. What can the State Legislature do to help? 
Quite frankly, the most useful assistance that airports could receive from the State Legislature is 
help with funding these increased security efforts. All ofthese efforts that are already underway, 
and those that are contemplated, cost significant dollars. If the State was able to assist with this 
funding, it would relieve much of the burden on our airports. 
Furthermore, as stated in my opening statement, it would be extremely helpful if the State, in 
concert with the Federal government, would help the airports direct their efforts by defining "the 
threat." If the threat was defined, our airports could place the necessary resources into the most 
appropriate activities to protect the public. 
City of Livermore 
Livermore Municipal Airport 
Leander Hauri, A.A.E. 
Airport Manager 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman Dutra, members of the Committee. My name is Leander 
Hauri. As current president of the Association of California Airports, an 
organization of approximately 150 members largely representing the states smaller 
facilities, I'd like to express our concern with the state of security at California's 
smaller airports. 
As you know, small airports in other states figured prominently in the activities of 
the September 11th terrorists. They took flying lessons, rented aircraft, toured crop 
dusting operations and effectively had unfettered access to these facilities. Small 
airports remain vulnerable. As of today, there is virtually no state financial or 
regulatory involvement in security of smaller airfields. Other states have taken the 
lead by funding security enhancements and regulating security requirements in 
order to preclude the use of these facilities as terrorist launching pads. 
Our industry would like to see the State Legislature introduce legislation to tighten 
up this vulnerability by funding security enhancements and regulating uniform 
security requirements at these smaller fields. Well over one hundred million 
dollars in jet fuel sales tax revenue goes into the state's general fund each year, 
with only something close to eight million dollars returning to benefit aviation in 
the form of funding for the Caltrans Division of Aeronautics. 
California has one of the most under-funded aviation programs in the country. The 
events of the last two months have clearly illustrated both the importance of our 
airports system to our economy as well as its vulnerability. Prior to September 
11th, airports faced challenges with inadequate funding, keeping up with 
infrastructure maintenance, capacity, mitigating the impact of aircraft noise on our 
neighbors and dealing with the consequences of incompatible land use near 
airports. 
Add to those issues now the lack of meaningful security in and around our smaller 
airports. Security is not simply a large airport issue. Terrorists have demonstrated 
their ability to exploit our weaknesses. Every California airport represents a 
gateway to the national air transportation system .. Let's not fix the problem at the 
States largest airports while leaving our smaller airports exposed. California's 
small airports need your help, now more than ever. 
Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today. I'd be happy to 
answer any questions. 
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Good Morning my name is Tom Csekey, I am Vice President of SEIU, 
Local1877. 
SEIU represents 1000's of airport workers - in particular we represent 
about 600 screeners at LAX, 500 at SFO, and are organizing 100 at 
Oakland International. 
We have for years spoken out about a system at our nations airports 
which did not work - in part because the system in place by the Airlines 
forced contractors to make ever lower bids to maintain the work and thus 
paying the screeners just slightly over minimum wage. 
This led to extreme high turnover rates and a workforce which was 
not properly trained. 
The recent legislation concerning Airport Security which was signed by 
President Bush yesterday has some serious flaws- in fact it punishes the 
workers for system failure. 
SEIU is outraged that the final legislation signed requires citizenship to 
work as a screener. 
In order to serve in our Armed Forces you do not have to be a citizen yet 
you can come out and not be able to get a job as a screener. 
The current workforce is low paid and thus the job dislocation will hit the 
poorest communities the hardest again. 
If the government displaces them - government must be responsible to 
find them alternate employment. 
We must insist on a smooth transition which allows those who qualify to 
be retrained in order to remain in the Federalized jobs. 
So SEIU asks the California Legislature to-
1. Write a letter to Congress protesting the Citizenship requirement 
for screeners and urge that piece of the legislation to be 
corrected. 
2. We ask for State Government to work with Local 
Government and Federal government to insure that those 
screeners who are displaced be found alternate employment. 
If the Federal government sees fit to bail out the Airline Industry certainly 
we can bail out the additional victims of a failed Airport security system. 
Thank you. 
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October 12, 2001 
Honorable [Congressional member] 
Washington, DC 20515 
Re: National Airport Security System 
Dear Representative [ Name ]: 
On behalf of the 450,000 working people in California who are members of the 
Service Employees International Union, I am writing to ask you to support 
Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta's proposal to strengthen our nation's 
airport security system. His proposal would change the security screening 
procedures in our nation's 450 airports to a safer system that is similar to 
successful models in Europe and Israel. 
Secretary Mineta's approach is a better alternative to plans currently being 
debated in Congress that would exclusively use federal employees to screen 
passengers at all airport security checkpoints. It would institute new thorough 
federal governmental control and oversight to ensure a high level of security 
while taking steps to professionalize screeners through stricter hiring practices, 
more training, better pay and benefits, and other improved standards. 
This approach would avoid a serious pitfall: the near impossibility of recruiting 
and training a new 30,000-person screener workforce within a reasonable 
timeframe necessary to address the public's aviation safety concerns. 
As you consider improvements to aviation security at this critical time, SEIU-
the largest union of private security workers and the largest union in the AFL-
CIO- urges you to ensure that the final bill: 
• Establishes rigorous standards and criteria for hiring screeners, including 
federally administered background checks for current and new 
employees; 
• Establishes federal training programs for screeners and management; 
• Establishes federal certification for individual screeners and screening 
companies; 
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• Applies policies to all airports - both large and small - in order to maintain a 
uniform safety standard throughout the system; 
• 
• 
Ensures adequate worker pay and benefits to decrease turnover rates and stabilize 
the screener workforce; 
Mandates government audits of training procedures; and 
• Gives the government the right to suspend licenses of, and terminate companies 
that are performing poorly- allowing maximum accountability and flexibility. 
We would welcome the opportunity to meet with you to discuss these principles and provide 
more information about workers' concerns about public safety and aviation security 
measures being considered. Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
Allen Davenport 
Director of Government Relations 
cc: Dean Tipps 
Skip Roberts 
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SEIU Press Release 
For Immediate Release: Saturday, September 15, 2001 
Airport Security Workers Issue Checklist for Protecting Public Safety 
Airport security workers issue five proposals for protecting passenger safety. 
For several years, airport security workers have been asking for improvements they need to be able to protect 
public safety. 
As a result of the September 11 tragedy, Congress and the nation may now be ready to act on the concerns 
security workers have been raising. Here are five proposals from members of the Service Employees 
International Union (SEIU), the largest union of security employees in the U.S. and the largest union in the 
AFL-CIO: 
1. Increased Federal Role, With Airports- Not Airlines- Managing Security 
According to a recent General Accounting Office report, "When several air carriers and security companies are 
handling screening within one airport, as is the case in the United States, responsibility is fragmented, uniformity 
is lacking, and competition among the security companies to be the low bidder for the air carriers' screening 
business puts downward pressure on screeners' wages, making it difficult to attract and retain good screeners." 
(Longstanding Problems Impair Airport Screeners' Performance, June 2000, page 38) When airports are 
responsible for hiring and overseeing pre-board screening - as they are in Europe- there is not the same 
pressure to put profits ahead of passenger and public safety. 
Increasing the federal government's role in training, certifying, and supervising screeners - including placing a 
U.S. Marshall at every airport checkpoint- along with mandating better staffing, working conditions, and 
compensation, is essential to ensuring that the 18,000 screeners in the U.S. are able to make our nation's 450 
airports as secure as possible. 
2. Screener Staffing Should Allow For Thorough Inspections 
Too often, airport security checkpoints are staffed at skeleton levels and workers who are unable to work are not 
replaced. Requiring adequate staffing levels- and vigilantly pursuing understaffing violations- would help move 
people through security checkpoints quickly and reduce the chance that security could be breached. 
X-ray screeners also should be rotated after 30 minutes so they are as alert as possible. Currently, it is not 
uncommon for x-ray screeners to be forced to stay at their post for as long as an hour and a half without a break, 
causing lack of concentration, blurry vision, and headaches. 
3. Pay and Benefits Should Be Raised to Reduce Turnover 
Even though pre-board screeners play a critical role in aviation security, they are among the lowest-paid 
employees in U.S. airports. Last year, the GAO found that starting salaries for screeners at 14 of the nation's 19 
largest airports were $6 per hour or less, and starting salaries were $5.15 per hour at the remaining five airports. 
(Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener Performance Problems, March 16, 2000, page 5) Many 
screeners have to work two or more jobs, leaving them tired and distracted as they scan thousands of objects 
per hour for tiny but potentially significant signs of danger. 
According to the Federal Aviation Administration, from May 1998 through April 1999, turnover at the same 19 
largest airports ranged from 1 00 to more than 400 percent, meaning nearly all workers leave after only a few 
months, just at the point where they have mastered the job. Without the paid sick leave or health coverage that 
most other workers receive, they are on the job even when not feeling well enough to focus properly. 
Improved pay and benefits would reduce the industry's alarmingly high turnover rate and make it easier to recruit 
and retain the kind of skilled, experience, stable workforce that passengers and the public can depend on. It 
would also bring standards for airport security closer to those in European airports, where security workers 
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typically make at least twice what their American counterparts receive, along with health coverage, sick leave, 
and other benefits. 
4. Screeners Should Be Given Tools to Meet the Demands of the Job 
Screeners' skills vary from airport-to-airport and even concourse-to-concourse, since the air carriers - not the 
airports or the federal government - design and administer their training and oversee their testing. Screeners can 
be on the job after less than two days of training. There is no consistent and reliable means to measure their 
performance or the performance of their managers or equipment. Extremely high turnover makes the problem 
even worse. 
To ensure consistent, high-level training, the federal government must provide it. With initial and ongoing training, 
screeners should be taught the skills they need to meet the inter-personal, regulatory, and technical demands of 
their jobs, and those skills must be updated on a regular basis with classroom, as well as hands-on training. Aii 
manuals should be regularly updated. Security companies also must use up-to-date, quality equipment that is 
promptly replaced if it breaks. 
When the GAO studied practices in France, England, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Canada, the agency noted, 
"A test conducted jointly by FAA and one of the countries showed that the other country's screeners detected 
over twice as many test objects as did U.S. screeners." 
5. Screeners Need a Strong, Independent Voice to Speak Out for Safety 
Many security workers are afraid to speak out for safety. Screeners need to know that they can raise safety 
concerns with Federal Aviation Administration or airport officials without fear of retribution. 
Screeners also must have the freedom to form a union so they can gain a strong, independent voice to speak out 
for safer procedures, improve their working conditions, and bargain for better wages and benefits. When 
screeners at airports in Los Angeles and San Francisco formed a union, they won a living wage for security 
employees and quality standards that gave airports the authority to enforce rules protecting passenger and public 
safety. 
Nearly all European screeners have both union protection and strong legal rights to speak out about safety 
violations. 




Heightened Federal Standards with Local Accountability 
Proposed Legislation to Improve Airport Security 
The current system of low-bid contracting, poor screener training, high turnover, minimal background 
-checks, and inadequate staffing jeopardizes our ability to adequately safeguard passenger security. The 
responsibility of aviation security must clearly be removed from the airlines and replaced by a new 
program with higher federal standards and stronger oversight for screeners, screening procedures, and 
security contractors. 
In tandem with increased federal standards, airports should assume responsibility for enforcing these 
new regulations as part of an integrated airport-wide security program. This program should include law 
enforcement officers at each screening checkpoint to ensure that federal standards are met. The 
program should be paid for through a nominal per-ticket user fee. 
The following proposed legislation, similar to airport security programs common throughout Europe, is 
the most comprehensive and enforceable long-term solution to addressing airport security needs: 
1. Increased Federal Standards for Screeners and Contractors 
Tough Federal standards must be established to: 
• Provide strict guidelines for screener training and certification before screeners are permitted to 
staff a checkpoint. Training must address all of the interpersonal, regulatory, and technical 
demands of checkpoint security jobs, and those skills must be updated on a regular basis with 
classroom, as well as hands-on, training. 
• Provide comprehensive government-conducted background checks for all airport screeners. 
• Increase staffing levels at checkpoints to allow for thorough inspections of passengers and 
luggage and to ensure that screeners who monitor x-ray machines are rotated every 30-minutes to 
reduce fatigue and concentration lapses. 
• Provide increased pay and benefits for screeners. Improved pay and benefits would reduce the 
industry's alarmingly high turnover rate and make it easier to recruit and retain the kind of skilled, 
experience, stable workforce on which passengers and the public can depend. It would also bring 
standards for airport security closer to those in European airports, where security workers typically 
make at least twice what their American counterparts receive, along with health coverage, sick 
leave, and other benefits, with the result that annual turnover is often below five percent. 
• Ensure that security screening equipment is up-to-date, quality equipment that is promptly 
replaced if it breaks. 
• Provide screeners with whistleblower protection to raise safety without fear of retribution. 
• Ensure that the Federal Government certifies prospective contractors before they are able to 
operate at U.S. airports. Contractors must be re-certified each year and be debarred if they have 
too many violations. 
2. An Airport-Wide Security Program with Local Accountability 
• In order to ensure that there are no gaps in or a lack of coordination in airport security operations, 
security screening must be integrated into existing airport security systems that include airport 
oversight of airport police, airfield access, baggage handling, terminal gate guards and parking lot 
security. Only by having one entity that is familiar with the particular needs of each airport 
responsible for all security at an airport can we be assured of coordinated and seamless security 
from airport entry to the plane. 
• In order to ensure full integration of all security operations at airports, this comprehensive security 
program for each airport must be administered locally by an Airport Security Director who oversees 
the implementation of federal security and screening standards at all airport screening 




responsible for all security at an airport can we be assured of coordinated and seamless security 
from airport entry to the plane. 
• The Airport Security Director must assign a law enforcement officer to supervise each security 
screening checkpoint. Each officer should be trained to enforce all federal security screening 
procedures and will ensure that individual screeners and contractors are in complete compliance. 
3. Funding Through Passenger Security User Fee 
• This comprehensive airport security program would be funded though a Passenger Security User 
Fee applied to each ticket and redistributed to each airport based their number of annual 
enplanments. A tripling of current U.S. screening costs, to pay for the aforementioned security 
enhancements, would cost each airline passenger an estimated $2 per airline ticket. 
• Airport authorities should be indemnified beyond $1 million from liability through a system of 
self-insurance funded through the user fee. 
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Chronology of SEIU's Push for Enhanced Aviation Security 
June/July, 1998: Hundreds of airline passenger security and service workers at Los Angeles 
International Airport (LAX) begin organizing with the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 
-Local1877 in order to improve wages, benefits and working conditions. Workers testify before City 
Council about how high turnover, low pay, and inadequate staffing and training hurt passenger security 
and safety. 
November 10, 1998: Based primarily on the testimony of pre-board screeners at LAX and concern about 
high turnover, the Los Angeles City Council votes to amend the City's Living Wage Ordinance to cover 
airline subcontracted security workers at LAX. Wages are lifted from $12,000 to $18,000 a year. 
January 1999: After a number of security breaches at LAX, pre-board screeners meet with FAA officials 
to discuss concerns about staffing, training and the need for whistle-blower protection for security 
personnel. Over 60 LAX pre-board screeners sign a petition to the FAA calling for the FAA to address 
high turnover, short staffing, and the need for whistle-blower protection for screeners who speak out 
about security concerns. 
February 16, 1999: A special hearing of the Los Angeles City Council Commerce Committee is called to 
address screener concerns about airport security. Workers testify that contractors continue to ignore 
staffing and training concerns and that screeners suffer from blurry vision, headaches and inability to 
concentrate when contractors fail to rotate them every 30 minutes as is customary. 
September/October 1999: Airport Screeners at San Francisco International Airport (SFO) together 
with SEIU Local 790 raise concerns about low pay, high turnover and inadequate training in testimony 
before the San Francisco Board of Supervisors and SFO officials. 
January 2000: San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown, together with SFO officials, passes the Quality 
Standards Program designed to raise wages, improve hiring standards and increase training standards 
for airport security personnel, including all pre-board screeners. 
April 4, 2000: SEIU Local 1877 brings an LAX pre-board screener to testify at an FAA public hearing in 
San Francisco. The screener, together with an LAX Airport Commissioner, Miguel Contreras, provides 
testimony about the need to reduce turnover, improve staffing and training standards and protect 
screeners against retaliation for speaking out about security concerns. 
January 2001: SEIU Local 6, together with other Seattle airport unions, issues a policy memo to 
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA) officials calling on the Port of Seattle to address high 
turnover and low wages among pre-board screeners at SEA-TAC. 
June 14, 2001: Screeners at Oakland International Airport (OAK) meet with President of Oakland Port 
Commission to discuss their concerns about how low-bid contracting, high turnover, and working 
conditions adversely impact airport security. 
June 25, 2001: Screeners at OAK testify about security concerns to Aviation Committee of Oakland Port 
Commission. 
July/August 2001: Huntleigh (ICTS) screeners at LAX, OAK, and SEA meet with Southwest, Alaska and 
Northwest Airlines as well as with airport officials to raise concerns about how working conditions and 
management practices prevent them from providing the best possible security services. In OAK and 
SEA, SEJU and screeners ask airport officials to adopt Quality Standards Programs, similar to measures 
adopted in Los Angeles and San Francisco, to reduce turnover and ensure that security contractors are 




Rail and Transit 

TRI-DELTA TRANSIT 
Testimony of the California Transit Association 
to the 
Assembly Committee on Transportation 
Information Hearing 
925 757 2530 P.02/03 
Impact of Terrorism on State Transportation Services and Facilities 
Tuesday, November 20, 2001 
Jeanne Krieg 
Chair, California Transit Association 
CEO/General Manager, Eastern Contra Costa Transit Authority 
X Introduction and thank you for invite to participate. Jeanne Krieg, Chair of the California 
Transit Association, General Manager of the Eastern Contra Costa Transit Authority I Tri 
Delta (Antioch). 
X The Association represents 80 of the state's public transit operators, including the 10 
largest urban systems, as well as suburban and rural systems throughout the state. We 
represent both bus and rail systems. Several of our members are on the panel today 
X Last year Califomia,s transit operators provided more than 1.3 billion passenger trips. 
Our members provide about 85-90% of the transit trips in California. 
X As stewards of the public trust as well as public funds, the top priority of all California 
transit operators is to provide safe, efficient and effective transportation services to our 
citizens. We have always focused much of our energy and resources on ensuring the 
safety and security of our operations and facilities. 
X We have always worked with our local, regional, state and federal law enforcement, 
medical and emergency service agencies on disaster and emergency preparedness 
training. All of our agencies have written plans to cover such contingencies, and most of 
us actually participate in local agreements spelling out which agency takes which actions 
during a disaster or emergency. And, we regularly train and re-train on these plans, 
enhancing communications and relationships with our partner agencies, and refining the 
skills and response times of our own personnel. 
You have invited some of our largest systems who operate some of the most high profile services 
and facilities in the country to speak to you today. They will detail for you the specifics of their 
plans and programs so I will focus my comments on the small and medium operators. 
X To illustrate what some of our other, smaller operators are doing, I'll describe just some 
of the recent and planned efforts of one small-medium operator on the Monterey 
Peninsula: 
X Conducted a risk assessment of the agency services and buildings. 
X Practiced with local SWAT team on bus hijacking scenarios. 
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X Trained. local fire department and EMT personnel on how to access a bus, 
use its equipment, and transport wounded passengers from the vehicle. 
X Consulted with local counter-terrorist expert on preparation measures. 
X Educated agency staff: how to communicate with the public in such an 
event. emergency contact information. etc. 
X Updated their contingency plan for agency's buses to be used in 
evacuation of surrounding communities and from specific buildings. 
X For the most part, smaller agencies do not employ their own security or police forces. 
They do often, however, have informal agreements with the local police or sheriff for 
regular observation of transit routes and vehicles during service. 
X Some of our larger members, are upgrading security forces, adding personnel to routes or 
stations, and adding or upgrading teclmology like on-board or in-station video cameras. 
Of course, all these efforts require additional financial investments. 
X Additionally, the Federal Transit Administration has always provided training and 
resources to transit agencies on emergency and even terrorist situations. For instance, the 
FTA published in 1997 a synthesis of best practices on "Emergency Preparedness for 
Transit Terrorism, and a synthesis on "Improving Transit Security., 
X Other published resources include 1999's ''The Use of technology in Preparing Subway 
Systems for Chemical I Biological Terrorism," 1998's "Defending Subways Against 
Biological Terrorism," and this year's "Protecting Surface Transportation Systems and 
Patrons from Terrorist Activities." 
X Existing training courses provided by theFT A include "Threat Management and 
Emergency Response to Bus Hijacking," "Transit Bus System Safety," ''Threat 
Management and Emergency Response to Rail Hijacking," ''Transit Rail System Safety," 
"Effectively Managing Transit Emergencies," and ''Response to Weapons of Mass 
Destruction." 
X Since September 11th, the FTA has indicated that it is arranging to have professional 
security experts conduct security assessments of the 100 largest transit systems in the US. 
In addition, the FTA will be offering two-day, cost-free security awareness and training 
workshops across the country. The FT A already sent us a Safety and Security Tool Kit, 
containing many publications and resources on these subjects, a swmnary of practical 
security and emergency response advice from New York and Washington, D.C., and 
sample materials to increase public awareness about safety and security. 
X Thank you for your attention and efforts. 
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Good morning, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. for the opportunity to appear before 
the Assembly Transportation Committee to update you on Amtrak's efforts to enhance 
the security of the traveling public in the wake of the horrible tragedy that was September 
II. Now, more than ever, the indispensable role that passenger rail plays in our nation's 
transportation system is abundantly clear. For three days, when not a single commercial 
airline was operating in the United States, Amtrak kept business people moving and 
brought stranded family members home. Here in California, the trains continued to run, 
often very full. The State of California is one of Amtrak's most valued partners, and your 
history of support for planning, developing and investing in passenger rail services has 
become a standard to which other states look as an example. The State's investment is 
based on the notion ofproviding a multi-modal transportation system, which allows for 
the many choices oftravel, resulting in reduced congestion, improved mobility and many 
alternatives, especially in times of national emergency. Your foresight is commendable. 
Californians - indeed all Americans - are riding the rails in substantial numbers, 
even in the face of dramatic decreases in travel nationwide. Americans are simply 
staying home these days. Some Amtrak services - notably the Northeast Corridor and 
corridors such as the Pacific Surfliner- have seen strong ridership gains since the 
September 11th tragedy. Others- such as the Cascades in the Pacific Northwest and the 
Capitols- are more affected by the downturn in the economy. While airlines are seeing 
decreases of 20 - 25 percent, Amtrak's ridership nation-wide has declined just 1% during 
the month of October. Here on the West Coast- where the soft economy is having an 
effect more than other regions -- ridership is even with last year. Amtrak is being called 
on to play a greater role than ever in today's transportation environment. People still 
need to attend their business meetings, visit their grandchildren or get away with the kids, 
but Amtrak does not offer sufficient capacity over some of our routes. 
With the demand and attention in a post-September 11 environment comes the 
need to reassess the type of safety and security measures that we need across the system. 
Quite literally, our world changed instantaneously and Amtrak moved quickly to keep 
pace and implement some important security enhancements. Shortly after September 
11th' Congress asked Amtrak to take a look at its security measures and report back. In 
response, Amtrak assembled a $ 3.14 billion September 11 Response Package that I will 
discuss in just a moment. But let me tell you how Amtrak responded on September 11th 
and the days following. 
Almost immediately after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon, Amtrak suspended all train operations so that an inspection of all the rights-of-
way over which we operate could be conducted. Our engineers, as well as the engineers 
of the freight railroads over which we operate, ensured that all of the infrastructure- all 
of the bridges and tunnels and rails- were safe for our passengers. Theinspection was 
expeditious and full operation was resumed hours later. As I mentioned earlier, as the 
airlines were grounded for the next several days, Amtrak was one of the only public 
carriers keeping America moving. 
In the days after September 11, Amtrak's nationally accredited police force led 
the effort to identify and implement security enhancements throughout the system, 
consistent with Amtrak's current level of resources. For example, for the first time ever 
in the rail industry, passengers are required to produce photo identification before being 
issued a ticket. In addition, our QuikTrak ticket machines -the self-service machines 
located throughout the system are now equipped with a system that checks data contained 
on a person's credit card against a FBI maintained watch-list. In fact, regardless ofwhere 
a reservation is made - whether at a QuikTrak machine, online or with an Amtrak agent -
names are automatically compared with the FBI's watch list on a real-time basis. 
Many of our stakeholders ask about our baggage policy, and I can report that 
Amtrak does inspect its checked baggage as well as its mail and express shipments. It's 
important to recognize, however, that- world-wide- surface transportation systems are 
open systems, distinguishable from the enclosed environment oftypical airline travel. 
Surface transportation generally does not employ baggage screening or metal-detection in 
the stations or on the trains. But Amtrak police officers, who have been on highest alert 
almost every day since the attack, will search individual bags with probable cause. Our 
police force has been more visible, more vigilant and takes its mission very seriously. 
The Amtrak Police Department coordinates closely with outside agencies - most notably 
the FBI, other law enforcement agencies and our host railroads- to improve the 
monitoring of our physical infrastructure and facilities. 
We are consistently educating and training our employees to be aware of 
suspicious items, such as packages, and to be diligent about the "Employee Watch 
Program" - a proactive program to ensure that our employees are actively working to 
keep guests, the equipment and themselves safe and secure. 
These are things that Amtrak can do, and has been doing, to both enhance security 
and bolster the public's confidence in passenger rail travel. What Congress asked 
Amtrak to provide them with was an estimate of what we need to move forward. 
Americans are counting on Amtrak, more than e\·er, to get them where they need to be 
with the utmost safety and care.· Amtrak requested $1.53 billion in safety and security 
improvements and $1.61 billion for capacity to meet the demand. Were Amtrak to 
receive the safety and security funding, Amtrak is prepared to do the following: 
• On a system-wide basis, Amtrak will install more security-enhancing systems at 
facilities (stations. maintenance facilities, on the trains) such as fencing, lighting, 
security cameras and communications-systems. In the West, we will deploy 50 
more personnel and four K-9 units. Amtrak employees will receive additional 
training in anti-terrorism, hazmat detection and response systems. 
• Amtrak will enhance the life-safety conditions of the tunnels in New York, 
Baltimore and Washington, DC. 
• Amtrak will repair and upgrade trainsets that are sitting in the shops to redeploy 
out in the field to provide the additional capacity needed. And, Amtrak will 
purchase additional trainsets for corridor type service, such as in California. 
That request is working its way through Congress and we certainly hope it will be 
successful. People are thinking twice about traveling, but when they are, they're thinking 
about Amtrak. Amtrak is ready for the challenge, but we need the resources to continue 
to enhance the system. 
What's clear is that :\mtrak has proven itself once again to be an important part of the 
national transportation network. The public has recognized that. Supporters in Congress 
are advocating other bills- such as the High Speed Rail Investment Act and S. 1530 
(RAIL-21) and S. 1550. both sponsored by Sen. Fritz Hollings, that will place Amtrak on 
a level playing field with other transportation systems nationwide. Californians will 
certainly benefit from these bills with increased roundtrips, faster trip times and enhanced 
security and service. We hope the legislation is successfully enacted into law. 
We look forward to continuing to do our part in this new paradigm. Our objective is 
simple: meet the growing demand for train travel in the safest and most secure 
environment. 
Thank you. 
San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District 




Assistant General Manager of Operations 
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Good morning Chairman Dutra and Members of the Transportation 
Committee. 
Thank you for giving the Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART) the 
opportunity to discuss our efforts to provide safe and secure public 
transportation for the residents of the San Francisco Bay Area. 
My name is Paul Oversier and I am BART's Assistant General 
Manager for Operations. 
As such, I have overall responsibility for the day-to-day operation and 
maintenance of the system. 
2 
BART is a 95-mile rapid rail transit system with 39 stations located in 
the counties of Alameda, Contra Costa, San Francisco and San Mateo. 
BART's role as the backbone of the region's transportation network is 
borne out both by what happens on a normal weekday and by what 
happens when circumstances are atypical. 
A normal weekday for BART means providing on-time service to over 
326,000 riders, who are going to work, school, medical appointments 
as well as cultural and sporting events. 
3 
When BART is not operating normally, such as was the case in the fall 
of 1997 when we were shut down for several days due to a strike, the 
impact on the region and its economy was far-reaching and 
immediate. 
Traffic congestion, for example, reached unprecedented levels, as 
many commuters experienced a doubling and even tripling of their 
normal commute travel times. 
4 
On a more positive note, in the aftermath of the 1989 Lorna Priata 
earthq'uake and the temporary closure of the Bay Bridge, BART's role 
in the region's transportation network evolved from one of 
importance to one of critical necessity as the system provided the 
only practical means of access between the East Bay and San 
Francisco. 
To this day, during the peak one hour of the commute, the 21,000 
Transbay riders carried by BART exceed the number of vehicles that 
cross the Bay Bridge during the same one hour period. 
Without BART, it would take an entirely new deck on the Bay Bridge 
to handle today's commute traffic. 
5 
To carry 21,000 Trans bay riders in the peak one hour and 48,000 
Transoay riders during a typical 3 hour commute period, BART 
operates trains from 4 different East Bay lines every 2.5 minutes 
through the Transbay Tube. 
Each of these trains carries between 700 and 1,000 riders. 
BART also provides a"t:,ess to other key activity centers in the Bay 
Area. 
For example, fully 1/3 of the commuters traveling to work here in 
downtown Oakland from Central Contra Costa County do so by BART. 
6 
BART Police Commander Clark Lynch will touch on some of the 
specific steps the District has taken since September 11th to further 
' 
enhance the safety and security of our system. 
Before I turn it over to Commander Lynch, I'd like to share with you a 
brief thought about the new environment in which we find ourselves 
and areas where the legislature might be able to help systems such 
as BART. 
Almost by definition, rail rapid transit systems are characterized by 
high and concentrated utilization levels supported in part by easy, 
convenient and open public access. 
7 
Many of the security measures available, in varying degrees, to other 
modes of transportation, simply aren't practical in the high volume, 
multi-access point environment of rail rapid transit. 
Capital improvements that fund technological solutions for detecting 
and/or deterring unauthorized intrusions into our right-of-way and 
facilities is one example of an area where state financial assistance 
would be helpful. 
Funding for enhanced use of closed circuit television technology is 
another. 
8 
These types of one.;time investments would not only enhance the 
safety and security of the BART system and its riders, but would help 
mitigate the post September 11th on-going financial and physical 
burden of protecting these locations with just our human resources. 
I'll now turn it over to Commander Lynch. 
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Chairman Dutra and members of the Transportation Committee, thank you 
for inviting BART to speak with you this morning and describe some of the steps 
we have taken in preparation for terrorist activities and some of our future needs in 
this area. I am Clark Lynch, and I am the Patrol Commander for the BART Police 
Department. 
BART has been involved in emergency planning since the system began 
operations, and has a detailed Emergency Plan in place which includes chapters on 
a variety of events which could occur. These include natural events such as 
earthquakes, fires, floods, or high winds; and also includes District responses to 
criminal activities such as explosions, bomb threats, and hostage taking. The 
Emergency Plan is updated regularly, and stresses a coordinated response by .all 
involved personnel, both District employees and other first responders, utilizing 
the incident command system (ICS). 
After the Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1995, the District recognized a need 
to update this plan in a new area, the potential use of nuclear/biological/chemical 
(NBC) weapons. We sent personnel through the U.S. Army's chemical school, the 
Department of Defense Domestic Preparedness training, the Federal Transit 
Administration First Responder Training, and a variety of other courses dealing 
with this specialized subject. The District also prepared an NBC response plan 
that, for obvious reasons, was not part of the public Emergency Plan, but followed 
the same format in providing guidance to employees in various departments with 
response protocols. 
The BART District has been focused on two areas when dealing with 
potential terrorist activity. These include prevention of acts on the system and 
mitigation of the consequences if an act does occur. The preventative steps have 
included steps toward "target hardening" and cooperative sharing of information 
with other organizations, including intelligence information. Target hardening 
steps have included the installation of closed-circuit television systems, 
installation of improved intrusion alarms, and improved use of the "crime 
prevention through environmental design" (CPTED) concept. CPTED includes all 
physical traits of an area from landscaping to lighting to the types of building 
materials used, and this can have a significant impact on general crime prevention 
as well as terrorism. BART has also been involved in several regional groups 
which facilitates the flow of intelligence information which may be critical in 
anticipating terrorist events. 
In the area of mitigation after an event, we cannot overstate the need for 
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immediate and appropriate first responder actions to save lives. This will require 
early recognition of an event, immediate actions to contain the scene, and 
gathering all the necessary resources to provide appropriate levels of aid. For an 
event of the magnitude ofthe Tokyo attacks, this level of response will not be 
available from any single source, but must be coordinated among a variety of first 
responders. BART has worked to make certain this response does occur smoothly, 
but the recognition and response by District employees in the first one-two 
minutes of any NBC event will be critical to the safety of our patrons, other 
employees and first responders. This requires planning, training and execution. 
We have conducted drills in this area and will continue to do so in the future. 
In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 t\ BART initiated some 
additional steps to further enhance the safety of our system. These included higher 
employee visibility, especially uniformed police presence; conducting "sweeps" of 
trains at selected locations to check for suspicious packages or suspicious activity; 
removal of trash receptacles at underground platforms; closure of restrooms; and 
manual control of selected elevators. The District has continued to stress to its 
employees that everyone shares a responsibility for safety and security, and has 
encouraged employees and patrons to report suspicious circumstances to the 
police department. The police department has responded to these additional calls 
3 
related to unattended packages, unknown powders, or other circumstances 
generated by increased public concern throughout the past two months. We have 
also continued and strengthened our relationship with other agencies, including 
local, state and federal agencies to exchange information on these topics. 
Lastly, I would like to discuss some of BART's future needs required by the 
current situation related to potential terrorist activities. The District has retained a 
consultant with nationally recognized expertise in transportation and anti-terrorism 
to assist us with a comprehensive threat and vulnerability analysis. This analysis 
is designed to make sure we don't overlook any area and to ensure that we are 
expending our limited resources in the most productive manner. Included with the 
document provided to the committee are several needs that the District has 
identified, and proposed steps to address those needs. I will just highlight a few of 
these needs. 
One of the most critical assets and most visible icons of the Bay Area is the 
District's trans-bay tube. We recognize the inherent vulnerabilities of a pubic 
transit system designed to provide fast, efficient transportation to large numbers of 
riders. However, we also recognize a need to target harden our facilities to the 
fullest extent possible. For the trans-bay tube, this has included placement of 
personnel at critical points and the enhancement of physical alarms. We are 
4 
currently enhancing tunnel alarms designed to better detect trackway intrusions. 
We are also looking at improvements in the area of our administrative and control 
facilities, enhanced use of CCTV technology throughout our system, purchase of 
personal protective equipment for employee use in the event of an NBC event, and 
improved use of electronic lock technology to better control access at critical 
points throughout the District. As biological and chemical detectors reach a 
higher level of development and refinement, we will also be investigating their 
potential uses in our system. 
These physical, target hardening, capital projects are in addition to the needs 
for enhanced personnel resources which have been required at the highest states or 
alert. The District has provided this enhanced physical presence through the use 
of overtime and redeployment, but the monetary costs and physical toll on 
employees continue to build. As the current situation develops into the future, 
BART will continue to address these needs, but we ask that your committee and 
State Government continue to consider the requirements of local transit in terms of 
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Install Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) and intrusion 
alarms at entrances to the most vulnerable 
tunnels and underground areas. 
Upgrade all locks at BART administrative 
offices, stations and maintenance facilities. 
Improve physical security at BART's main 
administrative building which houses the 
operations control center and police dispatch center. 
Install CCTV at entry points of all stations. 
Purchase a mobile command post vehicle. 
Develop redundancy capability for BART's 
communications and train control systems. 
Install intrusion alarms at all personnel access points 
to underground portions of the system. 
Improve the physical security of all maintenance/ 
storage yards with hardened perimeters, use of CCTV 
and improved entry controls. 
Purchase personal protective equipment, i.e., escape 
masks suitable to use in chemical vapor environment. 
Improve intrusion protection system on all above ground 
richt-of-wavs, includimr an enhanced barrier svstem andJor 
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11.) Establish an alternative Emergency Operations 
center (EOC) with the capability to also function 
as a.fully operational operations control center. 
OPERATIONAL AND STAFFING STRATEGIES: 
1.) Additional police officer staffing to allow sweeps 
of all trains entering the Transbay Tube. 
2.) Additional personnel to staff vulnerable portals and 
other access points. 






Santa Clara Valley Transportation 
Peter M. Cipolla, General Manager 
Transportation Security Testimony 
APTA: 
• CLEARLY, THE VALUE OF AN EFFECTIVE PUBLIC 
TRANSPORTATION NETWORK HAS SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED 
OVER THE PAST FEW MONTH'S. 
• WHILE MOST OF US IN THE INDUSTRY KNEW AND ARE PREPARED 
TO RESPOND IN TIMES OF CRISIS, THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11 
AND THE RESPONSES BY TRANSIT SYSTEMS ALL OVER NORTH 
AMERICA-PARITCULARL YIN NEW YOUR AND WASHINGTON 
DC-PRVIDED CLEAR-CUT EVIDENCE THAT TRANSIT IS A KEY 
ELEMENT OF OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE STRUCTURE. 
• BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER, APT A, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 
TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION HAD EXTABLISHED A 
FRAMEWORK WHICH FOCUSED ON A TWO-PRONGED APPROACH 
TO THIS ISSUE ... ONE WHICH DEALS WITH 
EVACUATION/EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND THE OTHER 
WHICH DEALS WITH EFFECTIVE SECURITY. 
• AS INCOMING CHAIR OF APTA, I EXTABLISHED A SPECIAL TASK 
FORCE COMPRISED OF SELECTED MEMBERS OF APT A'S EXECUTIVE 
COMMITTEE ... AS LUCK WOULD HAVE IT, APTA WAS HOLDING OUR 
ANNUAL MEETING IN PHILADELPHIA SEPT 30-0CT 6---NEARL Y ALL 
EXECUTIVE LEVEL PROFESSIONALS-BOTH FROM OUR PUBLIC 
SECTOR AND PRIVATE SECTOR-WERE COMING TOGETHER. WE 
SPENT HOURS RELIVING THE EVENTS OF SEPT 11---HOW WE AS AN 
INDUSTRY RESPONDED. I GIVE US HIGH MARKS, BUT ROOM FOR 
IMPROVEMENT. 
• SEC, MINETA, THE FTA ADMINISTRATOR, FRA ADMINISTRATOR 
AND OTHER KEY FEDERAL OFFICIALS JOINED US AND WE WERE 




AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE SECURITY TASK FORCE 
Notes and Actions Arising From Meeting On October 29, 2001 
Richard A. White-Task Force Chair 
Peter M. Cipolla 
Celia M. Kupersmith 
Ronald J. Tober (via telephone) 
Ronald L. Barnes (via telephone) 
Peter A. Cannito 
Alan C. Wulkan (unable to attend) 
Robert H. Prince (unable to attend) 
Anthony M. Kouneski, APT A Staff 
Karol Popkin, APT A Staff 
Greg Hull, APT A Staff 
1. The TaskForce confirmed that on September 29,2001 the APIA Executive Committee 
Established the APIA Executive Committee Task Force to provide policy and strategic 
direction on emerging security issues and needs of APIA and the transit industry. The Task 
Force has been formed with Richard White as Chair and includes APIA Chair, Peter Cipola, 
APIA First Vice Chair, Celia Kupersmith, APIA Immediate Past Chair, Ronald Tober, Bice 
Chair-Business Members, Alan Wulkan, Vice Chair-Bus and Paratransit Operations, Ronald 
Barnes, Vice Chair-Commuter and Intercity Rail, Peter Cannito, and Vice Chair-Rail Transit, 
Robert Prince. With the imminent retirement and resignation of Robert Prince from the 
APIA Executive, Larry Reuter will be appointed as Vice Chair-Rail Transit and will be 
included as a member of the Task Force. 
The Task Force acknowledged the strong support ofFTA Administrators, Jenna Dom and the 
Transit Oversight Projects Selection Committee in securing $2 million of TCRP funding to 
specifically address transit security research needs. The TOPS Committee further identified 
the APT A Executive Security needs, The TOPS Committee further identified the APT A 
Executive Security Task Force as the steering group for determination of these projects. 
2. It was agreed that the composition of the Task Force will be maintained as established but 
will be augmented by a designee of the Department of Transportation (this has subsequently 
been determined to be Robert Jamison, Program Manager, Federal Transit Administration). 
Additionally, the Task Force will be augmented by a representative of the Transportation 
Research Board, Stephan Parker, for those matters pertaining to TCRP projects planning. 
The task Force will additionally be supported by members of the industry for specific task 
assignments yet to be determined. 
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3. The Task Force determined that short term and mid to long term tasks need to be addressed 
and that there is an immediate need for short term deliverables through the Task Force; 
Short Term Tasks: 
);> Enlist industry support to develop and distribute checklists that can be utilized by all 
modes of the transit industry to address emergency preparedness and security. 
This task is target for completion by December 15, 2001. 
>- Select a consultant to assist the Task Force with the following functions; 
development of a work-plan and implementation timetable 
frame issues 
determine additional requirements for industry support 
recommend prioritization of issues and potential security projects for funding 
through the $2 million allocation by TCRP 
establish modal security working group forums for the inter-agency sharing of 
security programs, processes, procedures and resources 
The task Force determined that the consultant to be selected must be knowledgeable of 
the transit industry, possess transit security expertise, and also be knowledgeable of 
international transit security programs and processes. 
The selection of this consultant is to be effected immediately. The intent is to advance 
issues in time to review at the next APTA General Managers' Seminar February 2-6, 
2002 in San Diego. 
>- Meet with the TRB representative to confirm processes and procedures and scope of 
work necessary for selection of TCRP projects. 
This meeting is to be effected immediately. 
>- Arrange a meeting of the Task Force with the Assistant Director of the FBI to discuss 
possible and practical means for intelligence information provision to the transit 
industry. 
This meeting is to be arranged as soon as possible. 
>- Arrange a meeting of the Task Force with the newly created National Infrastructure 
Security Committee chaired by John Flaherty, Chief of Staff, Department of 
Transportation. 
This meeting to be arranged through Robert Jamision as soon as is practicable. 
Mid-Long Term Tasks: 
>- Select and initiate TCRP security projects according to prioritization of needs identified. 
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>- Determine international liaisons to support security programs development and industry 
information/ best practices sharing (example-U.I.T.P.) 
>- Review security strategic plans and directions of other related organizations (example-
U.S. Conference of Mayors. 
4. Next meetings of the Task Force; 
>-Teleconferencing as may be required 
>- Friday, December 7, 2001,7:30 AM-8:30AM breakfast meeting in Washington, D.C. 
Location to be determined. 

Testimony from the Southern California Regional Rail Authority 
Before the Assembly Transportation Committee 
Provided by Anne Louise Rice, Government Affairs Manager 
November 20, 2001 
Good morning, Chairman Dutra and members of the Committee, my name is Anne 
Louise Rice, Government Affairs Manager for the Southern California Regional Rail 
Authority, operators ofMetrolink the commuter rail service. As you know, Metrolink 
provides service in the six -county region of Southern California. We started service in 
October 1992 with 24 trains and 2,500 riders. Today, we operate 128 trains daily, 
Monday through Friday, plus weekend service. Our average daily weekday ridership is 
now 32,500. 
I am pleased to be here today to report on Metrolink's on-going security program which 
was updated in light of the September 11th incidents. Since that fateful day Metrolink 
has initiated new security measures to protect our passengers and physical assets, while 
enhancing operational safety. I will briefly highlight those and then address the questions 
of what more can be done and how the Legislature can help. 
First, concerning the measures we have taken since that time, we have added some 19 
safety initiatives. Some are currently underway while others were short-term measures 
which have concluded. They include: 
• Adding five special unscheduled trains on September 11 to return passengers home 
in advance of regularly scheduled afternoon trains; 
• Increasing randomized track, bridge and tunnel inspections; 
• Instructing all locomotive engineers to lock cab car and locomotive doors; 
• Increasing frequency of conductors walking the train; 
• Developing security awareness messages for passengers, including seat drops, web 
site and placards on bulkheads 
• Increasing the presence of the Los Angeles County Sheriffs at Los Angeles Union 
Station by assigning extra deputies. 
As you can appreciate, to identify which measures we are currently implementing as 
opposed to those that were needed only in the short-term would be to compromise the 
security program. However, we can assure you that we continue to monitor daily the 
situation, working in concert with the LA County Sheriffs Department and other local, 
state and federal agencies, and evaluating our efforts as the situation dictates. 
Second, what more needs to be done? In addressing this issue, we must first recognize 
that each transit system operates in unique environment and so there is no "one size fits 
all" approach to the question of enhancing security. Any solution must meet the criteria 
of feasibility, sustainability, long-term use and multi-benefit investment. The last two are 
closely linked. As an example, when we retrofit our bridges against tectonic plate 
movements our long-term investment yields a benefit of enhanced security against terror 
attacks. Likewise, when we strengthen our rolling stock to withstand impacts from grade 
crossing incidents, a corollary effort is to strengthen the car in the event of a terror attack. 
Accruing safety benefits in multiple areas is essential when making such investments. 
Finally, as to specific recommendations, at a minimum, we would like to see state funds 
provided for on-going operating costs associated with increased law enforcement. We are 
still preparing our estimates for long-term incremental costs, but as an example, we know 
that in the past three months we have spent an additional $500,000 for these services. In 
addition, as new safety technologies become available, we will need to implement them. 
This will require additional training of our Metro link staff and our contracted safety 
personnel beyond what is currently budgeted. Because we are in the business of moving 
the people of California, we need the state to be a partner by providing a long-term 
investment. If state dollars drop off and/or are expected to be supplanted with local funds 
which aren't available, then we've will have unintentionally created an unfortunate and--
perhaps unsafe --situation. 
Testimony on Security Program 
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November 20,2001 
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Third, what can the Legislature do? Again, state funding for long-term investments both 
for capital projects and on-going training would be most helpful. Recognizing the 
Assembly Transportation Committee is the policy making arm of the Assembly, we 
would ask that you consider creating an umbrella program dedicated to these types of rail 
safety enhancements that could then be approved for funding by the appropriators. To 
avoid overlap and ensure cost-effective measures are put in place, we would ask that you 
coordinate with our other partners, the Federal Railroad Administration, the Federal 
Transit Administration, as well as the American Public Transportation Association, all of 
whom have been actively engaged in addressing these security issues from the national 
perspective. In fact, they are expected to release recommendations early next year which 
draw from the experiences of rail operators' throughout the country who are currently 
hardening their systems. Clearly, the link to these upcoming national recommendations 
is a necessary input into developing state policy. 
Thank you for the opportunity to address the Committee today. 
Testimony on Security Program 
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October 12, 2001 
Fran L. Hooper 
American Public Transportation Association 
1201 New York Ave. 
Washington, D.C. 20001 
Dear Fran: 
T-761 P.002/003 F-069 
Southern California Regional Rail Authority 
Operations Center 
2558 Supply Street 
Pomona, California 91767 
Because of rhe incidents of September 11, 2001, the Southern California Regional Rail Authority 
(Metrolink) has undertaken a number of initiatives. Some of them are underway and are not yet 
completed, but will be as quickly as possible. We will be continuing to monitor the situation and 
evaluating our security efforts as the situation dictates. 
Physical Assets 
Activities since September 11 
> Track, signal, and communication personnel given instruction about increasing 
personal awareness of their environment. 
> Initiated Threat Awareness training for all employees and contractors. 
}> Increased the randomization of the track, bridge and tunnel inspections to include 
nights and weekends. 
}> Inspected trains and track/structures within 24 hours of September 11, 2001 
incident. 
~ Ensured all locks on cab cars and locomotives were functional. 
> Ensured fuel levels in storage tanks were kept topped off, in case of fuel shortages. 
pperational Issues 
Activities since September 11 
> Initiated Threat Awareness training for all on-board crewmembers, transportation 
supervisors and managers. 
> Ensured that a uniformed off-duty police officer is in cab car when operating in 
push mode. 
> Instruction to all locomotive engineers to lock cab car and locomotive doors. 
11/06/2001 TUE 16: 22 (TX/RX NO 7359 l f4J 002 
T-761 P.003/003 F-069 
1l•OS-Zil01 04:28pm From-OPERATIONS 
)> Reviewed the SCRRA emergency procedures as it relates to mass casualty situation. 
> Initiated security assessments of the six most critical facilities of the Metrolink 
system using the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) 
process. Two completed. 
Information Systems Security 
Activities since September 11 
> Updated virus protection. 
· ~ Removed outside access then slowly re~implemented to ensure no unauthorized 
access. 
>- Reviewed network security. 
Passenger Handling 
Activities since September 11 
> Instruction to all crewmembers about increasing awareness of their environment. 
No additional cost. 
> Increasing the frequency of the conductors walking the train. No additional cost. 
> Developing security awareness messages for passengers, which will include seat 
drops, web site, passenger newsletter information, and placards on bulkheads. Cost 
$5000. 
> Arranged for special, unscheduled trains on September 11, 2001 to return 
passengers home in advance of regularly scheduled afternoon trains. 
)> Increased the presence of the Los Angeles County Sheriffs at Union Station by 
hiring extra deputies who are assigned to Union Station. 
If you have, any questions about any of the security issues please call me. 
Sincerely, 
Edward Pederson 
Manager of Safety and Security 
(909) 593 2954 
cc. David Solow 
11/06/2001 TUE 16:22 ITX/RX NO 73591 f4l 003 
NOV-15-2001 THU 08:50 AM AC TRANSIT FAX NO. 5108917157 
Transit Security Needs for AC Transit 
Those projects are proposed and combined would total approximately $7- $10 
million. 
• GPS Computer Installation of computers in the AC Transit sheriff's cars to 
enable access to Global Positioning System data currently being installed on 
transit buses. Would enable more rapid response time to security/safety 
threats. 
• Security Gates. Installation of new security gates with guardhouses 
surrounding the transit bus storage facility. 
u Extension of Security Card Program. Provide for automated security 
admission and employee tracking at all facilities. 
• Video Surveillance. Acquisition and installation of video SUIVeillance 
cameras and security system in the transit bus storage yards. 
• Bus Video Surveillance System. Install on-board bus video surveillance 
system in remaining in remaining fleet vehicles that are not equipped. 
• Command Center Bus. Using an Over-the-Road style bus shell, install 
dispatch, cellular~ fax and other state of the art communications equipment to 
facilitate continued control of operations. This vehicle would provide 
continued opem.tion of needed transportation services during emergency 
situations. The command vehicle would be able to communicate with other 
transit, police and fire vehicles. 
• Fault Tolerant Voice and Data Communication. Install equipment to 
enable our voice and data communications network to withstand isolated 
outages without disrupting the entire system. Provide alternate routing and 
redundancy, and improve network data security from electronic attacks. 
Additionally, Wido Area Network (WAN) routers, servers and firewalls need to 
be upgraded. 
• Increase Security of Network Equipment. Physical network and 
telecommunications equipment must be in dedicated spaces secure from 
unauthorized access. Access to these spaces must be included in the above 
mentioned surveillance and security systems and need uninterruptable power 
and temperature control. 
~t Disaster Preparedness and Recovery. Develop and implement procedures 
and facilities to replicate business critical processes and systems offsite. 
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Los Angeles County 
Metro pol ita n Transportation 
Authority (MTA) 
Assembly Transportation Committee 
November 20, 2001 
MTA Overview 
• State-Created Agency 
• Responsible for: 
• Bus & Rail Operations 
• Transportation Finance and Planning for 
Transit, Highways, etc . 
• Allocation of Transportation Funds 
• Including LA County Transportation Sales Tax 
Broad Security Responsibility 
• 2,000 weekday peak-hour buses 
• 60 miles of Metro Rail Service 
• Red Line - North Hollywood to downtown Los Angeles 
• Blue Line- Long Beach to downtown Los Angeles 
• Green Line - Norwalk to El Segundo 
• 1.3 million daily boardings (bus & rail) 
• 8,900 Employees 
Broad Security Responsibility 
(cont'd) 
• 50 rail stations 
• 11 Bus Divisions & 1 Rail Division 
• Support Facilities 
• Gateway Headquarters Building 
• 16 Municipal Bus Operators 
• Other Operators, Government Entities & 
Security Forces 
• SAFE (Call Boxes) & Freeway Service Patrol 
Security Overview 
• System Incorporates Many Security Features. 
• Significant experience preparing for and 
responding to major events: 
• Northridge Earthquake 
• Civil Unrest 
• 2000 Democratic National Convention 
• Well-prepared 
Existing Security Program (1) 
(Prior to 9/11) 
• People: 
• MTA Security 
• Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) 
• Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) 
• Contract Security 
• Hardware: 
• Surveillance 
• Silent Alarms & Available Cell Phones 
Existing Security Program (2) 
(Prior to 9/11) 
• Operator Training 
• Routine Division Visits 
• LAPD & LASD at MTA Headquarters 
• Monthly "Cops & Ops" Meeting 
• Routine Drills and Table-top Exercises 
• Frequent Special Joint Operations 
Enhanced Security (1) 
(Since 9/11) 
MTA Initiated: 
• Employee awareness information developed and 
disseminated via MTA intranet and paycheck inserts 
• Trained mail room staff on bio-hazards 
• Staff maintaining frequent contact with DOT Office of 
Intelligence and Security and disseminating 
intelligence information 
• Working with and supporting Municipal Operators on 
regional security issues 
• Relocating bicycle lockers from vulnerable sites 
Enhanced Security (2) 
(Since 9/11) 
., Scheduled briefing by U.S. DOT technology . 
experts on high tech security systems 
• Requested APTA Peer Review on security for 
the January/February time frame 
Liaison with Feds: 
• Participated in & Following-up from Transit 
Operators Conference Call with Secretary 
Min eta 
Union Station Assessment 
• Initiated By Los Angeles Mayor James Hahn 
• Largest Passenger Rail Facility in Western U.S. 
• MTA Rail, MTA & Other Bus, Metrolink Commuter Rail, & 
Amtrak Service 
• MTA & Metropolitan Water District HQ Buildings 
• Multi-Agency Task Force Developing Assessment and 
Plan 
• To Be Presented to MTA Board on November 29th 
MTA Security Assessment 
• Initiated by MTA Board of Directors 
• Assessing All MTA Services and Facilities 
• Reviewing: 
• Deployment/distribution of resources 
• Technology issues 
• Physical security measures 
• Inter-Agency Coordination 
Interim Assessment 
• No areas of significant risk or vulnerability 
requiring immediate response have been 
identified 
• However, the top to bottom assessment will 
be very productive and valuable 
Financial Impacts 
• Experienced Increased Overtime Costs 
Immediately After 9/11 
• 11 °/o Dip in Rail Ridership 
• Lost Filming Revenues 
• Potential for Increased Insurance Premiums 
• Drop in Sales Tax Revenues Severely Impacts 
MTA Service and MTA-Funded Projects and 
Services Countywide 
Potential Improvements 
• Physical Improvements 
• Closed-Circuit TV 
• Physical Barriers 
• Additional Contract Security Officers 
• Increase Visible Security Presence at Critical 
Locations 
• Security Needs of Municipal Operators 
. STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
ASSEMBLY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE 
INFORMATIONAL HEARING ON EFFORTS TO PREVENT/RESPOND TO 
TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST CALIFORNIA'S TRANSPORTATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE & ACTIVITIES 
COMMENTS OF GREYHOUND LINES, INC. 
PRESENTED BY ROBERT R. ISAACS, STATE GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS 
NOVEMBER 20, 2001 
My name is Robert R. Isaacs, State Government Affairs Representative for Greyhound Lines. I 
have been asked here today to discuss Greyhound security efforts. In addition to my prepared 
remarks that have been distributed, I would like to draw your attention as well to the 3 
attachments. The I 51 is an open letter to our customers from Craig Lentzsch, Greyhound's CEO, 
and contained on the Greyhound website (at www.greyhound.com) detailing our current security 
improvements. The 2nd is a copy of the remarks by Mr. Lentzsch at a national press conference 
following the tragic events of October 3, 2001. The 3rd is a copy ofthe September-October issue 
of Greyhound Today, containing articles about Greyhound's activities following events of 
September I 1 th and October 3rd_ 
INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 
Greyhound Lines, has been in operation nationwide & in California for over 87 years. Today we 
serve North America with over 3,700 destinations and 21,000 daily departures. Greyhound's 
products and services include scheduled inter-city bus service; package express service; charter 
service; Flightlink© airport service; Quicklink© commuter service; Meet-and-Greet shore 
services supporting cruise lines, vacation and sightseeing service, destination management, and 
charter service for conventions; Lucky Streak© casino service; food service; trip planning and 
fare and schedule information database management; and telephone information center 
management. 
According to National Highway Transportation Safety Administration, Greyhound - and it's 
nationwide interline partners - represent the safest mode of transportation in the America. And 
in order to ensure the safety of our employees and customers, Greyhound has long had security 
measures in place that fully met the needs of a ground transportation mode. 
Ground transportation whether it is rail, public transit, automobiles or even pedestrians by its 
very nature, has always been a free-flowing, open system where people can travel on any given 
mode and change between modes. This open, flexible ground system is very unlike our air 
traffic system where planes fly in a highly-controlled fashion from fixed points at fixed times 
with passengers in pre-assigned seats. 
On September 11th, the world changed, however- and with it- our concept of what is acceptable 
security for ground transportation in a crisis situation. Greyhound reacted quickly to the crisis 
and enhanced security in a number of ways. In addition, we have continued exploring options 
for tightening security even more. 
WHAT HAPPENED ON -- AND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING- SEPTEMBER 11? 
The terrorist acts of September 11th did more than shock and sadden people everywhere- they 
tested our nation's transportation system as never before. Airline passengers were stranded for 
2 
days. Express air carriers that deliver thousands of packages daily were grounded along with 
passenger planes, delaying payrolls and other shipments important to our nation's ability to 
conduct business. Rental car agencies, local and regional transit and rail systems and intercity 
rail systems were swamped with added demands. The nationwide transportation system 
staggered a bit. The airline industry still hasn't recovered. 
The impact on Greyhound was enormous. In the four days following the attacks, demand for 
Greyhound services nationwide increased by 50 percent and more - in fact, over fourfold in 
many locations. It created peak-level demand during a normally off-peak period. 
Greyhound employees responded with the pride and commitment to serving America that is 
deeply ingrained in the company's history and culture and we got the stranded airline passengers 
home. Two factors contributed to the company's successful response: 
• The extraordinary efforts of our employees and 
• The unique ability to be capacity-flexible. 
Greyhound's Crisis Management Team (CMT) quickly gathered in the Emergency Operations 
Center (EOC) to determine how Greyhound might be affected by the attacks in New York City 
and Washington, DC. In the hours that followed, terminals nationwide began to see a surge in 
passengers. The team looked at how passengers could be rerouted or resources supplemented at 
heavily impacted locations. Implementing their decisions quickly and effectively, we doubled 
our capacity in less than 24 hours. That is what we mean when we say we are a capacity flexible 
system. 
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WHAT HAPPENED ON- AND IMMEDIATELY- FOLLOWING 0CTOBER3? 
On October 2, Craig Lentzsch flew to Washington, D.C. for a meeting with Secretary of 
Transportation Norman Mineta and Congressional officials to share ideas for improved security 
for the inter-city bus system. Early the next morning, he learned of a serious criminal attack on 
one of our buses near Nashville, TN. As a precaution and until further information could be 
gathered, Mr. Lentzsch made the decision to shut down the entire Greyhound system in the 
United States. We completed the shutdown in less than two hours. After receiving assurances 
from the FBI, U.S. DOT and Tennessee law enforcement officials that it was the senseless and 
violent act of a single deranged man, Mr. Lentzsch - in consultation with our labor union -
decided to re-start the system on a "voluntary" basis. Virtually every driver chose to get back 
behind the wheel. Because local enforcement authorities would not help, we asked our available 
customer service and security people to search carry-on bags. And they did. We are extremely 
proud of the manner in which Greyhound employees nationwide met the challenge and 
continued to serve America's traveling public. We were operating again in 2 Y2 hours- the total 
shutdown process lasted about six hours. 
WHAT IS GREYHOUND DOING TO ENSURE THE CONTINUED SAFETY OF OUR CUSTOMERS? 
The events of the last few weeks - and the stress it has created - seems to have redefined for 
some what is normal and permissible in our society. There has been an increase in the number of 
threats and copycat acts committed around the country, including dangerous and harmful acts 
directed at Greyhound and its passengers. Incidents such as unruly passengers on buses and 
airplanes or bomb threats in buildings have increased and served to increase public tensions. 
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Greyhound has made significant changes in the way it conducts business and ensures the safety 
of our customers and our employees. These measures include: 
• Additional security guards and cameras in major terminals 
• Use of electronic sensing wands at 33 locations 
• Expanded pre- and post-trip checks of vehicles 
• Temporary restriction of seating in the first row of seats and an increased buffer zone 
separating the driver from the passengers to reinforce our policy against disturbing 
drivers while the bus is in motion 
• Offering cell phones pre-programmed with emergency numbers to all drivers and 
requiring all drivers to have a cell phone. 
• Requiring all passengers to provide a name with the purchase of a ticket. 
• Using our ticketing system to ensure passengers properly check baggage and remain with 
their bags until they are loaded on the bus 
• Inspecting packages and requiring valid identification from unknown shippers who use 
our GPX package delivery service 
• Cooperating fully with all branches oflaw enforcement 
• Temporarily closing lockers and parcel checks in some facilities 
• Requiring positive identification from all passengers in certain locations. 
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HOW IS GREYHOUND LOOKING TO THE FUTURE WITH RESPECT TO SECURITY AND HOW CAN 
CALIFORNIA HELP AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL? 
Greyhound is a mode of ground transportation and the approach to security should be the same 
as other ground transportation modes like train, public transit, subway, light rail, and even the 
personal automobile. Ground transportation is fundamental to our freedom and mobility and is 
not like air travel. In looking to the future of ground transportation security, we must recognize 
that any security solution will only be effective if it is part of a cooperative effort across the 
entire ground transportation system. 
In addition, inter-city buses provide the only transportation available to many rural Americans. 
Greyhound has thousands of rest stops and bus stops in small towns and villages across the 
nation. Greyhound alone has five times more locations than Amtrak and the airlines combined. 
We must not do anything that would jeopardize our ability to serve these customers as we move 
forward. However, the stakes arc high for inter-city bus. Since October 3rd, Greyhound drivers 
have been the target of assaults and 6 innocent passengers died in the October 3rd incident. 
While public transit has historically experienced driver assaults, the recent Greyhound 
experience is a marked increase. And because inter-city bus facilities are in so many 
communities and rural locations, making these facilities secure is a far greater task than that 
facing any other transportation mode. 
Greyhound has continued to do our part to improve security, but Congress must address critical 
security upgrades beyond that which Greyhound can do alone. Inter-city bus must have federal 
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assistance to establish new security systems on an expedited basis. We are engaging federal 
officials to discuss and encourage legislation for inter-city bus security, like the bills being 
considered for Amtrak and the airlines. 
Senator Max Cleland of Georgia has introduced an amendment to the supplemental 
appropriations bill currently under consideration in DC that calls for $400M in federal funding 
over 2 years. The funds would be appropriated to the DOT, and inter-city bus operators, like 
Greyhound, would then apply for the funds to improve security. The funds would be used to 
increase the safety of drivers, upgrade the emergency communication systems, improve 
passenger and baggage screening and fully implement a ticket identification system nationwide. 
There's also an equivalent bill being put together by the bipartisan leadership of the House 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. California Senators Barbara Boxer and Dianne 
Feinstein could be important allies in this Senate measure, and support from California's 
congressional delegation will be important to the House measure. 
You could help increase security on California's and the nation's inter-city bus system by: 
• passing an Assembly resolution supporting the Cleland amendment and House T&I measure; 
and 
• encouragmg the support of California's Senate and House members for including bus 
security funding m the supplemental appropriations bill that Congress is currently 
considering. 
I have copies of the Cleland amendment for your review and use. 
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WHAT CAN THE LEGISLATURE AND THE STATE DO TO HELP AT HOME IN CALIFORNIA 
California's transportation system was like the rest of the nation's - seriously tested on 
September 11th. How well it passed that test depended on whether you were at home with your 
family watching television or trying to get there. Airline passengers were stranded in many 
locations for days, due (in part) to the lack of seamless connections with intercity bus services. 
Though the intercity bus network was also affected that day, there were no disruptions in 
California and services elsewhere were reinstated in a matter of hours in most places. 
Greyhound was able to double capacity in 24 hours to carry stranded air passengers home. 
We have four (4) recommendations for the State of California: 
1. Though California has been a leader in the support and development of interrnodalism, the 
statewide network is still entirely too fragmented. California should step up its support for 
long-term development of interrnodal facilities requiring access for all modes - to provide 
seamless linkages for the traveling public. These linkages could also include required access 
to airports to ensure connections to and from all modes. 
2. Create an improved communications interface between transportation providers and local and 
state law enforcement agencies. The purpose of such an interface would be to ensure 
appropriate and rapid response by state and local law enforcement when requested by the 
carriers. It should also ensure proper confidential communications to the carriers by local 
and state law enforcement concerning such areas as plans for heightened security and risk 
assessments, so that we can help. 
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3. Greyhound is a resource in- and a resource to- the State of California. When you consider 
interregional transportation, think of us. When you consider statewide transportation plans, 
include us. When you consider statewide emergency response plans, call us. 
4. The decrease in business following September 11th and the additional costs of security 
measures are impacting Greyhound and other inter-city operators financially. We anticipate 
passenger revenue declines to continue into the fourth quarter and through the first quarter of 
2002. Greyhound is spending $5 million on enhanced security since September II th and we 
expect security costs to continue to rise in 2002. If the State of California pursues financial 
support for security measures, please do not forget to include intercity bus needs. 
CONCLUSION 
I would like to thank you, Chairman Dutra, and the Assembly Transportation Committee for 
including Greyhound in this important hearing. I would be pleased to answer any questions you 
may have at this time or following the hearing. 
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Greyhound Lines, Inc. 
Information about Greyhound Lines 
October 31, 2001 
Dear Valued Greyhound Customer: 
Our company's mission is to provide transportation across North America with safety, dignity and 
convenience. Safety is- and always has been- foremost in our mission. 
Making bus travel even safer is a responsibility we take seriously. We have made some changes in our 
security programs that began after the terrorist attacks in September. Here are some highlights of our 
safety enhancements: 
• Additional security guards and cameras 
• Use of electronic sensing wands at more than 30 locations 
• Expanded pre- and post-trip checks of vehicles 
• Temporary restriction of seating in the first row of seats and an increased buffer zone separating 
the driver from the passengers to reinforce our policy against disturbing drivers while the bus is 
in motion 
• Cell phones pre-programmed with emergency numbers in the process of being distributed to all 
drivers 
• Using our ticketing system to ensure passengers properly check baggage and remain with their 
bags until they are loaded on the bus 
• Inspecting packages and requiring valid identification from unknown shippers who use our GPX 
package delivery service 
• Cooperating fully with all branches of law enforcement 
• Temporary closure of some lockers and parcel checks 
• Requiring positive identification from all passengers in certain locations. 
We are continually examining ways to make our customers and employees more secure. We are 
working with the Department of Transportation and Congress to pursue additional security measures, 
including better screening of bags and passengers, securing the driver compartment, and an improved 
on-board emergency communication system. 
Freedom to travel in search of a better job, education, medical care or way of life has always been 
fundamental to our nation. Enabling that freedom for Americans is my goal as CEO of Greyhound. 
Thank you for your patience with any inconvenience you may encounter as we continue to roll out new 
security programs that provide you and our employees with a safe experience. 
Sincerely, 
Craig Lentzsch 
Chief Executive Officer 
Remarks by Craig Lentzsch, Greyhound president and CEO 
National Press Conference 
Washington, D.C. 
Oct. 3, 2001 
Earlier this morning, a Greyhound bus was involved in a tragic incident near 
Manchester, TN. All 13,000 employees of Greyhound are shocked and sad-
dened by this event. Our condolences go to the families and friends of the pas-
sengers that were hurt and injured and all of the people involved in the incident 
and the driver as well. 
We are doing all we can to provide assistance to the passengers and 
their families. Greyhound staff is on the ground at the site and at hospitals 
and have been there since early this morning. The bus originated in Chicago 
on its way to Orlando, Florida. The schedule had 38 passengers and a driver 
on board at the time of the incident. Immediately after the incident, we made 
the decision to act with an abundance of caution and on the side of safety and 
security and suspend service until we could identify more details and get more 
information on the nature of the incident. 
The Department of Transportation has been very supportive of us today. 
This morning, I met with senior U.S. DOT officials, including Secretary Mineta 
and Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson, as well as the chief of intelligence and 
security for DOT and the acting administrator of the Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration. I've also consulted with law enforcement officials in 
Tennessee and with the FBI. The officials have assured me that they believe 
this tragic accident was the result of an isolated act by a single deranged indi-
vidual. 
Given that information, I then consulted with the union leadership of our 
company, and our crisis management team, and we concluded that it's safe to 
resume service for our customers and necessary to resume service for our 
country. As of 1 PM Eastern time, Greyhound operations across the United 
States have resumed service. The system is safe, but we understand that in 
the aftermath of this incident, that our employees and passengers may not 
wish to return to the buses today. 
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Nevertheless, to address the situation, in order to offer maximum choice 
and convenience for our customers, today we will be offering a full refund to 
any passenger who does not wish to travel to their destination. And we have 
partnered with Amtrak to offer an alternative. Today only, Greyhound ticket 
holders may exchange their ticket for an Amtrak ticket to be used for service 
on any Northeast Corridor unreserved train and other trains in the Amtrak sys-
tem on a space available basis. 
Now, let me return to safety and security. At Greyhound, our passen-
gers' and our employees' safety is our first priority. That is why I made the 
decision early this morning to temporarily suspend our operations. Greyhound 
and inter-city buses provide the safest mode of transportation. 
We have long had security measures in place like security guards and cameras 
in our terminals to make our environment safe for our employees and our cus-
tomers, but the world has changed in recent weeks. Our concept of what is 
acceptable security for ground transportation in a crisis situation has changed. 
Greyhound, therefore, has taken steps to tighten security even more and will 
continue to do so in the wake of this incident. 
Yesterday, we began an experimental program wanding passengers and 
their carryon luggage with electronic sensing devices in San Francisco and 
Dallas and that program began today in Orlando, Florida. Prior to reboarding 
passengers today, we're hand searching carryon luggage. 
Coincidentally, I am in Washington, D.C., today to meet with Department 
of Transportation and Congress officials to explore a number of joint actions 
we can take to enhance bus safety and we have agreed that the company, and 
the company's union, will coordinate on the development of and implementa-
tion of enhanced bus security program with the Department of Transportation. 
Our operations are safe and are now up and running and our thoughts 
and our prayers are with the families and friends of the passengers who were 
injured or died in this unfortunate incident. 
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AMENDl\1ENT NO. CAL. NO. 
[STAFF \¥ ORKING DRAFT] 
November 7, 2001 
Purpose: To authorize grants to improve security on buses 
used in interstate and interurban transportation. 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES-107TH Cong., 1ST Sess. 
( 
S. 1214, 107TH Congress, 1ST Session 
Ncr'\TEMBER --, 2001 
) Referred to the Committee on ------ and 
ordered to be printed 
( ) Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed 
INTE_;\[DED to he proposed by Mr. CLELAND 
Viz: 
I At the cud of the bill, add the follmving: 
2 TITLE - -COMMERCIAL PAS-
3 SENGER MOTOR CARRIER SE-
4 CURITY GRANTS 
5 SEC. -01. EMERGENCY INTERURBAN BUS SECURITY AS-
6 SISTANCE. 
7 (a) IN GEKERAL.-Subchapter I of chapter 311 of 
8 title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
9 end the following: 
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1 "§ 31109. Interurban bus security grant program 
2 "(a) IN GENERAL.-
3 "(1) FUND ESTABLISHED.-The Secretary of 
4 the Treasury shall establish an Interurban Bus Se-
5 curity Fund account in the Treasury into which the 
6 Secretary of the Transportation shall deposit 
7 amounts appropriated under paragraph (2 }. 
8 "(2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.-
9 There are authorized to be appropriated to the Sec-
10 retary of Transportation $200,000,000 for fiscal 
11 year 2002, and $200,000,000 for fiscal year 2003, 
12 for deposit into the account established under para-
13 graph (1). Amounts deposited into the account shall 
14 remain available until expended. 
15 "(b) GRA-1\.;'T PROGRAM.-"\Vithout further appropria-
16 tion, amounts in the Interurban Bus Security Fund ac-
17 count are available to the Secretary of Transportation for 
18 grants to persons engaged in the business of pro·viding 
19 interurban bus service for system-\vide security upgrades, 
20 including the reimbursement of eA.'traordinary security-re-
21 lated costs determined by the Secretary to have been in-
22 curred by such operators since September 11, 2001, 
23 including-
24 " ( 1) establishing an emergency communications 
25 and notification system linked to la\v enforcement or 
26 emergency response personnel; 
S. 1214 Arndt. 
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1 "(2) protecting or isolating the driver; 
2 "(3) implementing and operating passenger 
3 screemng program at terminals and on interurban 
4 buses; 
5 "( 4) acqmrmg, upgrading, installing, or oper-
6 ating equipment, softYvare, or accessorial services for 
7 collection, storage, or exchange of passenger and 
8 driver information through ticketing systems or oth-
9 ervvise, and information links \Vith government agen-
10 cws; 
11 "(5) constructing or modifying garages, facili-
12 ties, or interurban buses to assure their security; 
13 " ( 6) training employees in recognizing and re-
14 sponding to terrorist threats, evacuation procedures, 
15 passenger screening procedures, and baggage inspec-
16 tion; 
17 "(7) hiring and training security officers; 
18 " ( 8) installing cameras and video surveillance 
19 equipment on interurban buses and at garages and 
20 interurban bus facilities; and 
21 " ( 9) creating a program for employee identifica-
22 tion and background investigation. 
23 "(c) APPLICATIONS.-To receive a grant under sub-
24 section (b), an applicant shall submit an application, at 
25 such time, in such manner, in such form, and containing 
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1 such information, as the Secretary may require, and a 
2 plan that meets the requirements of subsection (c) for the 
3 project to be funded, in ·whole or in part, by the grant. 
4 "(d) PLAN REQUIRED.-The Secretary may not 
5 make a grant under subsection (b) for a system-\vide secu-
6 rity upgrade project until the applicant has submitted to 
7 the Secretar:y, and the Secretary has approved, a plan for 
8 the project, and the applicant has submitted to the Sec-
9 retary such additional information as the Secretary may 
10 require in order to ensure full accountability for the obli-
11 gation or eA.'J)enditure of grant amounts. The Secretary 
12 shall give priority to emergency communication system de-
13 velopment and protecting or isolating the dri,·er. 
14 "(e) lNTERURBAt'J Bus.-For purposes of this sec-
15 tion, the term "interurban bus" means a self-propelled 
16 commercial motor vehicle used on highv,,ays in intrastate 
17 or interstate commerce to transport passengers for hire 
18 that-
19 '' ( 1) has a gross vehicle \veight rating of at 
20 least 10,001 pounds; 
21 "(2) is designed to transport more than 15 pas-
22 sengers, including the driver; and 
23 '' ( 3) has a baggage compartment under the 
24 passenger deck.'' 
25 (b) CONFORMING MiENDMENTS.-
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1 (1) The chapter analysis for chapter 311 of title 
2 49, United States Code, is amended-
3 (A) by striking "STATE" in the heading for 
4 subchapter I; and 
5 (B) by inserting after the item relating to 
6 section 31108 the follmving: 
''31109. Interurban bus security grant program". 
7 SEC. -02. BUS SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS. 
8 The Secretary of Transportation may use from 
9 $3,000,000 to $5,000,000 of the amounts deposited in the 
10 Interurban Bus Security Fund account established under 
11 section 31109 of title 49, United States Code, for research 
12 and development of security recommendations for inter-
13 urban buses (as defined in section 31109(e) of that title), 
14 including a revie11r of actions already taken to address 
15 identified security issues by both public and private enti-
16 ties, and including research on engine shut-off mecha-
17 nisms and the feasibility of compartmentalization of the 
18 driver, and compilation, review, and dissemination of in-
19 dustry best practices. In carrying out tllis subsection, the 
20 Secretary shall consult Virith interurban bus management 
21 and labor representatiYes, public safety and law enforce-
22 ment officials, and the National Academy of Sciences. 
0 
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Port of Los Angeles 
What the Port Needs 
1. Port, Interstate and bridge access is not sufficient to support cargo throughout growth or 
To sustain a terrorism attack even though the Alameda rail corridor will be operational 
next April. Upcoming Federal assistance legislation such as ISTEA reauthorization in 
2003 can provide a remedy. 
2. The Coast Guard and the US Customs Service need additional vessels, personnel 
identification cards and background investigation capability. 
3. Ports need to significantly upgrade personnel identification cards and background 
investigation capabilities. 
4. Local law enforcement, sworn officer, levels need to be upgraded. 
5. Additional personnel training. 
6. The proposed, Port of Long Beach, Intelligent Transportation System to manage 
Interstate vehicle access and to provide port security surveillance are ready to construct 
and need Federal cost sharing. 
On October 10, Long Beach mayor O'Neill testified on the above Port Security factors before the 
House, Transportation and Infrastructure, Water Resources Subcommittee along with the FBI 
and other Federal security representatives. 
It is recommended that the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors ensure that both aviation 
and seaport security improvements are coordinated especially where Federal management 
cooperation and assets may be needed. 
10118/01 
Del Smith 
Port of Long Beach 
Gus Hein, Director of Government Affairs 
• Since September 11th, transportation and infrastructure projects at the Port of Long Beach 
that may have been viewed solely as transportation in nature must now be viewed within the 
context of their security implications as well. 
• I had the opportunity several weeks ago to brief House Transportation and Infrastructure 
Chairman, Don Young as well as staff from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's 
Transportation, Logistics, and Infrastructure Committee. And I would like to share with you 
some of the same information I communicated to them regarding the Port of Long Beach, 
transportation, and security. 
• 2001 marks the 90th anniversary ofthe Port of Long Beach. 90 years ago Long Beach was 
visited by a lumber ship the SS Laqua. At that time Long Beach was just a small mudflat. 
• But over the past 90 years we have witnessed unprecedented changes in the Port's size and 
configuration. The Port changed and grown through two world wars, a population explosion, 
the rise and fall of a Navy base, and the age containerization. 
a) In 1911 was a small mudflat. In 2001 the Port encompasses 7600 acres of wharves, 
cargo containers, roadways, rail yards, and shipping channels handling approximately 5 
millionteus. 
b) In 1911 canning fishing and drilling oil were the top priorities, now it is moving 
containers. 
c) In 1911 cargo moving through Long Beach accounted for 11 million in cargo. In 2001 it 
will be close to 1 00 billion. 
d) In 1911 the Port was developed because a group of individuals wanted to bring trade, 
jobs and economic propriety to the City of Long Beach. Today, we have a Board of 
Harbor commissioners who still want to bring trade, jobs, and economic prosperity, but 
now it is not just Long Beach that gains the entire state as well. 
• So much in fact that the trade has become the bloodline of California's economy, the Port of 
Long Beach is the heart that pumps the blood. 
• Let's look at the trends that we are seeing at the Port and how we are adapting to them 
a) Growth in containerized trade-242% since 1993 
b) Ships are getting bigger 
c) Terminals must accommodate growth 
• Mega-Terminal Development Plan. These projects are necessary to accommodate expected 
growth in international trade. All of these container terminal projects include on-dock 
intermodal rail yard facilities and all but Pier A include harbor dredging or filling. 
• Transportation and Infrastructure Needs. Because of the financial burden that these terminals 
place upon the Port, public funding is desperately needed for off-terminal roadway and rail 
projects submitted in a separate package. 
A. Gerald Desmond Bridge 
B. 710 Freeway 
C. Intelligent Transportation Systems-Provides truckers, dispatchers, terminal operators, and 
traffic engineers with seamless surveillance. 
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PORT SECURITY 
• On September 11th Long Beach Police and Fire went on tactical alert and the Port Security 
Committee immediately decided that the Coast Guard would begin doing a risk assessment 
of ships outside the breakwater, inspecting them if necessary, and escorting the outbound 
ships. 
• Heightened security though out the Port 
• High Visibility Patrols 
• Restricted access to Port Buildings 
• Liaison with customs, INS 
• Increase man-hours for security force 
• Individual Terminals brought in extra security 
• LB Police Department conducted risk assessment 
• High risk areas- Oil Terminals 
Fuel Storage Areas 
Interagency Security Task Force Met 
• Coast Guard conducted - 96 hour notice before entering the Port-W /in 25 miles the vessel 
checks with the VTS 
• Tankers can only come in during daylight hours 
What do we need? 
Monetary support 
Additional Personnel Training 
Monitor video capability 
Port of Los Angeles 
What the Port Needs 
1. Port, Interstate and bridge access is not sufficient to support cargo throughout growth or 
To sustain a terrorism attack even though the Alameda rail corridor will be operational 
next April. Upcoming Federal assistance legislation such as ISTEA reauthorization in 
2003 can provide a remedy. 
2. The Coast Guard and the US Customs Service need additional vessels, personnel 
identification cards and background investigation capability. 
3. Ports need to significantly upgrade personnel identification cards and background 
investigation capabilities. 
4. Local law enforcement, sworn officer, levels need to be upgraded. 
5. Additional personnel training. 
6. The proposed, Port of Long Beach, Intelligent Transportation System to manage 
Interstate vehicle access and to provide port security surveillance are ready to construct 
and need Federal cost sharing. 
On October 10, Long Beach mayor O'Neill testified on the above Port Security factors before the 
House, Transportation and Infrastructure, Water Resources Subcommittee along with the FBI 
and other Federal security representatives. 
It is recommended that the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors ensure that both aviation 
and seaport security improvements are coordinated especially where Federal management 




ASSEMBLY COMMIITEE ON TRANSPORTATION 
INFORMATIONAL HEARING REGARDING ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT 
AND OR RESPOND TO TERRORIST AITACKS 
Good morning. I am Captain Scott Glover, Division Chief for the Eleventh Coast 
Guard District's Marine Safety Division. I am responsible for marine safety and 
security issues throughout California, Nevada and Arizona. 
Thank you for this opportunity to outline the Coast Guard's Role and Actions in 
addressing port security for California's commercial ports. This is a significant 
topic as California is a leader in our nation's maritime trade. The port of LA/LB is 
the nation's busiest port with almost 35% of all cargo coming into the U.S. 
arriving at this port. The ports of San Francisco & Oakland are also among the 
largest ports in the United States and San Diego is a key naval port. 
I was asked to address three topics in my discussion this morning: 
a. What is the Coast Guard doing to support Homeland Security? 
b. What more can the Coast Guard do? 
c. How can the State of California help? 
WHAT IS THE COAST GUARD DOING TO SUPPORT HOMELAND 
SECURITY? 
Most Americans are much more familiar with the Coast Guard's safety role rather 
than our port security role. In fact, our safety missions were in large part an 
outgrowth of our security role. The U.S. Coast Guard has been responsible for 
port security since enactment of the Espionage Act of 1917. We performed port 
security duties throughout both world wars. 
WHAT ACTIONS HAS THE COAST GUARD TAKEN SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 
2001 
On September 11th the terrorist threat demonstrated global reach that requires a 
higher maritime security posture and a "new normalcy" for Coast Guard mission 
priorities and capabilities. The multi-mission nature of the Coast Guard allowed 
us to increase maritime security in response to the September 11th attacks 
immediately, using existing active duty, reserve, civilian, and auxiliary personnel, 
and existing shore units, ships, boats, and aircraft. As the only federal service 
with both national defense and law enforcement authority and capabilities, the 
Coast Guard provided the Nation with an existing foundation upon which to build 
its maritime homeland security efforts. 
Our security actions focus on three areas - vessels transiting in and out of our 
ports, waterside security of the ports and shores ide security of the port facilities. 
The following are the cornerstones to 011 's Homeland Security (HLS) mission; 
a. Sea Marshall program, 
b. Vessel escorts, 
c. Harbor patrols, 
d. Facility inspections, and 
e. Maritime Domain Awareness 
The Sea Marshal Program is very similar to the Air Marshal program in that we 
place teams of armed personnel in the pilothouses of large commercial vessels. 
The intend of the program is to prevent terrorists from gaining control of a large 
commercial vessel and using it as a missile as the aircraft were at the World 
Trade Center. The Sea Marshal program has gained such a level of local 
interest that scarcely a day goes by without some accolade, or press clips about 
this program. The positive control of high risk commercial vessels, including 
cruise ships, entering California's ports provides visible assurance to the public 
and remains one of the few security measures that actually improves the flow of 
commerce as there are no delays to shipping schedules and increases the public 
confidence in the cruise industry. While there has been a dramatic drop in the 
cruise ship bookings since September 11, the knowledge that Sea Marshals 
board each cruise ship, and Coast Guard patrol boats can be seen escorting the 
cruise vessels directly supports the resurgence of this valuable industry. 
Vessel escorts are employed for particularly important vessels to protect them 
against USS COLE type attacks. Whereas the sea marshal program establishes 
positive operational control over transiting ships, a vessel escort program will 
enable us to protect the ship from an external hostile attack. The individual 
escorts will entail Captains of the Port enacting a security zone around the laden 
commercial or military ship and providing armed boat patrols to serve as 
perimeter control. 
Harbor patrols are used to protect waterfronts facilities from waterborne attack or 
sabotage. 
Historically we have conducted waterfront facility inspections for those facilities 
that handle dangerous cargoes. We have refocused these inspections along 
security lines .. 
The new 96-hour notification requirements for inbound vessels have improved 
our maritime domain awareness. 
Finally, the Maritime Security Act (Hollings Bill) which was under development 
well before the September 11 attacks, will, if enacted, further expand Coast 
Guard authority and responsibilities. This Act will implement the 
recommendations of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. 
Seaports. 
WHAT MORE CAN THE COAST GUARD DO? 
I don't think the question is "What more can the Coast Guard do", but rather, will 
we be able to maintain our heightened security standard, our "new normalcy". 
Up to this point, our response has been resourced by operating existing forces at 
surge levels and cutting back on other Coast Guard missions. We cannot 
operate at this pace indefinitely. 
Our first action following the attacks of September 11 , was to surge our 
personnel resources. The entire U.S. Coast Guard- Active Duty, Reserves, and 
Auxiliary, was surged. The Active Duty members have put in extraordinary 
hour. 2600 Reservists, the largest recall since WWII have been brought onto 
Active Duty and even our volunteer Auxiliarists who normally conduct volunteer 
recreational boating safety inspections are manning our active duty offices. 
Our second approach to assigning more resources to our Port Security mission 
was to cut back on our more traditional UE missions including counter drugs, 
illegal immigration and fisheries. However, with most of our major cutters, patrol 
boats, and aircraft protecting domestic ports and vital sea approaches, our 
presence is minimal in other missions. There is a well-defined nexus between 
terrorism and organized crime, drug and migrant smuggling. We must restore 
our capability to return to these important mission areas as soon as possible, 
while maintaining our increased maritime security posture. 
In the long term, the Coast Guard's Homeland Security mission will require more 
active duty and reserve personnel, and additional asserts, particularly patrol craft. 
We will not be able to maintain our "new normalcy" without additional assets. 
HOW CAN THE STATE LEGISLATURE ASSIST 
The Coast Guard has not, and cannot, conduct the port security mission on our 
own. We have actively partnered with the State and local governments and 
industry. Some examples include: 
a. Shortly after the September 11 disaster, State Fish and Game 
provided four of their most capable boats with crews to assist in 
harbor patrols. For over a month two of these vessels patrolled 
the San Francisco Bay while the other two patrolled LA/LB. 
Unfortunately they have had to reduce their assistance but still 
provide 1 boat for each port. 
b. The State Office of Emergency Services worked with us in 
developing our list of key port assets. This list became the basis 
for our patrol schedules. Admiral Riutta met personally with the 
Director (Dallas Jones) and Deputy Director (Mark Ghilarducci) of 
the OES to demonstrate his total support for the program. 
c. The Coast Guard is a member of the State Strategic Committee 
on Terrorism. (SSCOTT). 
d. The Coast Guard Intel Community is an active member with the 
State Threat Assessment Committee (STAC). (This committee 
focuses on actual incidents. Its mission to provide the Governor 
with real time threat assessments.) 
e. Mike Griffin (Coastal OES) and Henry Renteria (Oakland OES) 
PARTICIPATED in the recent Maritime Homeland Security War 
game conducted at the Center for Executive Education at the 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. (Emphasized 
PARTICIPATED- they were involved in highlighting State 
capabilities. 
f. The State Lands Commission and the Coast Guard coordinate 
their safety inspections of all oil facilities. Recently the State 
Lands Commission has asked the Coast Guard to assist in 
development of State regulations for security standards for oil 
facilities. 
g. OSPR and the Coast Guard coordinate responses to oil spills. 
h. The Coast Guard and MARAD have worked with state, local and 
industry representatives to establish two MTS subcommittees in 
the State of California (north and south). The intent of these 
committees is to improve coordination of MTS issues at all levels 
by public and private stakeholders. 
( 1 ) Both of these committees have established a port security sub-
committee and are drafting recommended security standards for 
port facilities. 
1. Mr. Norman Fassler-Katz, Senior Consultant, Select Committee 
on California Ports, Office of Assemblymember Alan Lowenthal, 
has developed the Gatifornia MITS Advisory Committee as a 
coordinating body for lhe two regional bodies. This is the only 
state with two MTS committees and a coordinating committee. 
This is an indication m-the sheer size of the port community and 
tt.e::state 's interest. 
CONCLUSION 
Our mission is about protecting lives and the economy, by providing both 
physical security and reassuring the public with our visible presence in a manner 
which sustains and re-stimulates economic activity. In the same way an 
advertising dollar spent reaps a multiplied economic return in the privale sector 
so can a security dollar reap a multiplied effect in the public sector if aur 
presence reestablishes faith that our economic vitality will continue. 
The Coast Guard has the unique position of being both a military armed force 
and a Federal law enforcement agency. As we approach the third month of our 
response to September's Terrorist attack and the initiation of our Homeland 
Security Mission, it has become apparent that Coast Guard assets and 
leadership are playing significant roles in protecting commerce and providing a 
reassuring and viable presence to the American public. 
It is also equally clear that, in the long term, the Coast Guard's Homeland 
Security mission will require more active duty and reserve personnel, and 
additional asserts, particularly patrol craft. We will not be able to maintain our 
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TESTIMONY BY TAY YOSHITANI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
PORT OF OAKLAND 
ASSEMBLY TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE 
NOVEMBER 20, 2001 
Good morning Chairman Dutra and members of the 
Committee. My name is Tay Yoshitani and I'm Executive Director 
of the Port of Oakland. I wish first to applaud the Committee for 
conducting this hearing and giving me the opportunity to address 
the issue of seaport security. 
California is home to three of our country's four largest ports. 
Our ports are a vital asset to our state and the entire country. Since 
95% of all international trade is sea born, our ports help drive our 
state's economy by serving as California's entre to the global 
economy and all the economic benefits that come with it. It is 
critical that we keep our seaports safe, secure, and operating 
efficiently and effectively. 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, we at the Port of 
Oakland have taken constructive steps to tighten security. We have 
worked with our shippers and terminal operators as well as other 
government agencies such as the U.S. Coast Guard. The Coast 
Guard has been an especially important partner for us as we work 
to ensure the security of shipments passing through the Port. 
They have stepped up their efforts by adding additional patrols, 
calling up reserves, and implementing a new sea marshall program. 
We are also providing input to the U.S. Congress as they begin 
to craft comprehensive seaport security legislation. One of the 
greatest challenges in crafting such legislation is trying to define 
what type of "threats" we need to protect against. We have had 
countless meetings and phone calls to try to determine how to guard 
against future terrorist attacks, but it is a difficult task. The 
number of scenarios for terrorist activities is innumerable. 
Therefore, it is critical that as we establish new security measures 
and procedures as part of any legislation that we better define those 
threats, which are of greatest concern and then direct our energies 
and efforts to address ways in which to protect against them. 
Because of the fact that California has 3 of the 4 largest ports 
in the state and the fact that international trade is especially vital to 
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our state's economy, I believe the State of California has a definite 
role to play in helping ensure that California seaports operate safely 
and efficiently. The state can play a role in helping us define 
potential threats. Also, as we do not expect significant federal 
monies to help us improve security, the state can play a role here as 
well. Operating seaports is an incredibly capital intensive business. 
Protecting our assets will cost money in both new security 
equipment and other operational expenses. We will need to find 
new ways to protect against potential security threats while at the 
same time making sure that we continue to operate our ports 
efficiently and cost-effectively. We can not let security in and of 
itself shutdown or severely disrupt the many efficiencies we have 
achieved in the past few years that allow us to help drive the 
California economy. 
Although this has been a challenging year for the Port of 
Oakland, due to the economic downturn throughout our country 
and the world, we are continuing to move forward with our 
expansion efforts. We are confident that this expansion will bring 
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greater economic vitality to the state, providing additional taxes and 
jobs for our communities. As we progress with this project, it will 
be important that we work closely with our policymakers and 
community to ensure that our facilities maximize the security of our 
workers and the public. 
I look forward to answering the questions that the Committee 
has posed and thank you for inviting the Port of Oakland to 
participate in this important hearing. 
QUESTIONS 
1. What are we doing to enhance security? 
In the federal maritime security legislation, they have indicated 
that they will require the U.S. Coast Guard to perform a full Threat 
and Vulnerability Assessment of the 50 most strategic ports. As a 
national strategic port, the Port of Oakland will be one of the ports 
that will receive this assessment. 
But we are not waiting for this security legislation to pass. We 
are already working diligently with our maritime tenants and the 
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local U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port to inventory the physical 
condition of our facilities and identify existing security procedures 
in place. We recently held a meeting with the Port's terminal 
operators, and representatives from the US Coast Guard, U. S. 
Customs and the Pacific Maritime Association. This meeting was 
held to begin the process that will continue over the next several 
months, of identifying the existing level of security and developing 
recommendations to further enhance security within the Port. 
A related effort is the Maritime Transportation System 
initiative sponsored by the U.S. Department of Transportation 
[DOT] and the U.S. Maritime Administration [MARAD]. The focus 
of the Maritime Transportation System initiative is to develop a 
system that is efficient, environmentally sound, and capable of 
expanding to meet our nation's needs into the future. Included in 
this initiative is the integration of shoreside infrastructure 
requirements into the Maritime Transportation System. A number 
of regional dialogues have been held across the country to solicit the 
input of people with expertise and knowledge of the maritime 
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industry at the operational level. Furthermore, efforts are now in 
progress to implement a San Francisco Bay Regional Maritime 
Transportation System Steering Committee with 5 sub-committees 
to address areas of action identified in the Maritime Transportation 
System Report to Congress. These areas include competitiveness, 
security, safety and environmental, dredging and shoreside 
infrastructure. The Port of Oakland will serve as chair of the 
Security Sub-committee. We hope that through these efforts we can 
improve not only our state's, but our nation's maritime security. 
2. What more needs to be done? 
The requirements of the federal legislation, when finally passed 
by Congress, will help determine what further actions are needed. 
One of the next steps will be to address the question of identification 
cards for Port workers and how best to implement a system in a 
cooperative and pro-active manner with the labor force. In 
addition, we will need to follow-up on recommendations developed 
by a committee that the Port has formed with our tenants to address 
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security and review our current contingency and emergency action 
plans to address possible terrorist attacks. 
We also need to assure that the Threat Assessment for the Port 
of Oakland is completed as soon as possible after the legislation 
passes. Currently this legislation requires the U.S. Coast Guard to 
conduct 10 Threat Assessments per year for 5 years. We will be 
urging the authors of the legislation to have these assessments 
conducted on an accelerated basis. 
3. How can the State Legislature help? 
The pending federal security legislation will create greater 
financial and administrative demands upon the state's airport and 
seaport facilities, and impact California's efforts to improve its 
economy. Ports throughout the state will need financial assistance in 
meeting federal requirements and in protecting and improving 
critical infrastructure needs. For example, alternative routing plans 
for cargo movement in the event of damage to critical highways will 
need to be developed. The Port has proposed the California Inland 
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Regional Inter-modal Rail System that would greatly assist and 
could act as a model in these efforts. This effort, which would utilize 
our rail system for short hauls to inland areas, will help move cargo 
without having to use our roadways. 
In addition, providing additional funding for dredging 
projects, such as our current -50 foot dredging project, would also 
enhance our state and nation's security interests in two important 
ways. First, since the Port of Oakland is designated one of the 
Strategic Deployment Ports in the event of a national emergency, it 
is essential we have adequate harbor depths at the Port in order to 
accommodate large military vessels, which are often necessary when 
responding to military threats quickly and efficiently with the same 
type of vessels available in the commercial maritime sector. 
Second, deeper harbor depths at California ports allow 
California to be more competitive in the global marketplace because 
they handle the modern deeper draft vessels that are utilized in 
maritime commerce today and that are planned for the future. 
Inability to handle these vessels at key California Ports could mean 
8 
this cargo will bypass California and move to the Pacific Northwest, 
Canada, Mexico or by all-water service directly to the East Coast. 
California ports are a key strategic economic asset to the nation's 
global presence in the marketplace. 
Finally, as I stated in my opening remarks, I urge California, 
in conjunction with the federal government, help us better define the 
threats that seaports are facing. With this knowledge, industry 
experts will be able to craft plans that will protect us from such 
threats. Our efforts would become focused and have a much greater 
chance at success. I also urge you to work with us on identifying 
ways the state can assist us financially with deploying better security 
equipment and procedures while making sure we do not disrupt the 
efficiencies that are vital to our success. 
We appreciate your attention to this critical issue of security 
and would be pleased to serve as a resource to you as you continue 
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Two Property Types Cont'd) 
11 Rail Transit Systems 
+ BART 
• San Francisco MUNI 
• Los Angeles MTA 
• Santa Clara VT A 
• Sacramento RT 
• San Diego Trolley 
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Assembly Transportation Committee 
Interim Hearing 
Transportation Security 
November 20, 2001 
Statement of Juan Acosta 
Government Affairs Director 
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad 
Chairman Dutra and Vice-Chair Pacheco, on behalf of the Burlington 
Northern & Santa Fe Railroad ("BNSF"), thank you for the opportunity to 
discuss the important issue of railroad security. BNSF joins the rest of 
our nation in extending our sympathy and condolences to the victims of 
the terrorist attacks on September 11, to their families and to their 
communities. We offer our thanks and support to those who worked so 
diligently in search and rescue operations and to our nation's armed 
forces. We also express our firm hope and confidence that all of the 
perpetrators of the attacks will be found and punished. 
I recognize the need to convince you that the railroad industry is 
more secure today than it was on September 11. Let me assure you this 
most certainly is the case. The industry is acting swiftly and prudently to 
increase protection of critical facilities and operations. In this public 
setting, I will share with you as much information as possible, without 
compromising national security. Therefore, I will speak primarily of the 
railroad industry as a whole and will decline to be too specific. 
The rail industry reacted swiftly to the events of September 11. The 
Association of American Railroads (AAR) coordinated the industry 
response plan, in full cooperation with federal government authorities. In 
the immediate aftermath of the attacks, railroads tightened security and 
intensified inspections across their systems. Major railroads, which 
maintain their own police forces to help assure the security of employees, 
property and freight, put enhanced security plans in place. Access to 
important rail facilities was restricted. Movement of freight to the New York 
area was suspended completely until the immediate threat was over. The 
entire rail industry- passenger and freight, front line employees and 
management, customer and carrier- all reacted swiftly and with 
resolution. 
At the same time they were attending to security issues, though, 
railroads realized they had a responsibility to keep our nation's vital rail-
transport link open. Full service resumed as quickly as the railroads, in 
cooperation with the U.S. Department of Transportation, determined it 
could be. 
On October 7 when major U.S. military action was initiated against 
foreign terrorists, the railroad industry, in coordination with our nation's 
top transportation security officials, again instituted precautionary 
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measures. The industry's 72-hour self-imposed "red alert" status included 
the following immediate actions: 
• restricting and increasing security for some types of cargo 
• increasing patrols and security at critical facilities 
• restricting certain operations near major public events 
• working closely with the military to provide needed support for 
the nation's ongoing military actions 
• working with rail customers and national security agencies to 
balance our nation's economic needs and national security 
requirements 
• tightening security on railroads' web-based information systems, 
removing some data and severely restricting access to material 
dealing with shipment of certain materials 
• continuing an industry-wide practice of conducting thorough 
background checks on employees before hiring 
Temporary restrictions on the movement of sensitive types of cargo 
allowed time for an assessment of the specific level of threat following 
military strikes in Afghanistan. Accordingly, on October 10 the nation's 
freight railroads resumed accepting all shipments under continued 
heightened security. However, the following security measures remain in 
place, continuously evaluated for effectiveness and modified as necessary: 
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• Railroad police forces are employing heightened patrols, 
inspections and surveillance as deemed appropriate for the 
security of shipments and facilities. 
• Certain trains will have operations modified commensurate with 
security requirements. 
• The Association of American Railroads continues to operate a 24-
hour command center linked to federal national security 
personnel and the railroads' 24-hour operations centers. 
• The industry continues to restrict access to its information 
systems. 
• The railroad industry's 200,000 employees maintain high 
awareness and vigilance. Daily briefings to all operational 
employees (e.g., Yard, Maintenance of Way, Engineering) and 
other communications to all employees serve as constant 
reminders of steps to be undertaken to ensure security. 
The U.S. Justice Department has asked the nation's law enforcement 
agencies, public utilities, airlines, railroads and other businesses to 
maintain the highest possible degree of vigilance, while continuing 
operations. Today, railroads remain in 24-hour/7-day-a-week 
communication with U.S. Department of Transportation intelligence and 
security personnel, the FBI, the National Security Council, and state and 
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local law-enforcement officers, and have plans in place to respond 
immediately to credible threats to our transportation network. 
To further address security in light of the new environment, the AAR 
Board of Directors has established five critical action teams, each led by a 
senior railroad or AAR executive and each involving the full participation of 
AAR members, including AAR's Canadian and Mexican members. The 
overarching focuses of these critical action teams, which are outlined 
below, are 1) to ensure the safety of our employees and the communities in 
which we operate; 2) to protect the viability of national and regional 
economic activity; and 3) to ensure that railroads can play their vital role in 
the military mission of our nation. In addition, freight railroads will 
cooperate fully with the critical action team dealing with rail passenger 
security. 
The five critical action teams established by the AAR are: 
1. Information Technology and Communications 
This critical action team is examining the security of 
communications, control systems, and information systems 
for the industry, including redundancy, backup and data 
confidentiality. An ongoing examination of issues related to 
cyber security has been folded into this effort. 
2. Physical Infrastructure 
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This critical action team is addressing the security of physical 
assets such as bridges, buildings, dispatch centers, tunnels, 
storage facilities, and other structures. The team is also 
addressing cross-border and port "gateway" physical security 
issues. 
3. Operational Security 
This critical action team is addressing issues to minimize 
exposure to unplanned occurrences while trains are in 
operation. The team is analyzing potential types of 
occurrences, their probability, and their consequences, as well 
as addressing the issue of fuel supply. 
4. Hazardous Materials 
This critical action team is working with the chemical industry 
and tank car manufacturers to examine the transport of 
hazardous materials by rail - including surveillance, routing, 
re-manufacturing, and packaging - with emphasis on 
materials that pose the greatest potential safety risk. 
5. Military Liaison 
This critical action team is augmenting the already existing 
close working relationship between railroads and the 
Department of Defense to determine immediate and ongoing 
military traffic requirements and to identify capacity, security, 
and equipment needs of the industry to meet military demand. 
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Railroads are confident that, if called upon, they will be able to 
match their performance during the Persian Gulf War, when 
they and other transportation providers accomplished one of 
the greatest mass movements in history in a way that was "so 
smooth it is almost as if there isn't a war going on," according 
to a spokesman from the Army's Military Traffic Management 
Command at the time. 
Each of the critical action teams described above is working quickly, 
but carefully. They are assessing short-term and long-term vulnerabilities 
in the areas of people, process, and technology and are developing an 
array of additional countermeasures. Some of these new 
countermeasures, designed to prevent, detect, and mitigate any terrorist 
attack, have already been deployed. To assist in this comprehensive effort, 
AAR has retained a group of former U.S. military and government security 
experts who bring a valued perspective to the evaluation. The analyses 
and action plans generated will form the basis for additional measures 
deemed necessary to enhance the security of our nation's freight rail 
network. 
Notwithstanding all of our efforts, experts will tell you there is no 100 
percent guarantee against terrorist assaults. Fortunately, railroads are 
accustomed to operating in adverse conditions. In order to respond to, 
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mitigate, and minimize the impact of dangerous and unusual incidents, 
railroads have established and practiced programs and procedures to 
protect the communities we serve and our employees, and to sustain the 
fluid flow of freight on which our economy depends. These programs and 
procedures include the establishment of emergency response plans for 
hazardous materials incidents and natural disasters, operational 
administration redundancy, and the training of rail employees and public 
emergency response personnel. These programs and procedures can and 
will be invoked in the event of a terrorist attack involving railroads. 
Finally, a terrorist action against railroads could have ruinous 
consequences for the railroad industry itself, thereby jeopardizing the 
critical role railroads play in our economy. AAR member freight railroads 
have already been notified by their insurance companies following the 
events of September 11 that the railroads' liability insurance premiums will 
be increased substantially and some coverage may be eliminated when 
renewals are due. As a result, the rail industry notes with interest the 
insurance assistance and the limitations on liability afforded the airline 
industry in the recently enacted "Air Transportation System Stabilization 
Act." Railroads, as common carriers, should be afforded similar liabtlity 
protections and insurance relief. 
8 
The people of BNSF are deeply saddened by the events that 
precipitated this hearing, and we strive every day to make the railroad 
industry more secure than it was the day before. We commend the Chair 
and the members of this Committee for their leadership in addressing the 
important issues before us. 
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TIMOTHY L. SMITH, CHAIRMAN 
610 Auburn Ravine Rd., Suite C Auburn, CA 95603 
(530) 823-7510, FAX (530) 823-7215 
November 23. 2001 
Honorable John Dutra, Chairman 
Assembly Committee on Transportation 
State Capitol 
P.O. Box942649 
Sacramento, CA 94249-0116 
Dear Sir, 
I would again like to thank you and your committee for the oppo.ctunity to speak on beh.Uf 
of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers of California to the issue of terrorism :md our 
preparedness in California. 
The following is a summary of the points I discussed with you and your committee at the 
recent hearings held in Oakland, CA on November 20, 2001 at the Elihu Harris Bldg. This 
format will not follow the reco.rded versi<>n of my discussion to you, but will hit on the 
points I would like to emphasize. 
After the attack on America on September 11th, 2001, I submitted to my constituency a 
question regarding what things we needed to do, from a labor perspective, to help safeguard 
the state of California from terrorist acts. All Locomotive Engineers in California were 
apprised of our situation after the terrorist attacks, and were told to kcc.:p very "watchful 
eyes!" 
Jn rccdviog the comments from sC)tnC of those 1 represent, I had to discern between the 
thoughts of issuing bazookas to all train crews to the other more manageable ideas. 
Needless to say. I chose the latter although I have ro admit, I did give the former suggestion 
some thought! 
It seems we need to reveal while on railroad property, who we are and what we do. The 
yards are large, and there arc tnatJy people who traverse the confines of the yards. In so 
doing, we must have all yards "well lit". The transient ptobkms, especially since September 
11'h, bring many disastrous scenarios to the forefront of consideration. 
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Communication between the carriers and labor is critical to enable the provisions of any 
security efforts to be spread to not only the employees and thek families. but the message 
will spread to friends and neighbors as well that everything is being done to safeguard the 
lives of this California society. Thus far, there is nothing bcing received by this office from 
the catric:r:s. 
Increases in staffing of railroad police. f1tA Inspectors and California Public Utilities 
Commission/Rail Safety Division Inspectors would gready enhance the security of the 
railroads. Today, they arc spread too lhin to be able to handle all ofth(: potential problems 
that would currently e,Ost shocld an incident ever occur. The railroad police can more 
readily respond to the complaints that they receive, especially regarding the presence of 
!-:ttangcrs lurking around the railroad yards, with more staff. FRA and CPUC R.'lil Safety 
Inspectors can more tcadily assist the carriers in inspection of rail..toad facilities and rolling 
stock. 
The I ncidG'llt Command System should be made to include the opct:at:ing crews in the 
hierarchy at all incidents. They ar.e the true first responders with an awareness level of 
training. They are a valuable source of information, and 11hould not be pushed to the 
background during the planning of mitigating an incident involving the property and rolling 
stock of the canic;r and the.: well-being of the population. 
Insuring that there are accurate train profiles and car placement identification for hazardous 
materials and nuclear waste transport.'ttion is critical to the above incident corrunand 
situation. Thusly, if the paperwork is correct, it may be verified by a pre-departure rollout 
inspection of the train by the Conductor. Currently, we are precluded from doing this 
because of the need to expedite the train. 
The most important aspect of security that we could consider would be to insist that there 
ax:e al$ays two crew m<..'111bers consisting of a Locomotive Engineer and another operating 
craft employee, jn the cab of freight trains, passenger trains, commuter trains, wotk trains 
and locals or light engines. The e:x:tl:'a set of eyes is necessary, and to this point not a 
problem in obtaining on other than Amtx:ak, but with the carrier's motto of "doing more 
with less", we need to assure our:odves that all railroads stay with the minimum. of two 
people in the cab for safety's safe. 
The best way to achieve this goal is to re-open legislation such as the two-person crew bill 
SB 200, which was narrowly dcfeat~-d in the Assembly last year. Short of this, the carriers 
should voluntarily see the need for permanent extra vigilance, especially since the work load 
for the Locomotive Engineer is great. 'They cannot always focus on things outside of 
signals. orders. or radio communication with the dispatchers while safely handling the train 
in his/her charge. The other set of eyes ar.e always watching for anything or anyone who 
might be su$picious, based on possible hazard potential scenarios. 
The rail..toads are currently running remote control power, usually found on the rear end of 
the ttain. Thi."> is an unmanned remotely controlled locomotive consist which could become 
a potential harbinger of problc.:ms due to the lack of first hand observation by a Locomotive 
Engineer within. Anyone could gajn access and do all types of interesting things that would 
impact the movement of a train through towns. Remotely conttollc:d equipment is 
dangerous due to the fact that it is urunanncd and available as a source of a terrorist act. 
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This is but a short compilation of some of the thing.:; that were submitted to chis office. I do 
hope that the considctations given to any and all of these points do not become douded by 
the usual thoughts of "nest· feathering" by this labor organization. The information 
imparted above is only the reasonable and unbiased opinion of normal people who have 
concerns for their safety and that of their families and friends. To this end I wish again to 
express my appreciation to you and your committee for the chance to add some input to this 
very serious threat to our great state! Until such time as I meet with you again~ I remain ... 
T othy L. ~ mith, Chairman 
California State Legislative Board 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 
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Assembly Transportation Committee 
Assembly Member Dutra, Chair 
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY HEARING 
Ill. DMV DOCUMENTS 
A. Driver License 
~ Anti-Fraud Reform Update 
~ Anti-Fraud Initiatives Being Evaluated/Implemented 
~ Anti-Fraud initiatives Being Evaluated for Feasibility 
and Effectiveness 
~ Biometric Efforts 
~ What States are Doing 
B. Hazardous Materials Endorsements/Certificates 
~ Existing Law 
~ Current Policy/Practice 
~ Recent Federal Mandate 
DMV'S ANTI-FRAUD REFORMS 
Over the past few years the department has implemented several anti-fraud 
reforms to considerably strengthen its policies and procedures relative to 
obtaining a driver license (OL) or identification card (10). The following are some 
of the reforms: 
? Legal Presence Documents Verified 
Beginning in 1994, the department began the electronic verification of all 
legal presence documents issued by the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) when submitted by an applicant for a OL/10. If documents 
cannot be verified electronically, copies of INS documents are sent to the INS 
for review. On-line verification was implemented in field offices in 1998. 
? New DUID System Implemented to Reduce Fraud 
In June 1999, the latest photo contract was implemented. This contract 
resulted in many enhancements, including drastically redesigning the 
transaction flow for a OL/10 card application. This provides the department, 
as well as law enforcement agencies, access to the applicant's image almost 
immediately. In addition, this system provides all field offices with the 
capability of retrieving the most recent photo on the image database. The 
new system also uses the existing photo on file for processing a duplicate OL 
transaction. At this time, enhanced security features were added to the OL/10 
card making counterfeiting or tampering much more difficult. 
? Policies and Procedures Strengthened 
Effective October 25, 2000, the policies and procedures regarding the 
processing of duplicate or renewal OLand 10 cards were strengthened. This 
includes retrieving the photo image of the applicant from the image database 
if the customer does not provide the appropriate photo document. 
Application processing and fraud detection training for field office employees 
has been enhanced. 
? Additional Review of Documents 
The department requires two persons review breeder or source documents. 
Before any original OL/10 card transaction occurs, the customer must have 
the appropriate legal presence/birth date document. 
;;... True Full Name Required 
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In June 1999, the department developed regulations and procedures that 
require applicants to use their true full name for all DLIID card applications. 
This requirement eliminated the use of nicknames or fictitious names (i.e., 
Santa Claus), which could facilitate fraud. 
;;.. Social Security Numbers are Verified 
The collection of the Social Security Number (SSN) for all commercial driver 
license applicants began in 1989 when it was required pursuant to the 
Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986. Subsequently, two legislative 
measures required the collection of the number for all non-commercial driver 
license applicants. On-going verification efforts, coupled with the 
department's "zero tolerance" policies on fraud/identity theft, successfully put 
into motion an SSN verification program with the Social Security 
Administration on October 14, 2000. 
;;.. Technology Upgrades 
In order to accommodate the increase in retrievals, several technology 
upgrades have been completed. This includes increasing the capacity of 
data transmission lines in all field offices and between Polaroid and Teale 
Data Center; installing additional photo capture stations in 35 high production 
offices, providing two additional photo retrieval workstations in DMV 
headquarters, and expanding the image database's capacity to handle an 
increased retrieval volume. In an effort to further deter counterfeiters, DMV 
enhanced the current DLIID card further to add additional security features, 
effective July 1, 2001. 
'ii- Fraud Point of Contact 
DMV has created a central point of contact, the Driver License Fraud 
Analysis Unit to track and resolve DLIID fraud. The department publishes a 
Fast Facts brochure on identity fraud which provides a toll fee telephone 
number and e-mail address. 
'ii- Employee Training Developed 
Field Office personnel were provided training to improve the quality of 
thumbprints captured by field office employees. 
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INITIATIVES BEING EVALUATED/IMPLEMENTED 
The Department is currently evaluating several anti-fraud initiatives that will be 
implemented within the next few months that include: 
~ Providing law enforcement agencies with the capability of retrieving photos 
directly from DMV's image database (CaiPhoto Project). In addition, provide 
field office employees photo retrieval capability at all workstations. 
~ Revising the Application for DUID Card (DL 44) to include additional 
information for processing and/or prosecution. 
~ Developing a History Questionnaire and a more comprehensive background 
check for Occupational License applicants. Currently, a Department of 
Justice (DOJ) background check is performed, but, with the new reform, an 
FBI check will also be performed. 
~ Changing the temporary and interim licenses to read "Not a Verified 
Identification" to caution businesses and various entities to not accept these 
documents as identification. 
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INITIATIVES BEING EVALUATED FOR 
FEASIBILITY/EFFECTIVENESS 
Several anti-fraud initiatives are currently being evaluated to determine the 
feasibility and effectiveness. They include the following: 
~ Provide the department the capability to flag a record with information related 
to lost or stolen driver licenses and when duplicate or replacement DUID 
cards are requested. · 
~ System development for detecting and reporting excessive numbers of 
duplicate applications on specific driver license numbers. 
~ Require submission of one primary approved identification document and one 
secondary approved identification document of any person applying for a new 
or duplicate driver license or identification card. 
~ Changing the electronic verification of the Social Security Number from a 




The OMV is involved in several projects relative to the use of a biometrics 
system. 
~ Commercial Driver License Biometrics Demonstration Project 
This project is sponsored by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 
(FMCSA) which will demonstrate the feasibility of using an automated facial 
and/or finger/thumbprint identification system to accurately identify 
commercial driver license (COL) holders and certify the identity of the existing 
COL holders. Along with Georgia and West Virginia, over 12,000 original 
images and 1,000 duplicate images have been collected and will be 
analyzed. The analysis will include determining whether using facial 
recognition as a primary identifier, with finger or thumbprint as a secondary, is 
more effective or vice versa. In addition, it will determine which finger (right 
or left index) or thumb (right or left) is more reliable. 
~ Department of Justice/Department of Motor Vehicles Thumbprint Pilot 
The purpose of this pilot is to determine the quality of OMV's existing 
thumprint images by using OOJ's automated fingerprint identification system 
and determine how many fraud records are contained in OMV's database. 
Approximately 300,000 driver license numbers containing over 1.3 million 
thumbprint images were provided to OOJ. This random sample contains both 
thumbprints taken from the old and new OL system and will be evaluated 
seperately. 
~ Automated Identification Verification Solution 
As part of the Governor's 2001-2002 Budget, $7.7 million was proposed to 
implement a one to one biometric system using both facial recognition and 
thumbprint verification. However, it did not pass through the Legislature and 
was subsequently removed. OMV is developing a business case that would 
address in part, the need for the Legislature to establish a public policy on 
biometrics, public/privacy issues, collecting more than one thumbprint or 
fingerprint, accuracy rates, and false rejection/acceptance. 
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>- Live Scan Fingerprinting 
As a result of 1997 legislation, the Department of Justice (DOJ) accelerated 
its plans to implement applicant live scan fingerprinting. Beginning January 
1, 2000, with few exceptions, DOJ will no longer accept rolled ink fingerprints. 
The fingerprints will be electronically captured and submitted to the DOJ for 
their automated background check process. This impacts applicants for 
occupational licenses, special driving certificates, and prospective employees 
when a background check is required. On January 2, 2000, DMV began 
sending applicants and prospective employees to live scan sites throughout 
the state for live scan fingerprinting. Currently, the department has submitted 
a Feasibility Study Report to the Department of Information Technology to 
obtain live scan devices for some of its field offices. The funding for live scan 
is through an Office of Traffic Safety grant. 
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WHAT STATES ARE DOING 
Electronic SSN Verification 
~ 11 states are electronically verifying the SSN on-line: Alabama, 
Arizona, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming). 
~ California is the only state that is electronically verifying. the SSN via 
batch process. 
Legal Presence Verification 
~ California and Wyoming are the only states that are electronically 
verifying legal presence. 
Finger or Thumbprint Capture 
~ 5 states are requiring thumbprints: 
California captures right thumb 
Colorado captures right index 
Georgia captures both left and right index 
Hawaii captures right thumb for DL and both left and right index for 10 
Texas captures both thumbs 
~ 2 states capture thumbprints on a voluntary basis: 
Arkansas and West Virginia capture right index 
Facial Recognition 
~ Illinois and West Virginia are using facial recognition software. 
Electronic Verification of Finger or Thumbprint 
~ Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, and West Virginia are electronically 
verifying finger or thumbprints. 
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HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ENDORSEMENTS 
Existing Law 
(§15210 CVC)- commercial driver's license is defined as a driver's license 
issued by a state or other jurisdiction, in accordance with the standards 
contained in Part 383 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which 
authorizes the license holder to operate a class or type of commercial motor 
vehicle. 
(§15250 CVC) - provides that no person may be issued a commercial driver's 
license until he or she has passed a written and driving test for the operation of a 
commercial motor vehicle which complies with the minimum federal standards 
established by the federal Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 and 
Part 383 of Title 49 of the code of Federal Regulations, and has satisfied all 
other requirements of that act as well any other requirements imposed by the 
Vehicle Code. 
(§15275(a) CVC)- provides that no person may operate a commercial motor 
vehicle unless that person has in his or her possession a valid commercial 
driver's license of the appropriate class, and an endorsement issued by the 
department to permit the operation of the vehicle, unless exempt from the 
requirement to obtain an endorsement, as specified. 
(§15275(b) CVC)- provides that an endorsement to drive vehicles, as 
specified, shall be issued only to applicants qualified by examinations prescribed 
by the department and that meet the minimum standards established in Part 383 
of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 
(§15278(a)(4) CVC) - requires a driver to obtain an endorsement issued by the 
department to operate any commercial motor vehicle that is a vehicle carrying 
hazardous materials that is required to display placards or markings pursuant 
to Section 27903 or that is hauling hazardous waste, as defined in Sections 
25115 and 25117 of the Health and Safety Code, unless the driver is exempt. 
This requirement does not apply to: 
• Any person operating an implement of husbandry who is no required to obtain 
a driver's license under the eve. 
• Any person operating a vehicle transporting asphalt or coal tar pitch at a 
temperature that requires the display of a marking on the vehicle pursuant to 
Section 27903 and that is described and classified by the US Department of 
Transportation as "elevated temperature liquid n.o.s. Division 9." 
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This provision does not apply to any person exempted pursuant to Section 
25163 of the Health and Safety Code, to any person operating a vehicle in an 
emergency situation at the direction of a peace officer pursuant to Section 2800, 
or to a driver issued a restricted firefighter's license and driving a vehicle 
operated for the purpose of hauling compressed air tanks for breathing 
apparatus that do not exceed 2,500 pounds. 
(§15300 - 15320 CVC) - commercial driving privilege penalty sanctions begin 
with Section 15300 CVC. 
(§13369 CVC) - provides the department the authority to refuse to issue or 
renew, suspend or revoke certain special certificates, the passenger transport 
vehicle endorsement, and the hazardous materials endorsement when certain 
causes exist. 
Current Policy/Practice 
Currently, a criminal background check is NOT an element of the commercial 
driver license application process, even if the applicant is applying for a 
hazardous materials endorsement. 
Only when the commercial driver is also applying for a special certificate (i.e., 
Schoolbus, School Pupil Activity Bus (SPAB), Youth Bus, General Public 
Paratransit Vehicle Certificate (GPPV), Vehicle to Transport Developmentally 
Disabled Persons (VDDP), Ambulance Driver, or Tow Truck) which requires a 
criminal history check, is a criminal background check administered with the 
Department of Justice. 
10 
RECENT FEDERAL MANDATE 
On October 26, 2001, President Bush signed the Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56). The bill requires 
changes in the issuance of driver licenses for the transportation of hazardous 
materials. Specifically, Section 1012 of the act amends the Hazardous Materials 
Transportation Act by prohibiting States from issuing or renewing a license to 
operate a motor vehicle transporting hazardous material in commerce unless the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) has first determined that the applicant does 
not pose a security risk warranting denial of the license. 
Section 1012 cannot be implemented without rulemaking by DOT. Until 
regulations to implement Section 1012 are in place, all indications are that States 
should continue to renew old, and issue new, commercial driver licenses under 
their usual procedures. 
See attached copy of the statute. 
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DMV Media Release 
2415 First Avenue, Sacramento, CA 95818 
CONTACT: Bill Branch/Steve Haskins, Media Relations Office 
Tel: (916) 657-6437 
Fax: (916) 657-8282 
JULY 3, 2001 
STATE ISSUES NEW SUPER-SECURE CALIFORNIA DRIVER LICENSE 
SACRAMENTO --The Davis Administration unveiled an all-new, super-secure 
California driver license today. The license features several new technologies to deter 
identity thieves and other criminals from duplicating or manufacturing fraudulent copies. 
By Friday, the first of the new anti-fraud driver licenses will begin showing up in the 
mailboxes of Californians who recently applied for or renewed their licenses. The new 
license has a hologram that is difficult for thieves to reproduce. It also retains most of 
the security features of the previous driver license, such as the secondary portrait and 
the magnetic stripe. 
"We want to be on the cutting-edge of protecting Californians from fraud and loss," said 
Secretary Maria Contreras-Sweet of the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency, 
which oversees the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). "This new license is one of 
the most technologically advanced cards in the entire United States." 
DMV worked with the Polaroid Corporation to develop the technology needed to make 
the improvements, which include: 
• An ink that changes color when viewed from different angles. Copy machines and 
other low-grade counterfeiting technologies simply c~n't do the same thing. 
DMV Media Release 
• A process that allows for full-color printing of fluorescent images, which emerge 
under ultraviolet light. The fluorescent inks also take copiers and laser printers out of 
the picture. 
• A fine-line color-design printing technology similar to that used on new U.S. 
currency, which also hampers photocopiers and scanners. 
Previously issued licenses will be replaced with the new version when they expire. 
Existing licenses will continue to be valid until expiration. It will take about five years 
before all existing licenses will be completely replaced. 
(NOTE TO PHOTO EDITORS: Color photographs of the old and new licenses will 
be available after 12:00 p.m. Pacific Standard Time on the Business Wire website 
at www.businesswire.com/cgi-binlphoto.cgi?pw.070301/bb2, or via e-mail file 
attachment by calling the DMV Media Relations Office at 
(916) 657-6437.) 
#### 
California Trucking Association 
Recommendations Hazardous Materials 
1) Evaluate ports of entry for targeted hazardous materials most likely to be used in terrorist 
activity (petroleum, gases (chlorine), ammonia nitrate). 
2) Eliminate unusually or willing chatter between drivers at CA Ports. Wait for containers at 
congested ports. Large security breech between drivers waiting at congested ports. 
3) Certified and trained permanent gate security at entrance to international marine 
terminals. Protocols for security breeches. 
4) Uniform terminal destination system for drivers. 
5) Adequate funding for California Highway Patrol to continue highway safety enforcement 
actions and address new activities to prevent harm at gate terrorism activities. 
6) Create a task force to evaluate those drivers not posing security risks warranting denial of 
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CALIFORNIA NA TION.AL GUARD 
Briefing to AssemblY Transportation Committee 
Questions: What is the Guard doing? 
~002 
Answen The California National Guard bas three missions - a federal mission, a state mission 
and a local (conup.unity) mission. Our federal mission is to provide mission-ready forces to the 
federal govemment as directed by the president. Our s~te mission is to provide military support 
to civil authorities as directed by the ~ovemor. And our local- our community- mission is to 
'provide support to the communities whore we ':V~~ and live. 
Following the attacks mi the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September Il'h. the Governor 
and the National Command Authority tasked us.to provide security forces across the state and to 
be prepared to provide forces globaUy. 
The National Commap.d Authorlty initially placed all US military forces at THREATCON 
DELTA in the wake of September 11th. This action) placement of military forces at 
THREATCON DELTA. requires milita;ry commanders to increase Force Protection Measures to 
the highest level of secw.jty short of actual war. We have subsequently reduced our Force 
Prote~tion posture due to a J;educed securitY threat to personnel and facilities. ·- ' . 
The Adjutant Gener.~··~ directed his corilm~d~i to institute Force Protection Measure Charlie 
at all California NationarGuard facilities. Force Protection Measure Charlie requires us to 
heighten our securlty:..pasture by blocking ~d r~sfricting access to California National Guard 
facilities. In addition,. we've place annc:d :soldi~?,rs: j;lt key National Guard facilities and require 
positive identification of all persons at our facilities throughout the state. 
~ - • • I • , • 
Governor Davis or.dered California Nationai Gu~p. troops to report to airports across the state. 
Twenty-nine (29) airports were selected for deployment of military personnel because of the 
vohz~e of passenge~·~d tl'An:!portation priority. Our mission at the ai.rpons is to provide a 
trained, armed, professional military security presence to reinforce local law enforcement and 
help restore confidence in public air transportation. 
We implemented the Governor's directive in three phases. Phase one commenced on October 5, 
2001 with the deployment of over 140 soldiers and airmen at the Los Angeles International and 
San Francisco Intellllltional airports. Phase ll was commenced on October 12, 2001 with the 
deployment of soldiers and a.innen to nino additional Northern and Southern California airports. 
Phase m commenced on October 19, 2001 with the deployment of soldiers and airmen to 1 & 
additional medium to small airports by October 19m, 2001. 
Federally Mobilized Units 
over the course of the past .five weeks, we have mobilized California Army and Air National 
Guard units for federal service in support of Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom, and 
other such missions as directed by the National Con:lll\and Authority. We currently have over 
3,800 personnel called to Federal Active Duty performing sccmity and suppon operations 
domestically and abroad. 
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It is possible we could see further deployments. We have not been informed of additional 
requirements for glob& deployment of California National Guem:l personnel. We arc: prcparccl to 
provide Military Support to Civil Authorities in the event of an emergency in the state. 
Questions: What still needs to be done? 
Answer: We are fully prepared prepared to respond to the call of the Governor for any state 
emergency. Our focus now is to ensure all applicable security measures are in place. We will 
work with the Administration if we identify any resource shortfalls. 
Question: How can Legislature help? 
Answer: We are working with the Administration to prepare legislation to support the needs of 
the California National Guard and our soldiers. We are not prepared to discuss the nature of 
those proposals, however, we will request your support after concurrence from the Governor. 
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Richard Eisner, F AlA, Coastal Region Administrator 
Governor's Office ofEmergency Services 
Oakland, California 
Chairman, Committee Members. 
Good Afternoon. I am Richard Eisner, Coastal Region Administrator for the Governor's Office 
of Emergency Services. The Governor's Office of Emergency Services has an overall 
coordination and facilitation role when it comes to terrorism planning, response and recovery. 
Note that I did not use the term "management." OES' primary role is to serve as the Governor's 
representatives when it comes to emergencies, but more specifically - our role is to support and 
coordinate state preparedness and response with our partners in state agencies and local 
government. 
As a result of this vulnerability of regional transportation system, OES has facilitated planning 
efforts with state and regional transportation planning agencies. 
At the State level, in the specific arena of terrorism, OES is partner with Cal Trans, California 
National Guard and the California Highway Patrol. Each brings a unique, valued expertise and 
resources to the table. 
OES facilitates state planning to ensure that the result is a unified preparedness and response 
effort, consistent with the overarching state emergency plan. This plan includes a State 
Terrorism Annex, which is constantly updated. OES' coordination role also extends to federal 
agencies that participate in Weapons of Mass Destruction/Terrorism preparedness and response. 
OES has incorporated the federal concept of operations into the state's plans to ensure that our 
planning efforts are compatible, and in several regions of the state, OES and the FBI co-chair 
terrorism working groups ofhealth, law, fire HAZMAT, transportation emergency planning and 
response agencies. 
OES has also been working to ensure that throughout our terrorism planning we have addressed 
transportation issues resulting from a terrorism event. Our plan has included our partners at 
CalTrans, California National Guard and the CHP. As new information about the threat is 
developed, we will update and refine our plans with these agencies, and we will continue to 
update the state's overall plan. 
At the regional level, as early as the mid 1980s, OES funded studies by the Metropolitan 
Transportation Commission to assess the 'residual capacity' ofthe Bay Region's transportation 
system- what capacity would remain after a major disaster and how that remaining capacity 
could be used to move the region's population. 
After the 1989 earthquake, OES again worked with the MTC, to ensure that transit operators 
could communicate effectively after a regional disaster, by providing an OES assigned 
emergency radio frequency to the operators. We have subsequently participated with MTC in 
training and exercised in preparation for a disaster response. 
Most recently, after the events of September 11th, OES and MTC convened a series of planning 
meetings of bridge and public safety agencies, and transportation operators, to ensure 
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coordination of response to a terrorist act. These Bay Area Bridge Closure Contingency 
Planning Meetings are ongoing and will benefit our response, regardless of the threat or the 
occurrence of an actual disaster. 
We have adapted a version of the State's Terrorism Annex for use by local governments as they 
develop their own terrorism response plans. This document is a template that even the smallest 
community can use to guide their local planning efforts. 
The State Strategic Committee on Terrorism (SSCOT), California's coordinating body for 
terrorism planning, is chaired by the Director of OES. Transportation issues are addressed by a 
number of subcommittees of the SSCOT. These subcommittees, at the request of the Governor, 
have just completed drafting an initial report on State's terrorism response. 
Our California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI), is the premier emergency management 
training facility in the country, and has long included transportation issues in their disaster and 
terrorism courses. They have offered a terrorism course since the 1970s, as well as hazardous 
materials courses, that include response to hazmat released that impact transportation routes. 
As I noted earlier, OES co-sponsors, with the FBI, regional Terrorism Working Groups. These 
are planning forums that include all disciplines-including fire, law enforcement, emergency 
management, transit and transportation, and public health agencies - to share information, 
contacts, protocols and training. Successful TWGs exist in the bay area, Los Angeles, the Inland 
Empire, San Diego, Fresno, and Sacramento. 
When an event occurs or is suspected, OES convenes the State Threat Advisory Committee (S-
T AC). Within minutes of the receipt of a threat, S-T AC convenes secure conference call for a 
few, specific, key players in federal and state government to discuss the incident or threat. 
Participants include FBI, CHP, DOJ, DHS and EMSA. Based on what is discussed in the secure 
call, a consensus threat assessment is presented to the Governor through the OES Director= 
"what this threat or incident means for the State." S-T AC met frequently in the days following 
September 11th and continues to meet on an 'as needed' basis. 
S-T AC was first convened on the night the diesel truck and trailer crashed into California 
Capitol in January of this year. On that occasion, having the right agencies on the call, we were 
able to advise the Governor within a few hours that this was indeed the work of a lone individual 
and that there were no lingering health issues involved. 
After an event, should California suffer a tragic attack, OES will use a process similar to that 
which we use in other disasters--earthquakes, fires, and floods - to look after the needs of the 
victims and speed recovery. Again, our partnership with CHP, CalTrans and regional 
transportation agencies is key. We have a lot of experience exercising with our partners. During 
Lorna Prieta, Northridge, and the numerous fires, winter storms and flood disasters we've 
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experienced- we were co-located with CalTrans and the CHP in the State Operations Center and 
Regional EOCs. 
When and if we have a terrorism incident in California- we will have to bring the full resources 
of the state to bear in responding immediately. We continue to work with state agencies and 
local governments to build a system that will serve the state. 
In closing, I want to reiterate our support for our partners at CalTrans and the CHP, and for 
regional and local transportation and transit agencies. The transportation systems of the state 
were strained long before September's attacks. The impact of disruption is great and our 
tolerance for congestion is low. However, I think we all agree that now, it is not only opportune, 
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FROM: Public Safety CSA 
DATE: October 3, 2001 
On September 11 the United. States experienced two terrorist attacks, one in Washington, D.C., 
and one in New York City. As a result of these events the Public Safety CSA met to consider 
steps that should be taken to enhance the safety of the community of San Jose. These fell into 
three categories: those actions that could be taken immediately within existing budgets, those 
actions requiring some time or some funding, and those actions that would require significant 
time or significant funding. 
The CSA departments worked together to implement those strategies that were within our ability. 
Copies of some documents that were created are attached. The City's website was also updated 
by the addition of information for the public, including the attached FAQ, website list, and 
disaster preparedness information. 
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE ACTIONS: 
1. CSA partners will hold intelligence briefings at regular intervals during the period of 
heightened alert for potential terrorist activity. Information on the sires of acutely 
hazardous materials was obtained and shared with the Police Intelligence Unit and the 
Fire Department's Bureau of Field Operations. Note: Evaluation of potential target sites 
should be conducted in confidential meeting environments. Staffshould consult with the 
City Anorney to determine what steps can be taken to protect confidential work products 
from Freedom of Information Act inquiries. Lists of "possible targets" should not be 
distributed outside of those working directly on the facility evaluation. CSA department 
members are well aware of potential terrorist targets and make an extra effort to avoid 
open discussion ofthesefacilities. 
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2. OES drafted a letter for local businesses with a hazardous materials permit. Fire and 
Police reviewed this letter. The Bureau of Fire Prevention provided electronic version 
labels, and OES staff coordinated the production and mailing of the 2500 letters. A copy 
of the letter is attached. The letter encourages some increased security steps, and urges 
hazardous materials users to strictly abide by existing regulations and guidelines. 
3. The Fire Department's Hazardous Incident Team will review any facilities of special 
concern, and notify the Hazardous Materials Program manager of any stepped up 
enforcement actions that could be beneficial. 
4. Fire companies reviewed their pre-plans for sites that have hazardous materials pennits. 
5. Existing terrorist response plans and resources were reviewed and evaluated. Information 
from New York City's Health Department was added to the resource materials. 
6. OES is·the point of contact for media representatives desiring information on the 
Metropolitan Medical Task Force and the City's participation in the Domestic 
Preparedness Program. 
7. OES developed FAQ and website fliers in conjunction with Outreach staff for 
distribution in the City Hall lobby and on the website. 
8. OES worked with partner agencies to review terrorism response capacity and security 
issues. Meetings were held with the staff of the County Health Department ro complete 
Standard Operating Procedures for bioterrorism response. A meeting with the Santa Clara 
Valley Water District included information regarding the high level of security of the 
potable water supply, and the inability to guarantee against a denial of service attack due 
to the long supply lines, including the aqueduct. Heightened security precautions include 
increased surveillance through cameras and personneL 
9. OES developed a packet of informational materials for the City staff meetings with the 
staff of Senator Barbara Boxer and Congressmember Zoe Lofgren. 
INTERMEDIATE STEPS: 
1. The CSA members recommend that the City establish a policy that all employees will 
wear their badges while at work and in City facilities. This will require that the City 
provide a photo identification badge to every City employee. Although badges are 
currently being issued to employees, there was period of about t1ve years in which such 
badges were not available. These current employees will need to have badges, as well as 
all new employees. Due to changes in appearance over time, badges should be re-issued 
every 10 years, or when the person's appearance no longer matches the badge closely 
· enough for security purposes. 
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2. The daily operation of City Hall should be altered immediately. All exterior doors should 
be locked, with panic hardware installed where it is needed, except for the two sets of 
doors into the lobby area: those from the C Lot and those from the Mission Street side. 
The City should consider employing uniformed security personnel as the lobby greeters. 
3. Every City department should establish a reception area, and all visitors should be 
admitted only through that point. All other doors to the department should be locked, 
with appropriate panic hardware installed where needed. 
4. The City should review the City Hall security plans and proposals that were developed in 
the mid-1990's. These plans were developed over a period of months with involvement 
by many City departments. The plans were not implemented due to the relatively high 
cost of some of the steps and the short time in which the City expected to occupy the 
building. A re-evaluation should be made now in light of future plans for the existing 
City Hall structures. and current employee concerns. Also, other city facilities should 
evaluate their security plans and proposals using the same criteria established for City 
HalL All City Departments should re-evaluate their Emergency Plans to assure that they 
are current and include specific direction on: 
• how employees are notified there is an emergency, 
• what action to take (evacuate building, etc.), 
• where to relocate, how accountability for employees will be maintained, and 
• who will make the decision on building re-entry or relocation for continuation of 
work. 
Guidance on these decisions may be found in the Department's existing Power Outage 
SOP's. 
5. Human Resources should prepare a new flier on services provided by the Employee 
Assistance Program, highlighting the availability of critical incident stress management. 
A cover memo should encourage City employees to seek assistance in dealing with their 
normal reactions to the abnormal events of the past few weeks. They might want to 
include a reference to the "After a Traumatic Event" and "Helping Chi ld.ren Cope With 
Trauma" information that is linked from the City's homepage. 
6. The City should establish a citywide policy regarding the admission of delivery personnel 
into City workspaces. The receiving party or representative should meet such persons at 
the department's public entrance. If delivery personnel need to be admitted to workspaces 
to make their deliveries a City staff member should accompany them. Parcels for 
unknown people, or people no longer working for the City, should not be accepted unless 
prior arrangements have been made by a departing employee. All such parcels should be 
returned to the sender for a better address. In genera), material intended for official City 
use should be addressed to the appropriate department position rather than a person, such 
as "OES Purchasing Representative." 
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7. All visitors into the workspaces of City Hall should be required to sign in with the 
appropriate deparunent receptionist and wear a visitor badge. The visitor should be 
escorted by the appropriate City staff member. 
I • lt,..U,...J..- • ....J 
8. Food preparation areas should have tighter security. Food service employees should wear 
a badge. Others should not be admitted. Supervising food preparation staff should 
carefully monitor deliveries. An extra emphasis on the prevention of food borne illness is 
also important. 
9. All intakes for the HV AC system should be secured with tamper proof wire mesh cages. 
Locks for these cages should be in the possession of a limited number of specified City 
personnel. All maintenance work on these facilities should be closely monitored by City 
employees. 
10. The City should develop a written policy on the reporting and disposition of 
unaccompanied packages or other our of place items. This policy should include 
notification of the supervisor for evaluation of the item, and of the Police for further 
management. This policy should be distributed to all employees as soon as possible and 
implemented immediately thereafter. 
11. The City should distribute the phone threat checklist to all employees every six months 
with their paychecks. 
12. Department heads should be encouraged to have the "Terrorism Awareness for Public 
Employees" class offered at times and locations that are convenient for their employees, 
especially those who are in critical facilities. OES currently offers this class monthly 
through the City's training catalog in the Civic Center. Additional classes at off-site 
locations could be added. 
13. All City departments, especially those whose facilities use hazardous materials, should 
evaluate their facilities and take appropriate steps to protect their facilities and materials, 
including developing or updating their disaster standard operating procedures. Personnel 
from this CSA are available to assist departments with all phases of such an evaluation. 
14. The City should develop a citywide security procedures handbook, and distribute it to all 
personnel. All staff members should be required to sign a statement that they have read 
and understood the contents. Human Resources should provide translations into 
appropriate languages, as needed, and assistance in reading and understanding the 
material for employees with limited literacy or limiting physical conditions. 
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LONGER TERM/RESOURCE INTENSIVE ACTIVITIES: 
I. The City should obtain an adequate community notification system. OES staff members 
have researched available options and systems in operation in Bay Area communities. A 
memo is being submitted with recommendations for research and selection of an 
appropriate type of community alerting and warning system. 
2. The GIS system should be developed to include layers needed for disaster response, 
including the location of all hazardous waste and hazardous materials permit holders, 
facilities using radiological material, and facilities using biological materials. Once this 
information is available it should become accessible to Police and Fire Dispatchers. A 
protocol should then be developed for the immediate reporting of any theft, burglary or 
break-ins that occur in these occupancies. 
3. IT should re-establish the redundant server in 855 N. San Pedro. As a protection against 
virus attack this server should only be part of the citywide network for a specified period 
each week to allow for the download of archival material. The use of this server should 
be enlarged to include all of the evolving vital records for the City. These would include 
at a minimum personnel/payroll records, EOC/OES plans and documents, Fire plans and 
critical response documents, Police plans and critical response documents, and other 
items deemed by the City Manager to be ''Vital Records" of the City. Each section of the 
vital records should be separately password protected, with access only for authorized 
users. 
4. The Employee Emergency Response Team should receive training on a regular basis. 
Their written plan should be reviewed and exercised at least annually, preferably in 
conjJ.ITICtion with the annual Civic Center evacuation drill. Each department head should 
be responsible to recruit the appropriate number of employees to staff the team needed in 
department controlled spaces, whether in City-owned or leased space. The City's Safety 
Officer should support this team. 
5. The design team for the new City Hall should re-evaluate the security features built into 
the new building. Access to non-public areas, security of food handling areas, security of 
the HV AC system components, and crime prevention through design features should be 
reviewed and strengthened where necessary. Members of this CSA are available to 
consult with the City architects and the security-consulting finn. 
6. The potential for cyber-terrorism needs to be considered in the design of all future IT 
projects. Redundancy and immediate access to protected data storage are critical in 
maintaining functionality during natural and technological disasters, as well as malicious 
interference events. Technologies such as removable hard drives and cloned data 
collections should be fully explored. 
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CONCLUSION: 
While it is impossible to guarantee perfect security in any location, or to protect against all 
possible emergency and disaster events, the CSA partner departments believe that these steps 
would lead to better protection for City employees, facilities and equipment against malicious 
interference, accident, or natural disaster. 





Hazardous materials users' letters 
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COUNCIL AGENDA: 10-16-01 
ITEM: XX 
Memorandum 
FROM: Frances Edwards-Winslow 
DATE: 10-9-01 
Date 
The City of San Jose has an emergency preparedness program based on the all-hazards model. In 
the early 1990's a risk analysis of San Jose showed that possible events included earthquakes and 
other natural disasters, hazardous materials accidents and other technological events, and 
multiple casualty incidents such as multiple vehicle accidents. Planning for rapid response to 
such events was begun. The City's Emergency Operations Plan was developed to comply with 
the State's Standardized Emergency Management System, and to provide a framework for 
responding to any type of disaster. At the countywide level a Multiple Casualty Incident Plan 
was developed that guided the evaluation and care of patients from the scene of an accident 
through their emergency medical transport to the receiving hospital. In addition, the County 
Health Department developed a Health and Medical Disaster Plan that focused on the delivery of 
medical care during any disaster event. This plan covers medical, mental health and 
environmental health issues. These plans were written, staff members were trained on the plans, 
and full-scale exercises were held to verify the functionality of the plans. 
In April1997 the City of San Jose was notified of its inclusion in the Federal government's 
Domestic Preparedness Program. The twenty-seven largest cities in the United States were 
provided with training by the Department of Defense and planning guidance by the Department 
of Health and Human Services. These two departments provided funding for the development of 
a cache of equipment and pharmaceuticals to support the care of victims of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) for the ftrst 12 hours after an attack. (Federal resources would begin to be 
delivered at that time.) Over 500 public safety personnel from San Jose and its mutual aid 
partners completed train-the-trainer courses on responding to a terrorist attack and caring for the 
victims of such an attack. San Jose's Metropolitan Medical Task Force (MMTF), made up of on-
duty City staff trained to respond to a terrorist event, completed its development phase in 
December 2000. The Department of Justice awarded two competitive grants to the San Jose 
MMTF for additional equipment. The City has received a total of $1.38 million from Federal 
sources for the planning, equipping and exercising of the MMTF. Exercises of the MMTF and its 
larger Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) are held regularly. The MMRS consists 
of medical care beyond the scene and partners with the County Health Department (medical and 
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mental health), the Medical Examiner/Coroner, the private emergency medical transportation 
service and the medical community, including hospitals, laboratories and private practitioners. 
ANALYSIS 
1. Although no community can be fully prepared for every possible expression of disaster, 
the City of San Jose has taken appropriate steps to evaluate the risks to the community, 
and to prepare to manage community needs growing from them. 
2. Mitigation is an important part of emergency preparedness. The City had an aggressive 
program in the early 1990's to eliminate unreinforced masonry buildings from the 
community because they are an earthquake hazard. Under the leadership of the Building 
Division this program is coming to a successful conclusion. More recently, the Office of 
Emergency Services and the Housing Department have partnered to develop a series of 
publications to assist multiple-family building owners to evaluate the safety of their 
buildings, and guidance to increase the safety of those buildings. 
3. San Jose has a variety of land use regulations and ordinances to prevent the construction 
of new buildings in t1ood plains or on steep slopes. Strict enforcement of the Uniform 
Building Code results in a building stock that has resistance to seismic forces and wind 
damage, and that has acceptable functionality in all plumbing, mechanical and electrical 
systems. 
4. Strict enforcement of the Fire Code results in buildings that are Jess likely to catch fire. 
Inclusion of smoke detectors provides the chance for escape if a fire should start 
accidentally. The use of proper buildings materials and appropriate setbacks minimizes 
the likelihood of conflagration. The County Fire Marshal's Office enforces weed 
abatement regulations to lessen the chance of the spread of wHdland fires. Street design 
and construction ensures access for emergency vehicles throughout the community. 
5. The maintenance .of storm drains minimizes the likelihood of localized t1ooding in the 
community. The Santa Clara Valley Water District, the county's flood control agency, 
develops waterway improvement projects to mitigate the potential for flooding. Land use 
regulations require that new developments plan for the appropriate management of mn-
off. The conscientious application of mitigation steps to flood control has earned the City 
of San Jose a 7 rating in the National Flood Insurance Program, resulting in savings for 
flood insurance holders, as well as lessening the likelihood of flooding in the community. 
6. There are many industries in our community that use hazardous materials. These facilities 
are governed by local, Stare and Federal laws that are designed to protect both the 
residents and the environment from an accident or spill. Annual inspections by various 
governmental agencies ensure that laws relating to both use and storage of hazardous 
materials are enforced. Hazardous materials transportation and hazardous waste 
transportation are governed by similar laws, which are enforced by the Federal 
Department of Transportation. 
7. Disease control is the responsibility of the County and State Public Health Departments. 
Disease survemance and disease reporting systems provide earJy warnings of a disease 
outbreak in a community. The Public Health Officer can begin aggressive treatment of 
infectious diseases immediately based on these systems. The California Public Health 
Department Laboratory in Berkeley, California is the only laboratory outside of the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta that can diagnose a variety of 
infectious diseases, including weaponized diseases that might be used by terrorists. The 
proximity of this lab to San Jose would enable our community to receive rapid response 
to a need for diagnostic lab work. 
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8. Public safety personnel in the City have received training in responding to a potential 
Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) event. Regular exercises and refresher training help 
them to maintain their skills, which can all be applied to accidental or naturally occurring 
disaster events. 
9. Members of the Radio Amateurs in Civil Emergency Service (RACES) have received 
training in supporting San Jose's first responders in the field during WMD events. They 
regularly participate in field exercises of the MMTF. 
10. Skills and equipment acquired as part of the Domestic Preparedness Program have 
proven useful in non-terrorist event~. The robot has been used for scene surveillance at 
two suicides and at several events where explosives may have been present. The triage 
tarps speeded patient care at the accident between the Coca Cola truck and the Amtrak 
train several years ago. The skills for scene management and patient care developed 
through the Domestic Preparedness Program aided in the effective management of the 
pepper spray incident at K-Mart, Montgomery Wards and Walgreen's in December, 
2000. 
PUBLIC OUTREACH 
Information on emergency preparedness is available on the City's website, with links from the 
homepage and materials on the Office of Emergency Services page. Talks on ''Terrotism 
Awareness for the Public" are provided by Office of Emergency Services staff to community 
groups on request. Presentations on San Jose Prepared! are offered regularly at community, 
school and religious groups. Public educations materials on all phases of emergency 
preparedness are distributed through the library branches and community centers in languages 
appropriate to each neighborhood, and at Council District events and other public events. The 
Public Safety CSA departments partner to distribute educational materials on public safety at a 
variety of events, including Fire Prevention Week and community fairs. 
COORDINATION 
This memo was coordinated with the Police Department and the Fire Department. 
Frances Edwards-Winslow 
Director, Office of Emergency Services 
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City of San Jose Office of Emergency Services 
What You Need to Know About the Threat of Terrorism 
Frequently Asked Questions 
Introduction 
At this time, authorities are not aware of any credible terrorism threat to the Bay Area. Residents and 
businesses should try to maintain normal activities and lessen their anxiety through obtaining 
accurate information. Many questions are currently being asked by San Jose residents. Here are the 
answers to the most commonly asked questions. 
Q. What should I do about terrorism? 
Heightened awareness of your surroundings is your best behavior change. In the work place, parcels, 
boxes, or other items that are out of place should be reported to a supervisor immediately, who should 
then evaluate and report to Security or the Police. People who don't belong should be challenged, and 
Security should be called to have them either properly identified or removed. Badging should be 
taken seriously. Food preparation and HV AC areas should be closely monirored. General building 
security should be heightened- keep doors locked, pay attention to people's ID when they sign in, 
badge everyone! 
At home, maintain the same kind of heightened awareness of people and packages in your 
neighborhood. Call the Police if you see a person, parcel or event that does not seem right to you. 
Maintain your emergency preparedness plan for your family. Have an· out of state contact number so 
family members can exchange information after a disaster when the local phones may not be able to 
receive calls. Have a family reunification point in addition to your home. If there were a natural 
disaster such as a flood or wildland fire you might not be able to go home right away. Select a 
location with a parking lot and some landmarks and establish a spot where your family will meet. 
Develop an emergency response kit for each family member. A downloadable flier is available at 
www.ci.san-jose.ca ... usloes/oes.hlJP.. Develop a shelter-in-place kit, in case there is a chemical release or 
smoky fire in your area. A downloadable brochure on sheltering in place is available at the link listed 
above. 
Q. Should I buy a gas mask for each of my family members? 
No. "Gas masks" filter air through canisters that are generally designed to neutralize one chemical. 
Therefore, without knowing what chemical could be involved, you would have no idea which filter to 
purchase. Second, gas masks require extra respiratory effort. When this equipment is assigned to 
emergency response personnel they are first given a respiratory rest to ensure that they are able to use 
them safely. Third, to be effective the mask must have a tight seal around the face. To ensure this 
correct fit, you must be fitted by someone skilled in this. 
Finally, masks have to be used properly to be sate. During the Gulf War the government issued gas 
masks to residents in areas of Israel where SCUD missles were landing. People who did not follow 
http://www .ci.san-jose.ca.us/oes/terror_faq.htm 10/9/01 
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the mask directions died from improper use of the masks, even though no gas was ever deployed. The 
Israeli experience suggests that more people get hurt using the gas mask improperly than would be 
hurt in an attack. 
a. What medications should I stockpile for myself and my children? 
None. Medications cannot be safely stockpiled. They have to be prescribed for a specific disease to be 
effective. Overuse of antibiotics leads to the mutation of pathogenic organisms, and they become 
resistant to antobiotic therapy. The dosage of any medication musr be selected for the individual 
patient. Age and physical size are important considerations for physicians when they select a 
medication and dosage for a patient. 
Physicians must also consider pre-existing medical conditions in the patient, and possible drug 
interactions that would be harmful to the patient. Finally, all medications have to be properly stored 
to maintain potency. Most medications can only be safely stored in home conditionsoffluctuating 
temperatures and humidity for short periods of time. This is one reason why medications are 
prescribed in the exact amount required to cure a specific disease. 
Furthermore, the Federal government has developed stockpiles of the medications that might be 
needed in the event of a terrorist attack on a community. These stockpiles are stored at locations 
throughout the United States. They can be delivered to an affected community within 12 hours to 
reinforce the existing local supplies available under nonnal circumstances in pharmacies and 
hospitals. A larger supply chain is also in place to enable appropriate dosages to be provided to 
victims. 
a. Should I store iodine tablets for my family? 
No. Some European countries with old-style nuclear reactors have issued potassium iodine (Kl) 
tablets to residents who are downwind of their facilities. This was done in reaction to the Chemobyl 
nuclear accident, where there was a known potential source for radioactive release under accidental 
conditions. Such conditions do not exist in our community. There is no need to store KI at home. In 
the unlikely evenr it were needed, supplies would be made available rapidly enough to protect the 
thyroid. 
Still have questions? Visit some of the disaster infonnation links available on our Disaster_and 
Emergency Management Information web page or call the City of San Jose Office of Emergency 
Services at 408~277-4595 from 8 am through 5 pm Monday through Friday, excluding holidays. 
10/9/01 
TOTAL P.13 
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Statement by Washington Hospital at the Transportation Committee Hearing 
November 20, 2001 
Presented by Kris LaVoy, Chief of Professional Resources. 
Washington Hospital is 308 bed District Hospital located in Fremont. 
Hospitals have 2 goals related to disaster: 
Protect our facilities and staff. 
Be prepared to accept potential victims . 
Washington Hospital is preparing on both fronts: 
SECURITY 
• Have a comprehensive security program. 
• Controlled access, camera surveillance of all entrances. 
• Completed securing critical systems- water, air handlers, medical gases. 
• Process of installing stanchions and bollards both permanent and removable (approx. cost 
$180,000.00 to protect buildings and control access. 
• Considering upgrade of air handling systems in other buildings on campus to allow use of 
these buildings to care for victims -expensive! (approx cost $750,000- $1,000,000). 
PREPAREDNESS 
• Washington Hospital has an effective Emergency Operations Plan. 
• Hospitals maintain a system of redundancies- generators, food and H20, supplies (AHA 
recently recommended, self sufficiency for 24-48 hours). 
• Washington Hospital has an outdoor shower facility- 4 victims with mechanism to 
contain H20. 
• Completed preparation for Anthrax- supplies, equipment and pharmaceuticals (cost 
$70,000). 
• In process of upgrading staff protective equipment for variety of agents - both biological 
and chemical ( approx. cost $1 0,000). 
• In process of working through the implications of other agents- that includes diagnosis, 
treatment, including drug therapy. 
For example- victims of botulism may require 6-8 weeks of ventilatory support- a 
ventilator costs $75,000. 
• Both a challenge and an ongoing cost- education of staff and physicians. Many MD's 
currently practicing have never seen these conditions! 
• Recently had discussions regarding function vs location. For example: can the "ED" 
function be provided in other physical locations if our dedicated ED were unavailable due 
to contamination or disaster? 
Who do we collaborate with: 
• Participate in several County EMS Committees. 
• Communicate with and "drill" with cities within our District, Fremont, Union 
City, Newark. 
What we need: 
• Funding to support security and preparedness expenses that are clearly earmarked 
for Hospitals. 
• A system of equipment and supplies to back-up local hospitals- if we could 
depend on this - we might prevent over-reaction, over-preparation. 
• Enhancement of our public health system. 
• Public education that is clear and consistent. 
• Finally, as you consider funding and legislation- remember that if there is 
another terrorist attack- hospitals are one of the places that the public will go, for 
information, for comfort and for care. 
In response to the comments made by Vic Valdes ofthe Fremont Fire Department: 
Washington Hospital is equipped to decontaminate patients. On the day of the specific 
situation discussed during the hearing, Washington Hospital was ready and waiting to 
accept victims. The decision not to bring victims to Washington Hospital was made by 
the EMS system not by Washington Hospital. 
Fire Departments have years of experience in hazardous materials, protective equipment 
and decontamination. Washington Hospital would hope to get additional support and 
ongoing training from the Fremont Fire Department. My hope would be that we could 
work together in a collegial environment for the betterment of the community 
Respectfully Submitted 
Kristine LaVoy, R.N., 
Chief of Professional Resources 
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